START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T STATE 067127 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2019 TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II): JUNE 24 2009, MEETING REF: A. GENEVA 521 (SFO-GVA-II-004) ¶B. MOSCOW 01664 ¶C. GENEVA 515 (SFO-GVA-II-008) Classified By: A/S Rose Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reason: 1.5(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-005. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: June 24, 2009 Time: 11:00 A.M. ) 12:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The third meeting of the third session of the START Follow-on negotiations focused on receiving the Russian Delegation comments on the U.S. Delegation proposed draft of the merged Joint Understanding that had been tabled on Tuesday, June 23, 2009 (Ref A). ¶4. (S) The Russian delegation noted that the revised U.S. Delegation proposal attempted to meet the Russians half way. The Russian delegation added, however, that while it could accept many of the U.S. Delegation proposed changes, the U.S. proposal did not go far enough. ¶5. (S) First, the Russian Delegation stated that the future treaty should not be limited to only the elements in the Joint Understanding, and proposed to add &inter alia8 to the chapeau. Second, Russia could not agree to the ¬ to exceed8 numbers of SNDVs (1100, proposed by the U.S.) and ODSNW (1675, proposed by Russia) in the U.S. draft. For Russia, the two numbers were interrelated and one Russian-proposed number could not be used without including the other Russian-proposed number (500 delivery vehicles). The Russian Delegation said that the ceilings for strategic delivery vehicles and their associated warheads would have to be agreed upon later. Third, the Russian Delegation stated that it was premature to describe counting approaches under the new treaty. Fourth, Russia still sought language stipulating a ban on the deployment of conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, and suggested adding a phrase that notes such missiles &could impact strategic stability.8 The Russian delegation noted that this was a particularly important point for Russia and that if the U.S. could not address its concerns in this area, there could be no treaty. ¶6. (S) The U.S. Delegation responded that there could be alternative ways to resolve Russia,s concerns on conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, including additional verification and transparency measures, adding that the U.S. had no current plans to actually deploy such missiles, but that, even though Russia was not an enemy, the U.S. had to prepare for future threats from others. The Russian Delegation also proposed changes to the closing section that would not commit the Parties to negotiations on further reductions in SOAs after the SFO treaty is concluded. The U.S. Delegation closed by reminding the Russian Delegation that President Obama expected to have a substantive statement to sign in Moscow. END SUMMARY. -------------- Foreign Minister Lavrov,s Speech to the OSCE -------------- ¶7. (S) Gottemoeller welcomed the Russian Delegation to the U.S. mission by noting that she had read with interest the speech delivered by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov to the OSCE in Vienna the previous day, especially his points regarding European arms control. She said that it would be interesting for our delegations to discuss this issue, but if we were to do so, we would be here until tomorrow morning. Gottemoeller said that she had noted with special interest Lavrov,s reference to Immanuel Kant,s Principle of Categorical Imperative, i.e., &we should always treat others in the way we expect them to treat us.8 Gottemoeller said that Lavrov had paraphrased Kant,s principle by stating that &no country should strengthen its own security at the expense of others.8 Gottemoeller said that Lavrov,s quote was particularly useful in the context of our work in the START Follow-on negotiations. She closed by complementing FM Lavrov on this speech and looked forward to continued dialogue on European security issues. ¶8. (S) Antonov thanked Gottemoeller for her remarks and said that he had also read the media reports on the speech, stating that he took particular note of Lavrov,s use of the term &indivisibility of security.8 He also said that it is too bad that we do not have time to discuss its meaning today; however, he agreed with Gottemoeller that it was an important issue in the context of our negotiations. Noting that what he was about to say was &off-the-record,8 Antonov said that it was hectic working in his department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) because of its &crazy workload.8 He also said that he was jealous that the some in the MFA had time to research quotes by Kant for use by the Foreign Minister. He went on to say his office in the MFA is usually criticized that its talking points were &too dry and formal.8 Nevertheless, the concept of &indivisibility of security8 was developed in his office without the help of Kant. -------------- Russian Comments on U.S. Non-Paper on the Joint Understanding -------------- ¶9. (S) Antonov said that he was prepared to share Russian Delegation views on the revised U.S. delegation proposal that was handed over at the previous meeting (Ref A). He said that the Russian Delegation had worked hard since yesterday to find common ground with the U.S. proposals contained in that paper. He appreciated the U.S. attempt to try to resolve differences in the document so that it would be ready for signing at the U.S.