GUIDANCE: LEBANON 1701 CONSULTATIONS, JULY 8

UNCLAS STATE 069808 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: UNSC PREL IS SY LE SUBJECT: GUIDANCE: LEBANON 1701 CONSULTATIONS, JULY 8 ¶1. (SBU) This is an action message. USUN is authorized to draw from the points in para 2 below as a basis for its participation in Security Council consultations on the Secretary-General's report on implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 (Lebanon) scheduled for July 8, 2009, and for its public statements on the consultation. ¶2. (U) Begin points: Thank you to Special Coordinator Williams and to Assistant Secretary-General Mulet for your briefings. This report, which we welcome, comes at an auspicious time. One month ago yesterday, the Lebanese state once again affirmed its independence in an electoral process that clearly represented the will of the Lebanese people. We look forward to working with the new Lebanese government and continuing to support Lebanese state institutions, such as the Lebanese Armed Forces. It is our hope that the cabinet selection process continues to be conducted in the atmosphere of peace that marked the parliamentary elections and that the process will also be free of foreign interference. The shape of Lebanon,s next cabinet is for the Lebanese alone to decide. These clear gains for Lebanon are amplified by the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Syria, but, as the Secretary General,s report indicates, there is much work outstanding before we can state that we have achieved full implementation of resolution 1701. Today I,d like to address four issues, which are, to a degree, interrelated: control of the border, arms smuggling, armed militias, and Blue Line violations. First, despite the best efforts of Lebanon,s Common Border Force, whose additional planned deployment in the East is lauded by the Secretary General, the territorial integrity of Lebanon cannot be guaranteed without a clear delineation and demarcation of the common Lebanese-Syrian border, including in the Sheba,a farms area. The Lebanese government has reiterated that its half of the Joint Border Committee stands ready to begin constructive work, and the Syrian government has indicated that it is in contact with the Lebanese government with the aim of convening a meeting of that body. When meeting U.S. officials in Damascus in early March, Syrian officials estimated that joint work would begin by early May. However, the first meeting has not yet occurred. The repeated delays in beginning this crucial work lead us to ask: what should be the role of the Security Council in facilitating improved security along the Lebanese-Syria border and, in particular, in promoting the urgent and necessary tasks of delineation and demarcation? Given the delays to date, we would suggest that this is a serious issue for further discussion and that Council members should consider using their influence to speed this process through bilateral discussions with the parties involved. I also note that the Secretary General reports that the Common Border Force is arresting an increasing number of commercial smugglers. We commend this as a sign of both increased efficiency and dedication among the agencies involved. But what can we do to further improve the efficiency and success rate of this Force, and to ensure that it fulfills its primary goal of preventing the smuggling of weapons into Lebanon? Should we consider coordinated provision of technical assistance and aid to the Lebanese Common Border Force, much as the international community, the United States included, has provided to build the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces and other Lebanese state institutions? Has the time come to discuss a civilian monitoring mission sponsored by this Council? Additional measures should be considered, as, disappointingly, not a single incident of weapons smuggling has been discovered to date. By Hizballah,s own admission, active arms smuggling is occurring across the Syrian border into Lebanon. If Hizballah is rearming, as Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qussem asserted in a speech on June 4th, then the arms it is obtaining must by definition be crossing the Lebanese frontier in clear violation of resolution 1701. Arms in the possession of Hizballah, and Palestinian rejectionist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ) General Command and Fatah al-Intifada, pose, according to the Secretary General, a threat to Lebanon,s security and the stability of the region. Hizballah,s arms clearly violate resolutions 1559 and 1701 and, in the words of the Secretary General, &pose a serious challenge to the ability of the Lebanese State to exercise full sovereignty over its territory.8 I would note that these arms also pose a danger to regional stability. As described in the report, Hizballah,s Deputy Secretary-General has admitted that it has provided, via its cells in Egypt, &every type of support to Palestinian groups in Gaza, including military assistance over a long period,8 an unwarranted and illegal interference in Egypt,s political affairs. How can Hizballah purport to defend the sovereignty of Lebanon at the same time as it violates the sovereignty of other Arab states? The Secretary General suggests that the issue of militia arms be resolved through a domestic Lebanese process, but that process must ultimately result in Hizballah submitting to the authority of the Lebanese government and converting itself into a solely political entity. Moreover, this issue cannot be solely the concern of the Lebanese government, as Hizballah receives political and material backing from foreign states, especially Syria and Iran. At the same time, we must work to address the outstanding political challenges that Hizballah has seized upon to justify its weapons, including the unresolved Sheba,a farms dispute, which requires but a signed map from Syria to affirm its stated position that Sheba,a is Lebanese territory, as well as Israeli Blue Line violations ) my final point. We must ask ourselves how we can work together to reassure the Government of Israel that its northern border and nearby citizens are secure, as well as how we might best ensure disarmament of Lebanese militias. Until we can answer these questions, Israel has said it will persist with its reconnaissance over-flights of Lebanon. While we recognize those over-flights as violations of the Blue Line, we also understand Israel,s justification for them: this Council has not ensured that Lebanon has secured it borders in order to prevent the entry of illegal arms or related materiel. In short, Hizballah has intentionally created the threat that leads to these Blue Line violations. In addition to my previous suggestions on the role the international community can play in helping Lebanon secure, delineate, and demarcate its border, we would also do well to continue to robustly support UNIFIL,s mandate as laid out in resolution 1701. We should also continue to urge Israel to take further steps toward the implementation of resolution 1701, including by withdrawing from northern Ghajar village. We think Israel,s sharing of technical strike data on cluster munitions is an excellent step toward building confidence in the region and would hope that the spirit in which it was offered might be reciprocated by other parties. We also note that the trilateral meetings at Naqoura have provided an excellent basis for bilateral military cooperation, and are handling increasingly complex issues of mutual concern. We encourage the parties to address all outstanding provisions of resolution 1701 in an equally collegial and productive manner. We ask these questions because all of us here have shown our interest in and commitment to solving the perplexing, but critical problem of how to best achieve full implementation of resolution 1701, which the United States views as essential to a free and independent Lebanon, secure in both its territory and in its exercise of full national sovereignty. We applaud the work of the Secretary General and his representatives in Lebanon, and pledge our support to their efforts to further the implementation of resolution ¶1701. We would ask both Lebanon and Israel, as well as Syria, Iran and other regional states with a stake in this resolution, to do the same. End Elements. CLINTON