CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): GUIDANCE ON

UNCLAS STATE 064170 SIPDIS, SENSITIVE - THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): GUIDANCE ON U.S. CW DESTRUCTION FOR SENIOR-LEVEL VISIT, WEEK OF JUNE 22, 2009 REF: A) STATE 051992 CWC: PLANNING FOR THE OPCW EC TRIP TO VISIT TWO CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES ¶1. (U) This cable provides guidance for the senior-level U.S. team that will be in The Hague June 23-25 for consultations with Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) delegations on the currently anticipated U.S. timeline for destruction of its stockpile. Several if-raised question and answers are at para 11. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Based on current plans, the United States is on track to destroy 90 percent of its declared chemical weapons stockpile by the extended CWC deadline of April 29, 2012. The United States will continue to make every effort to find ways to accelerate this process. The United States is firmly committed to the CWC and has no intention to violate any of its obligations under the Convention. The Obama Administration will be taking a hard look at how best to address the situation which, if mishandled, could have significant international political and legal ramifications both within the OPCW and in other international bodies and in other international compliance contexts relating to countries such as Iran and North Korea. It also could undermine the Administration's broader arms control and nonproliferation agenda. State and NSC will be reviewing our domestic and treaty obligations, including options for managing the legal aspects of missing the 2012 deadline. State will also be developing a strategy for exploring with key international constituencies our legal options for missing 2012, including the feasibility of extending the CWC destruction deadlines or obtaining OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference of the States Parties (CSP) approval to identify benchmarks and additional transparency measures until destruction is complete. ¶3. (SBU) The remaining 10 percent of the U.S. stockpile is located at the two non-incineration facilities: the Pueblo Chemical Depot (Colorado) and the Blue Grass Army Depot (Kentucky). Even with increased funding, DoD currently estimates that CW destruction at Pueblo will not start until after the destruction deadline, and will run from 2014 until 2017. The destruction at Blue Grass is expected to operate from 2019 to 2021. Both facilities will use non-incineration technology consisting of neutralization followed by destruction methods for the by-products. In addition, the current plan has gaps in CW destruction operations from approximately 2012 to 2014 and 2017 to 2021. The Department of Defense will engage Congress on exploring options for accelerating destruction, to include transporting the CW stockpiles at Bluegrass to declared incineration sites, but such measures would not be enough to meet the 2012 deadline. ¶4. (SBU) Russia currently asserts that it will meet the 2012 deadline, but we suspect it is unlikely to meet this milestone judging from delays in facility construction. We do not know how Russia plans to address the question of its CWC obligations if it misses the deadline. Russia, however, is likely to finish CW destruction before the United States. The Japanese will not complete destruction of abandoned CW munitions in China until many years after the deadline. However, these munitions may present a different treaty issue since they were only recently discovered. Libya also has a declared stockpile, but should be able to meet the 2012 deadline. Iraq has residual items that are unlikely to be destroyed before the deadline. (No other treaty parties, including Iran and China, have declared any stockpiles that remain to be destroyed.) Thus, we do not know with certainty which states will be unable to meet the 2012 deadline or how long after 2012 their destruction schedules may extend. ¶5. (SBU) Since 2006, the United States has explained that it did not expect to be able to meet even the extended deadline of 2012, but would continue to seek opportunities to improve our CW destruction progress. The ambiguity in this statement was deliberate, and at no time did the United States say definitively that it would miss the deadline or that, if it did, treaty obligations would be violated (for example, the treaty can be amended, or there may be arguments why the particular circumstances the U.S. faces might excuse missing the deadline). The United States, in its previous request to extend its deadline (which, under the Convention, did not require a formal amendment),and in subsequent presentations to other States Parties, reported projections of only 66 percent of its stocks being destroyed by 2012, but it stated it would seek ways to accelerate the program. In addition to the reporting in 2006, the United States has provided updates on destruction progress at each Informal Session of the EC. These briefings have not included program end-dates. Thus, although the prospect of the U.S. missing the 2012 deadline is known to many States Parties and criticism to date has been relatively mild, we can expect more attention in the wake of a May 2009 DOD report to Congress that we have no realistic options for meeting the 2012 deadline. Currently, the United States is on track to complete destruction of 90 percent of its stockpile by the 2012 deadline, 98 percent in 2017 and 100 percent in 2021, as outlined in the May 2009, Chemical Demilitarization Program Semi- Annual Report to Congress. The report details options that DoD considered to accelerate destruction. Our decision in 2006 to be more forthcoming has helped to moderate reactions. ¶6. (SBU) Since 2006, the Iranian CWC delegation has been questioning, in multiple sessions of the EC, our ability to meet the 2012 deadline. Starting in 2007, upon submission of a report every 90 days to the Council on the status of our CW destruction program, Iran started to make a political issue out of our inability to provide dates for the start of operations at Pueblo and Blue Grass. Although the degree of Iranian obstructionism has ebbed and flowed with the composition of its delegation, they have raised this issue at virtually every EC session. Brazil recently (EC-56) called for discussions of the feasibility of meeting the 2012 deadline, though at this point we do not know their intentions. It is also likely that the United States will not receive much political support from our Allies if we do not have a plan for addressing the impending