-Russian Summit. He said that the Russian Delegation had come up with some proposals that would meet the U.S. Delegation half way. He said that these Russian counter-proposals would help to narrow the differences in the draft Joint Understanding. Before describing the Russian views, he stated that the Joint Understanding would serve as a framework for our future work, but it does not mean that the new START Follow)on Treaty would only be limited to the provisions contained in the Joint Understanding. Antonov made the following points that reflect the Russian Delegation comments: - First point: In the last sentence of the introductory paragraph, add the words &among others,8 so that the sentence would read: &The new Treaty will contain the following elements, among others:8 - Second point: In paragraph 1, the most critical problem the Russian Delegation has is with the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles contained in the U.S. Delegation proposal. Antonov said that he noticed that the U.S. Delegation had only preserved the number of nuclear warheads from Russia,s version. He said that it was unacceptable to have the Joint Understanding only refer to one number because the two sets of numbers (for warheads and delivery vehicles) were interrelated. Antonov went on to say that while the Russian Delegation listened closely to the U.S. side,s explanations for why the U.S. had proposed 1100 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and they understood that U.S. and Russian forces were structured differently, this issue could not be resolved either today or tomorrow. He said that resolving this issue will be the most important task for our future negotiations, and he is not quite sure how we should deal with it. Therefore, since Russia could not accept the U.S. Delegation-proposed deletion of the number &5008 for strategic delivery vehicles, he proposed that both numbers be deleted from the Joint Understanding. Antonov then read the following Russian-proposed text for paragraph 1: &1. A provision to the effect that each Party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms, so that seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and their associated warheads do not exceed levels to be agreed upon.8 - Third point: Antonov said that since the key issue in our negotiations is how the sides should account for delivery vehicles and warheads and we would not be able to agree what those future counting rules will be before the July Summit, he suggested that we shorten the U.S. Delegation-proposed text in paragraph 2 as follows: &2. Provisions for calculating these limits.8 - Fourth point: Antonov said that the U.S. explanations provided in Moscow during the previous session (Ref B) regarding the issue of counting converted ICBMs and SLBMs against the Treaty,s strategic delivery vehicle limit was understood but the U.S. position that newly-developed ICBMs and SLBMs configured with non-nuclear warheads would not count against that limit only served to aggravate Russia,s concerns on the issue. He argued newly-developed conventional ICBMs or SLBMs should be considered strategic offensive arms and count against the Treaty,s strategic delivery vehicle limit. He said that not counting these ICBMs and SLBMs would negatively affect strategic stability and could lead to serious consequences for Russia,s security. Therefore, Antonov said that for the wording in this paragraph, the Russian Delegation went back to President Medvedev,s June 20 remarks in Amsterdam, while taking into account Lavrov,s comment about strengthening the security of one country at the expense of others. He then read the following Russian Delegation proposal for paragraph 6. &6. Provisions on non-deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration and their impact on strategic stability.8 - Fifth point: Antonov said that with regard to the last paragraph on future negotiations, he suggested that the sides should draw from the April 1, 2009, Joint Statement for the language. He proposed the following text: &The two Presidents have also directed that following conclusion of the treaty, the discussion of the prospects for effectively verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms will continue in a step-by-step process.8 ¶10. (S) In conclusion, Antonov said that the Russian Delegation agreed to the U.S. text in all of the other paragraphs in the U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding; these proposals reflected the maximum flexibility the Russian Delegation could offer at this point. All of these proposed changes would still have to get approval from Moscow. He said that his delegation had the courage to take the initiative to offer these counter-proposals, and he expressed the hope that Washington would look favorably upon these proposals as well. Russia, too, wants to move the process forward on concluding the Joint Understanding. He then provided a Russian paper, dated June 24, 2009, containing the language he had proposed. The text of that paper will be provided septel (Ref C). -------------- U.S. DELEGATION COMMENTS ON THE RUSSIAN PAPER -------------- ¶11. (S) Gottemoeller thanked the Russian Delegation for its work in responding quickly to the U.S. non-paper on the Joint Understanding. She remarked that it is odd that the Russian Delegation was not ready to accept the U.S. formulation in paragraph 1 for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and strategic nuclear warheads: the formulation for the language on strategic nuclear warheads was drawn directly from a Russian-proposed definition that had been provided during the initial meeting of the Bilateral Implementation Commission in April 2004. It was