REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN GAZA ARMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 006469 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 TAGS: EG IR IS KPAL MARR MOPS PHSAQ PREL XG NATO SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN GAZA ARMS INTERDICTION EFFORT REF: STATE 4900 Classified By: EUR PDAS Marcie Ries for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 1.(C) This is an action request. Department requests USNATO and USEU reach out to NATO and EU Secretariat Officials on the points that follow. Additionally, Embassy Prague is requested to brief senior Government officials representing the EU Presidency to: -- Brief them on ongoing efforts for a new multinational mechanism to interdict weapons supplies to Hamas at points of origin and transit routes; a mechanism that will complement ongoing efforts with Egypt and Israel to disrupt transfer of weapons at terminal delivery points; -- Note that, as briefed in an informal discussion January 15 in Washington with key interlocutors, the new mechanism would likely feature enhanced intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination and military operations; and -- Request NATO and the EU to support plans to organize an expert workshop in the near future that will develop practical modalities for the effort. General Background ) ¶2. (U) The United States and Israel committed to cooperative efforts in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in Washington on January 16. We expect that the MOU has already had a positive impact on international efforts to achieve a ceasefire in the Gaza conflict and will help to support post-conflict security in the region. ¶3. (C) In implementing our commitments under the MOU, the U.S. plans action in two separate but related spheres: (1) Work with Israel, Egypt and Palestinian Authority security forces to improve security along Gaza,s border with Egypt; and (2) Work with other international partners to develop a new interdiction regime to help prevent the flow of weapons and explosives from the point of origin and along transit routes before they reach Egyptian or Gazan territory. ¶4. (C) This message focuses exclusively on support for the second element of this strategy. General Concept of Joint Interdiction Mechanism ) ¶5. (C) The U.S. is exploring the establishment of a new multilateral mechanism aimed at interdicting the flow of arms to Hamas at points of origin and in transit routes. ¶6. (C) On January 15, the Under Secretary of Political Affairs' Senior Advisor Stephen Mull and other Department officials held an informal discussion with a group of Washington-based Ambassadors and DCMs from the embassies of the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Egypt. ¶7. (C) The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a prospective new effort to interdict illicit weapons smuggling to Gaza. Ambassador Mull laid out a vision for an interdiction regime that would likely include the following elements: -- Increased intelligence sharing and coordination on Gaza arms supply origin and transit routes, through the establishment of an intelligence fusion cell or similar mechanism; -- Coordinated diplomacy, including both bilateral and multilateral persuasion and the denial of overflights/territorial sea passage to stop trafficking; -- A military interdiction regime. ¶8. (C) The military interdiction regime we envision would be similar to commitments undertaken under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),in which participating states act on reliable intelligence to prevent the transit of illicit materials through ship inspections " both at sea and in port" and denial of overflight privileges to airplanes suspected of carrying illicit cargo. All such actions are taken in accordance with national legal authorities and relevant international laws and frameworks. We do not envision military operations on land at points of origin, or anywhere along transit routes. Rather, the focus will be on maritime operations -- both on the high seas, and in ports of cooperating littoral states. ¶9. (C) We have not yet determined the primary theater(s) of operation for this mechanism. Intelligence on these weapon flows is sparse, probably because of their piecemeal nature. There are claims that such supplies transit both the Mediterranean and Red Sea. For interdiction operations in the Red Sea, one option might be expanding the mission of Coalition Task Force 150 to include specifically targeting suspected Hamas arms supplies. We could consider standing up a similar mechanism in the Mediterranean, for example, NATO naval assets possibly could deploy rapidly, but Rules of Engagement may be difficult to agree at 26. Building a new Coalition Task Force may be easier to sustain over the long run. ¶10. (C) Clearly, such a joint mechanism would have to be based on developing actionable intelligence, and obtaining the cooperation of littoral states in offering their ports for cargo inspections. ¶11. (C) In addition, the question of disposition of illicit cargo seized and detained as a result of interdiction actions will have to be addressed, along with an evaluation of existing authorities and the possible need for increased authorities. ¶12. (C ) Undertaking the mission represents an important confidence building measure for the Israeli government to encourage its constructive participation in efforts to secure Gaza, and thus to extend and solidify the ceasefire in Gaza. The February Workshop ) ¶13. (C ) The U.S. has already received sufficiently positive expressions of interest that we are moving ahead. -- If asked: We have gotten positive expressions of interest from UK, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands; no response yet from Norway. Egypt has publicly announced that they will not be participating in this joint effort, though we have reason to believe that they also will not try to block our efforts. We are awaiting an official reply from the Egyptian government. ¶14. (C ) Denmark has offered to host a workshop for contributing states to the new mechanism in the timeframe of February 4-5. ¶15. (C ) Notionally, day one of the workshop might consist of expert level consultations that would break into sub-groups; day two would be at a more senior level, and would feature reports from the sub-groups, and hopefully result in agreement for the way forward. Deadline/Points of Contact -------------- ¶16. (U) Department requests missions/post report on interest in cooperation in both the broader effort and the proposed workshop by January 28. Please report results to P Special Assistant Constantinos Nicolaidis, with copies to NEA/RA Michael Adler and Constance Arvis, and EUR/RPM Peter Chisholm. CLINTON