deadline and that they will raise the issue (at some point) with the United States bilaterally at a senior political level. ¶7. (SBU) On May 21, 2009, the U.S. CWC delegation informally informed OPCW Director-General (DG) Pfirter(Argentina) and EC Chairman Ambassador Lomonaco (Mexico) of the likely U.S. inability to complete destruction by 2012, with destruction completing at Pueblo in 2017 and Blue Grass in 2021 (ref A). All other international participants on the trip were informally notified the week of May 25, 2009, that the non-incineration sites of Pueblo and Blue Grass would not be operational until after the 2012 deadline. These briefings were designed to pave the way for the EC visit (May 31 June 5, 2009) to Pueblo (and Umatilla, Oregon, an operational CW destruction facility using incineration technology). The trip was led by EC Chairman Lomanoco (Mexico) and DG Pfirter. During the visit to Pueblo, the EC members heard officially, for the first time, the projected operational dates for Pueblo and Blue Grass. The EC members were not surprised at the receipt of this information and their responses were constructive. ¶8. (SBU) The first official multilateral disclosure of the operational dates for Pueblo and Blue Grass during the recent EC visit, along with the pending circulation of the draft trip report, could make for a hostile political environment for the United States at the upcoming 57th Session of the OPCW EC, July 14-17. To mitigate the potential negative political fallout, a senior-level team will be in The Hague June 23-25 for consultations. Consultations are being arranged with a variety of EC members, regional groups, and senior Technical Secretariat (T.S.) staff. This cable provides guidance for these consultations with CWC delegations, along with several answers to difficult questions that could be raised. ¶9. (SBU) Goals of the consultations: --Articulate a positive message by highlighting the successful elements of the U.S. chemical destruction program, the U.S. commitment to the CWC, and the Obama administrations commitment to examining all possible options for accelerating CW destruction; --Minimize, to the extent possible, criticism of the United States timetable for CW destruction; --Ensure that significant EC delegations and players are made aware of the current status of the U.S. CW destruction program, including the projected operational dates for the Pueblo and Blue Grass facilities in advance of the T.S. circulating the draft report on the EC visit to Pueblo and Umatilla; however, note that the projected dates represent the current schedule and the United States is actively reviewing what options may be available to it to accelerate our destruction activity. --Assuage concerns of any delegations that the United States is not committed to 100 percent destruction of the CWC stockpile as rapidly as possible; -- Emphasize that the Obama Administration is reviewing options for dealing with the situation and avoid any statement that the U.S. expects to violate any of its CWC obligations; --Make clear in consultations that the United States is, to the greatest possible extent, committed to pro-active full disclosure and consultations with other parties; --Hear concerns of delegations and gain insight into their positions heading into EC-57 (July 14-17). ¶10. (SBU) Themes that should be highlighted in consultations: --The United States is fully committed to meeting the objectives of the CWC, including verified destruction of 100 percent of our CW stockpile as rapidly as possible; --The Obama administration is fully committed to examine all possible options for accelerating CW destruction; --On April 29, 2012, the United States is currently projected to have destroyed approximately ninety-percent of its CW stockpile, which means that seven of the original nine storage sites will have eliminated all of their chemical weapons. (Approximately eight-percent of the CW stockpile will remain at Pueblo, and approximately two-percent at Blue Grass.); --Since 2006, the United States has found ways to accelerate its CW destruction program. We are exploring options to accelerate destruction at Pueblo and Blue Grass consistent with the CWC and safety, technical and other requirements (e.g., Article IV, para 10 protecting the environment); --The United States is committed to proactive disclosure of the U.S. CW destruction program, including schedule and cost data. ¶11. (SBU) Answers to questions that may come up during consultations Begin questions and answers: Q1: Will the United States seek, or support, an amendment to the CWC on the extended destruction deadline of April 29, 2012? A1: Article XV of the CWC specifies the process for amending the Convention: one-third of the States Parties would need to support an amendment conference; a majority of all States Parties would have to vote in favor of the amendment (with no State Party casting a negative vote); and all States Parties casting a positive vote would have to ratify the amendment. Countries may also propose opening up other parts of the CWC to possible amendments, which could create serious obstacles to agreement. We would like to hear other parties views on this option, but we are mindful of the obstacles to amending the treaty. Q2: During the EC-56 General Debate, Brazil called for the Council to address the feasibility of the 2012 deadline sooner rather than later. Does the United States support this action? A2: The Council is currently receiving reports from possessor states every 90 days on CW destruction that has taken place during that particular period. Furthermore, the Council has sent representatives to facilities in both the United States and Russia. Thus, the Council is already engaged to some extent in overseeing destruction efforts. We would be interested in learning more about the Brazilian suggestion. Q3: Will the United States support additional transparency measures? A3: The United States is committed to proactive full disclosure, to the greatest possible extent, on its CW destruction program, including schedule and cost data. The United States supports measures to ensure transparency of its CW destruction program. We are willing to consider additional transparency measures as well. Please let us know of any specific suggestions that your delegation may have. Q4: Does the U.S. claim that it does not have an obligation under the Convention to destroy 100% of its stockpile by 2012? A4: The The United States is making no such claim. We are examining how to address the situation in a manner that will best address the treatys requirements. End questions and answers. CLINTON