unfortunate that Russia could not accept it now. ¶12. (S) Antonov said that Russia was not prepared to discuss the details of counting rules at this point and that it was better if the sides could agree to a simple formulation for the Joint Understanding while retaining &constructive ambiguity.8 He said that, of course, Russia is always willing to listen, but the sides should be discussing such important details in a quiet atmosphere without the pressures of the Moscow Summit in our immediate future. Gottemoeller responded by saying that the U.S. needed to have a clear idea of what we are counting in order to narrow the scope of the numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles. Antonov said that he fully agreed, but he just could not do it now. ¶13. (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov to provide more clarity on why Russia would want to remove the U.S.-proposed language that the counting rules were drawn from START and the Moscow Treaty. Antonov replied that the sides have not agreed on what the counting rules would be and in fact the Russian side did not have its own views yet on this issue and was open to all options, in order to work on mutually acceptable formulations. He went on to state that the U.S. explanations on counting rules have not clarified the issue for Russia. References to START and the Moscow Treaty, as applicable, are ambiguous. Russia wants language that is clear, especially for such an important issue as calculating limits under the Treaty, and it was too early to decide what this would be. ¶14. (S) Regarding paragraph 6 on non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs, Warner asked if the Russia,s use of the term &non-deployment of8 meant the same thing as a &ban8 from Russia,s previous text. (Begin Comment: Koshelev, Antonov,s deputy said &yes8 in a side remark, but Antonov did not develop the point. End Comment) Antonov said that the Russian Delegation was not looking at ways to conceal the Russian position in the Joint Understanding of a ban on non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs: the sides had already had that discussion and the Russian side had not yet received convincing arguments from the U.S. side. He said that is why they added the phrase &and their impact on strategic stability8 to the paragraph. Antonov went on to say that this may not be the best wording for that paragraph, he was simply looking at ways that might help to resolve if for the Joint Understanding. He said that the sides had been discussing this key issue for the last three rounds, and that Russia position on this issue was set forth by the Russian President in Helsinki. He said that he was trying to tell the U.S. that this is a very serious issue for Russia. Furthermore, as the Russian President had said in his Helsinki speech, if this issue is not resolved, there would be no Treaty. ¶15. (S) Gottemoeller said that Antonov,s message had been received loud and clear. She underscored that there were different ways to find solutions. She said that a ban on deployment of non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs is one way, finding solutions that would increase Russian confidence on future deployments of such systems could be another. She suggested that the sides need to remain open to all possible solutions, in particular, developing transparency and verification measures regarding deployments on non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs. She said that these types of solutions will require more substantive discussion and will not be resolved during this round. ¶16. (S) Elliott said that he would like to comment on the term &non-deployment8 from paragraph 6 (non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs). Regarding the earlier points Antonov had made on how non-nuclear ICBMS and SLBMs impact Russia,s strategic security, he said that the U.S. does not see Russia as an enemy. While the U.S. is still unsure of whether such systems will be deployed in the future, including a prohibition of deploying such systems in a treaty would preclude the U.S. from ensuring its own strategic security. He said he offered this as a way to help the Russian Delegation understand the U.S. point of view on this issue. The U.S. understands Russia,s concerns and the U.S. needs to increase Russia,s comfort levels regarding deployment of such systems. ¶17. (S) Antonov said that it was a pleasure to hear the words from Elliott that the U.S. and Russia are not enemies. However, he said, words must be reflected in deeds. It was his view that it should not be the case that in some respects we are enemies, and in other respects we are not. He said that each time he saw critical situations where U.S. steps undermine Russia,s security, he asked himself, are we friends or are we enemies? He went on to say that such situations include discussions in the Australia Group, concerning the proliferation of BW and CW, where the question arises, just whom are the CIA and FBI fighting against? With regard to the flank issue under the CFE Treaty, Russia has explained its needs many times and the U.S. is always against it, even though it poses no threat to the United States. With regard to missile defense issues, deployments of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Czech Republic and Poland posed serious threats to Russia,s security. Furthermore, the current NATO enlargement is undermining Russia,s security, yet the U.S. continues to support it even as we tell you that it undermines our security. He said that with all of these issues in mind, he asks the question again, are we enemies or are we not enemies. He said this is why