Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE66578
2009-06-26 18:26:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

(S) TURKISH FIRM AK MAKINA'S CONTINUED ASSISTANCE TO MISSILE-RELATED ENTITIES IN IRAN

Tags:  PARM MTCRE PREL TW IR TU 
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VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6578 1771848
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261826Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 066578 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2034
TAGS: PARM, MTCRE, PREL, TW, IR, TU
SUBJECT: (S) TURKISH FIRM AK MAKINA'S CONTINUED ASSISTANCE
TO MISSILE-RELATED ENTITIES IN IRAN

REF: A. STATE 003403
B. ANKARA 000070
C. ANKARA 000095
D. ANKARA 000293
E. STATE 027957
F. ANKARA 000452

Classified By: ISN/MTR ACTING DIRECTOR RALPH PALMIERO
REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D).

S E C R E T STATE 066578



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2034

TAGS: PARM, MTCRE, PREL, TW, IR, TU

SUBJECT: (S) TURKISH FIRM AK MAKINA'S CONTINUED ASSISTANCE

TO MISSILE-RELATED ENTITIES IN IRAN



REF: A. STATE 003403

B. ANKARA 000070

C. ANKARA 000095

D. ANKARA 000293

E. STATE 027957

F. ANKARA 000452



Classified By: ISN/MTR ACTING DIRECTOR RALPH PALMIERO

REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D).



1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Ankara, please

see paragraph 5.



2. (S) Background/Purpose/Objective: In January and March

2009, we raised with Turkish officials our concerns regarding

the sale of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine

tools by the Turkey-based firm Ak Makina to entities

affiliated with Iran's liquid propellant missile developer,

Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). We stressed to

Turkish officials that Ak Makina's relationships with these

Iranian companies posed proliferation risks and urged them to

take measures to stop Ak Makina from acting as a source of

supply to Iran's missile program. In response, Turkish

officials agreed to investigate information provided by the

United States on Ak Makina and indicated that they had been

closely monitoring the activities of this firm (Ref C and F).





3. (S) We now would like to provide Turkish officials

additional details on the business dealings between Ak Makina

and a missile-related intermediary named Ardalan Machineries

Company, which we initially discussed with the GOT in March

2009 (Ref E). Specifically, the United States has

information that the vice president of Ak Makina visited

Iran's Ardalan Machineries in mid-January 2009. Following

this visit, Ak Makina made arrangements to finalize the sale

to Ardalan Machineries of various Spanish-, Taiwan-, and

South Korean-origin machine tools, including several that may

be controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Wassenaar

Arrangement.



4. (S) We want to share this information with Turkish

authorities and reiterate that we believe that the machine

tools being supplied to Ardalan Machineries by Ak Makina are

intended to support Iran's liquid propellant missile program.

We therefore want to request the GOT take measures to

prevent these machine tools from being exported to Iran and

note t
hat such action would be consistent with United Nations

Security Council Resolution 1737.



5. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Ankara approach

appropriate host government authorities to deliver talking

points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report response.

Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.



6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:



(SECRET/REL TURKEY)



-- In January and March 2009, we raised with you our concerns

regarding the sale of computer numerically controlled (CNC)

machine tools by the Turkey-based firm Ak Makina to entities

affiliated with Iran's liquid propellant missile developer,

Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG).



-- We noted that Ak Makina's relationships with these Iranian

companies posed clear ballistic missile proliferation risks

and urged you to take measures to stop Ak Makina from acting

as a source of supply for machine tools to Iran's missile

program.



-- During our most recent discussions of this case in March

2009, you agreed to investigate information provided by the

United States on Ak Makina and informed us that your

government had been closely monitoring the activities of this

firm.



-- We would appreciate an update on the status of your

efforts in this case. We also would like to share with you

additional details on continued dealings between Ak Makina

and Iran's Ardalan Machineries Company.



-- Specifically, we understand that the vice president of Ak

Makina, an individual named Oguz Akyuz, visited Iran's

Ardalan Machineries Company in mid-January 2009.



-- As we have noted in our prior discussions regarding Ak

Makina, Ardalan Machineries Company is a procurement cover

for SHIG and likely is acting as a false end-user in its

dealings with Ak Makina to circumvent your export controls.



-- Our information indicates that following Oguz Akyuz's

mid-January 2009 meetings in Iran, Ak Makina made

arrangements to finalize the sale of the following machine

tools to Ardalan Machineries:



- model SKT-160, SKT250LM, and SKT400LMC CNC slant bed

lathes, model VX700/40 and VX750MH CNC vertical machining

centers equipped with rotary tables, and four KB100

horizontal boring and milling machines produced by the South

Korean firm Hyundai-Kia;



- a model SR3-AXP CNC vertical machining center produced by

Taiwan's Akira-Seiki;



- a model DV1270 CNC vertical machining center produced by

Taiwan's Vision Wide Technology; and



- a model FS-1 milling machine with rotary table manufactured

by the Spanish firm Maquinaria CME.



-- We understand that Ak Makina, using the name of its

Turkey-based affiliate Akhavan Company, may have submitted

licensing requests for these machines to be exported to Iran.





-- You will recall that in March 2009, we informed you that

Ardalan Machineries was working to obtain several of these

same machine tool models through Ak Makina.



-- We also advised you at that time that at least one of

these machines, the FS-1 milling machine produced by

Maquinaria CME is likely controlled by the Wassenaar

Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group.



-- We understand that two other machines that Ardalan

Machineries is seeking -- the VX750MH and the VX700/40 CNC

vertical machining centers equipped with rotary tables -- are

also potentially controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement.



-- Although the remaining machines are not controlled, each

is highly capable and could be used by SHIG to support its

production of liquid rocket engine components.



-- Given the capabilities of these machines and Ardalan

Machineries' affiliation with SHIG, we urge you to take

measures to prevent these items from being exported to Iran.



-- We believe such actions would be consistent with United

Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737,

particularly since SHIG has been designated by the Security

Council for its role in Iran's missile program.



-- We look forward to continued cooperation on export control

and nonproliferation issues and would appreciate hearing of

the actions you take in response to this information at the

earliest possible time.



End talking points/non-paper



7. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone:

202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for

ISN/MTR.



8. (U) A word version file of this document will be posted

at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.

CLINTON

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