RESPONDING TO JAPAN'S REQUEST FOR "RECIPROCITY"

UNCLAS STATE 064019 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD EWWT JA SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO JAPAN'S REQUEST FOR "RECIPROCITY" REF: TOKYO 638 ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 4. ¶2. (U) BACKGROUND: The Government of Japan (GOJ) and the Department of Energy (DOE) recently commenced a Megaports Initiative pilot project at the Port of Yokohama. Discussions between the GOJ and DOE regarding a range of Megaports issues are ongoing. During the course of these discussions, the GOJ has looked to leverage its cooperation with DOE to obtain additional information from DHS on maritime containers outbound from the Port of LA/LB to Japan. The GOJ has referred to this as a request for "reciprocity." Note that this "reciprocity" request is distinct from DOE-GOJ discussions regarding parameters and procedures by which radiation/nuclear detection scan data obtained by the GOJ at the Port of Yokohama can be shared with DOE. ¶3. (U) Reftel outlined three options proposed by the GOJ by which "Japanese Container Security Initiative (CSI) officers at the Port of LA/LB would target containers of concern for additional radiation screening." These options were: -- Use of RPM to scan targeted cargo as it passes through the import side of the port. -- Use of a handheld radiation detection device to scan targeted containers. -- Scan cargo through a mobile X-ray machine before it is loaded onto the vessel. ¶4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Tokyo is requested to emphasize the following points in responding to Japan's request for so-called "reciprocity": -- Acknowledge that there has been some confusion regarding the specific nature of the Japanese request, but that DHS continues to consider opportunities to increase the sharing of information on containers moving through the global supply chain with international partners (such as Japan). -- Note that under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), U.S officials stationed at four Japanese ports already work to identify and, in concert with Japanese officials, further inspect high risk cargo destined to the United States. -- Emphasize that CSI is a reciprocal program; Japanese officials also work in the Port of LA/LB and the National Targeting Center for Cargo to target containers bound to Japan. As such, DHS remains committed to sharing available information on Japan-bound containers that either originate or are transshipped through the United States. -- Point out that DHS has accommodated 100% of Japanese requests for information or inspection of suspect or high risk containers and will continue to provide outbound manifest information on shipments bound to Japan. -- However, stress that we remain open to enhancing our cooperation with Japan at LA/LB. Towards this end, are able to offer the following additional support at this time: -- Japanese officials stationed in LA/LB may continue to request inspection of suspect or high-risk containers bound to Japan. -- Once these containers are identified, DHS officials at LA/LB will use both non-intrusive imaging and radiation detection technologies to scan these containers. -- DHS will share with Japanese targeters the results of all scans conducted on suspect or high-risk containers. ¶5. (SBU) In delivering this message, Embassy is encouraged to reiterate that matters pertaining to U.S. outbound containers are unrelated to the Megaports Initiative and should be treated as a separate issue to be discussed with DHS. IF JAPAN CONTINUES TO REQUEST MEGAPORTS EQUIVALENT AT THE PORT OF LA/LB: ¶6. (SBU) In the event that Japanese officials continue to request additional capabilities at LA/LX, Embassy Tokyo is requested to ask the following questions: -- We would like to know why you are dissatisfied with the existing level of security cooperation that is already in place in LA/LB. What additional security operations would you like to see added? -- Is Japan asking this of any other countries? Do you intend to? If not, why are you only asking this of the United States? CLINTON