Russia is concerned regarding the deployment of non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs: the potential that you are building could be used at a particular time against Russia. He asked the U.S. side to think about what he had said, adding that there was still much to do to strengthen the trust between our two countries. He said it was good that the U.S. side had said that the decision to develop such weapons had not yet been made, but he wanted the U.S. side to know that if such a decision is made, it would affect Russia,s security. He said that the same goes for deploying missile defense systems in Europe. He encouraged the U.S. to stop implementing plans that would undermine Russia,s security and to please consider his words before making any implementation decisions. ¶18. (S) Warner said that he wanted to clarify the two wildly different positions on conventional ICBMS and SLBMs. He said that Antonov had made perfectly clear Russia,s position and he understands it. He pointed out that the U.S. position has a distinction between the strategic nuclear delivery count and the warhead count. He said that if the U.S. decided to deploy such systems in the future, the non-nuclear warheads placed on existing ICBM and SLBMs would count in the delivery vehicle limit but the conventional warhead would not count within the warhead limit. He concluded by stating he understood that this was not the Russian position. Antonov said that is why they referenced paragraph 6 the way they did, because the sides cannot agree at this time. He said that he appreciated the U.S. explanations for its position, and he believes that the sides understand each other perfectly. ¶19. (S) Antonov said that he had one more suggestion for the U.S. regarding paragraph 6. He said that if the U.S. could accept paragraph 6 as proposed by the Russian side, and later if the U.S. side could convince Russia that deployment of conventional ICBMS and SLBMs would not impact Russia,s strategic stability, it would consider removing the paragraph, on the grounds that ¬hing is agreed until everything is agreed.8 -------------- Summit Issues ) Other Areas of Cooperation -------------- ¶20. (S) Gottemoeller said that President Obama was looking forward to the discussions on a number of security issues at the Moscow Summit. She said that President Obama would be interested in hearing about the maximum amount of work that we can achieve before the Summit. That is why we should agree to meet before July 6 as there is much more work that needs to be done. She said that we have made considerable progress, and she has hopes to continue the discussions over the course of the next 10 days before the Summit. She said that there were also many areas where we can broaden our cooperation, including in the areas of Afghanistan and non-proliferation, as well as our cooperation in the NPT Review Conference, where the work on the joint Statement is proceeding quite well. We should continue to develop our cooperation in other areas as well over the next 10 days. Antonov agreed. ¶21. (S) Antonov reminded the U.S. Delegation that the Russian proposals that had been presented today had not been discussed in Moscow. He said he hoped his bosses would support them, but he said &bosses will be bosses.8 ¶22. (U) Documents exchanged: - U.S. -- U.S. Response to the Russian Paper on "Procedures for Negotiations between the Russian and U.S. Delegations to Draft a New START Follow-on Agreement, dated May 20, 2009"; -- U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Production Facility for Mobile ICBMs at Votkinsk, dated May 19, 2009"; -- U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On U.S. Plans to Equip ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-Nuclear ("Conventional") Reentry Vehicles, dated May 20, 20098; -- U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On Security Guarantees for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the START Treaty (START) in connection with the Expiration of the Treaty, dated May 20, 20098; -- U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On the Interrelationship between Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms, dated May 19, 2009"; -- U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On the Intentions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Participate in Working out the New Agreement to Replace the START Treaty, dated May 20, 2009"; and -- Responses to Questions of the Russian Side in Connection with the U.S. Paper "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty of May 19, 2009." (Begin comment: All of these papers were extracted verbatim from State 64643 and dated June 19, 2009. The papers were provided to the Russian Delegation at the conclusion of the meeting with no discussion. End comment.) - Russia: -- Russian Paper in response to the U.S. Non-Paper on the Joint Understanding of June 23, 2009, dated June 24, 2009; and -- PRESS RELEASE On the Third Round of U.S.-Russian Talks in Geneva to Work Out a New, Comprehensive Agreement to Replace the START Treaty, February 22-24 (sic). ¶23. (U) PARTICIPANTS: U.S.: Ms. Gottemoeller Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Couch Mr. Dunn Mr. Elliott Mr. Fortier Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Amb Ries Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mr. French (Int) Ms. Gross (Int) Russia: Amb Antonov Mr. Belyakov Mr. Ilin Mr. Koshelev Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Mr. Neshin Col Novikov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Smirnov Gen Venetsev Ms. Ivanova Ms. Komshilova Mr. Gayduk (Int) ¶24. (U) Gottemoeller sends. CLINTON