Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE71261
2009-07-09 20:03:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

SHIELD S15-09: SYRIA SEEKING CONTROLLED CW

Tags:  PARM PREL ETTC CH SY 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #1261 1902018
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 092003Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 071261 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC CH SY
SUBJECT: SHIELD S15-09: SYRIA SEEKING CONTROLLED CW
PRECURSOR FROM CHINA

Classified By: John Norris, DAS, EAP/FO
Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)

S E C R E T STATE 071261 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2034 TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC CH SY SUBJECT: SHIELD S15-09: SYRIA SEEKING CONTROLLED CW PRECURSOR FROM CHINA Classified By: John Norris, DAS, EAP/FO Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 4. ¶2. (S//NF) BACKGROUND: The United States has obtained information that indicates Syria is seeking to purchase a large quantity of pinacolyl alcohol from Chinese entities. Pinacolyl alcohol is a Schedule 2B chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and precursor for the chemical weapons agent Soman. It is not produced in large quantities for commercial purposes and CWC States Parties cannot transfer it to countries outside of the convention. The CWC requires States Parties to declare chemical plants that produce more than 1 ton of Schedule 2B on an annual basis. We would like the Chinese government to investigate whether any potential Chinese suppliers of pinacolyl alcohol received commercial inquiries from Syria. ¶3. (S//NF) BACKROUND CONT'D: We would also like to remind the Chinese government that if transfers of pinacolyl alcohol do occur, we would be obliged to report them to Congress. Any Chinese entities involved may be subject to sanctions, pursuant to provisions of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). END BACKGROUND ¶4. (U) ACTION REQUEST: The Department requests that Post deliver the points in paragraph 5 to appropriate host government officials and report a response. The points may be left as a nonpaper. END ACTION REQUEST. ¶5. (U) Begin talking points/nonpaper: (SECRET//REL CHINA) -- In the spirit of our cooperation in preventing proliferation, we would like to raise a matter of chemical warfare (CW) proliferation concern and request the Chinese government's assistance in investigating this activity. -- We have information that Syria is seeking to purchase a large quantity of pinacolyl alcohol from China. -- Pinacolyl alcohol is controlled by the Australia Group and is also a Schedule 2B chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),as it is a precursor for the chemical warfare agent Soman. -- We believe that Yongyi Chemicals Group Company and Qingdao Hong Jin Trading Company are potential suppliers for this commodity. We would appreciate China querying whether Yongi Chemicals Group Company, Qingdao Hong Jin Trading Company, or any other Chinese companies that produce this commodity have been contacted by Syrian organizations for the supply of pinacolyl alcohol. -- The listed address of Yongyi Chemicals Group Company is Jincheng Building 1508, No.368, Hanjiang Road, Changzhou, Jiangsu Province. The listed address of Qingdao Hong Jin Trading Company is Room 404, 2nd Building 8 Shangqing Road, Qingdao, Shandong Province. -- We are concerned that the chemical in question is intended for, or could be diverted to, Syria's CW program. -- As you are also aware, the CWC prohibits transfers of Schedule 2B chemicals to States Not Party to the CWC, such as Syria. -- We therefore request that the Chinese government take all steps necessary to investigate this matter and to prevent Syria from acquiring dual-use materials that could be used in its CW program. -- We look forward to the Chinese government sharing with us the results of its investigation into this matter. End talking points/nonpaper. 6: (U) Additional Talking Points: (SECRET//REL CHINA) -- We want to reiterate that the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) requires us to provide periodic reports to the U.S. Congress identifying persons (including individuals and entities) who have transferred to, or acquired from, North Korea, Syria and Iran certain items of proliferation concern, including items that are on the the Australia Group's lists. -- Under INKSNA, sanctions also may be imposed against persons identified in such reports. End additional talking point. ¶7. (S//NF) Please begin all responses with SHIELD S15-09 and slug for ISN. ¶8. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. CLINTON

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