Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE74349
2009-07-16 20:53:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

EFFORT BY RUSSIAN FIRM TO PROCURE TURNTABLE ON

Tags:  MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA RS IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0016
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #4349 1972108
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 162053Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T STATE 074349 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2034
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA RS IR
SUBJECT: EFFORT BY RUSSIAN FIRM TO PROCURE TURNTABLE ON
BEHALF OF IRAN ENTITY (S)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASON: 1.4 (C).

S E C R E T STATE 074349 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2034 TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA RS IR SUBJECT: EFFORT BY RUSSIAN FIRM TO PROCURE TURNTABLE ON BEHALF OF IRAN ENTITY (S) Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASON: 1.4 (C). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Moscow, please see paragraph 3. ¶2. (S) Background: The United States has information that as of February 2009, the Russian firm Crystaltechno Ltd. was working to procure a German-origin, single-axis turntable on behalf of Iran's Malek-Ashtar University of Technology. Although not controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),the single-axis turntable could be used to test gyroscopes and micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) sensors used in missile guidance and navigation systems. Since Malek-Ashtar is subordinate to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL),we are concerned this equipment may be intended to support missile- or military-related projects in Iran. In addition, we understand that Crystaltechno has engaged in extensive business dealings with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and a number of MODAFL-affiliated entities in Iran and routinely uses intermediaries in UAE and Armenia to facilitate its sales to Iran and avoid Russia's export control restrictions. We believe Crystlatechno ma y attempt to use similar shipping methods to supply this guidance and navigation testing equipment to Malek Ashtar University of Technology. We want to ask Russian authorities to investigate this activity and urge them to take measures to prevent Iran from using Russia as a source of proliferation-sensitive goods and technologies. ¶3. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Moscow approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. ¶4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET//REL RUSSIA) -- We would like to alert you to a matter of potential proliferation concern and request your assistance in investigating this activity. -- The United States has information that in February 2009, the Russian firm Crystaltechno Ltd. was working to procure a single-axis turntable produced by the German firm Imar Navigation. -- We are bringing this matter to your attention because we believe Crystaltechno may be seeking this equipment on behalf of Iran's Malek-Ashtar University of Technology. -- Malek-Ashtar University of Technology is subordinate to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and we are concerned this equipment may be intended to support missile- or military-related projects in Iran. -- The single-axis turntable, although not controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),could be used to test gyroscopes and micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) sensors used in missile guidance and navigation systems. -- We understand that Crystaltechno has engaged in extensive business dealings with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and a number of MODAFL-affiliated entities in Iran and routinely uses intermediaries in UAE and Armenia to facilitate its sales to Iran and avoid Russia's export control restrictions. --We believe that Crystaltechno may attempt to use similar shipping methods to supply this guidance and navigation equipment to Malek Ashtar University of Technology. --We therefore urge you to investigate this activity and take measures to ensure that Iran is unable to use Russian firms as a source for proliferation-sensitive goods and technologies. --We look forward to future cooperation on nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this information. End talking points/non-paper ¶5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR Mike Kennedy (Phone: 202-647-3176). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and EUR/RUS ¶6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -