OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: U.S. DIPLOMACY PREVAILS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 061676 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2019 TAGS: CU PGOV PREL PHUM OAS XM SUBJECT: OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: U.S. DIPLOMACY PREVAILS ON CUBA Classified By: Ambassador Hector E. Morales, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This cable is from the U.S. Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States. ¶2. (U) Note: This cable discusses the Organization of American States General Assembly's (OASGA) resolution on Cuba. We report on other OASGA decisions and activities in SEPTEL. Info addressees to this cable are largely posts in OAS permanent observer countries, and SEPTEL will address their participation in the OASGA. End note. ¶3. (U) Summary: After many weeks of intensive negotiations, at the OASGA in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, a concerted effort lead by Secretary Clinton helped secure a consensus resolution that allows Cuba to reintegrate into the OAS only after it complies with the practices, purposes and principles of the OAS. End summary. ¶4. (C) In the months preceding the June 2-3 OASGA, an overwhelming number of member states had called for revocation of the 1962 resolution, called "Resolution VI," that excluded the government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system. Venezuela, Nicaragua and Honduras demanded rescinding Resolution VI without imposing conditions on Cuba's return to the OAS. Other member states and the OAS Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza of Chile, agreed on rescinding Resolution VI, but wanted to include some language calling for Cuba to "dialogue" with the OAS before fully reintegrating. ¶5. (C) All countries, including the United States, agreed to Cuba's eventual full reintegration in the OAS; however, our position throughout the negotiations required Cuba to commit first to OAS core principles and values, including democracy, respect for human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms before it could return. We found unacceptable a two-tiered system where 34 members adhered to one standard and another member to a much lower one. Prior to the OASGA, few countries seemed willing to accept language to that effect. In the week before the OASGA, four different resolutions appeared on the table regarding Cuba. In the days leading up to the OASGA, we had daily and very intense negotiations at OAS headquarters within a "Cuba Working Group" composed of a subset of member states; the Working Group could not reach agreement before the GA. ¶6. (C) Negotiations in the Working Group resumed in Honduras in a small, dark, hot back room at the conference center on Sunday, May 31, and Monday, June 1. The following day, June 2, during one of the initial plenary sessions of the GA, a number of Foreign Ministers called for the Working Group to continue as a part of the GA process. Prior to the start of the Working Group meeting, Secretary Clinton met Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim, Mexican Foreign Minister Espinosa, and several other Foreign Ministers to discuss language that could lead to a consensus. Later that afternoon, Secretary Clinton and the Foreign Ministers commenced the Working Group meeting. U.S. Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas A. Shannon and U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS Amb. Hector E. Morales also participated in the negotiations. On the basis of her discussions with numerous delegations, Secretary Clinton presented a text for the Working Group's consideration. Slowly but surely, member states accepted the text that conditioned Cuba's return to the OAS on (a) the requirement that Cuba request reintegration, (b) a dialogue with the OAS based on the OAS' core purposes and principles, and (c) a determination by the OAS on Cuba's full participation based on OAS practices (consensus). Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Canada's support proved critical in bringing noncommittal states to our side; CARICOM leader Belize, as well as Costa Rica, Guatemala and Chile also helped. Secretary Clinton's leadership during these meetings facilitated efforts to get countries to agree to conditions for Cuba's reintegration, which were critical for a consensus decision. ¶7. (C) After Secretary Clinton left, and late in the evening STATE 00061676 002 OF 002 of June 2, Assistant Secretary Shannon announced to the Working Group that, while he would need to check with Secretary Clinton, he believed the Group had arrived at language acceptable to the United States. Momentary excitement produced applause at the thought that we might have a consensus. The Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro and Honduran Foreign Minister Patricia Rodas, however, noted that they too would need to consult, but would return within ten minutes. Two hours later, around 11 pm, OAS SYG Insulza announced that the Hondurans "required further changes," to which the United States and other countries replied "no." The ALBA countries continued to meet among themselves, but also with Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim and Chilean Foreign Minister Fernandez who attempted to convince them to join the consensus. At least two more hours later (and after both Foreign Ministers Amorim and Espinosa had departed),the negotiations ended with no deal. It had been a long day. Most of the countries in the Working Group felt disillusioned and even angry with the ALBA countries, upset with Honduran FM Rodas, but very supportive of the position brokered by the United States. It remained unclear what would happen on the final day. The options, from most likely to least: a) a delay, b) a vote, c) a walkout by the ALBA countries, or d) consensus. ¶8. (C) The "dead" deal on Cuba sprung to life mid-morning of June 3. During yet another informal meeting, the ALBA countries, led by Honduran FM Rodas, announced to everyone's surprise that they had reconsidered and would accept the previous day's text with no changes. After months of negotiations, the OAS narrowly avoided a vote, which would have seriously damaged the Organization, and had achieved a consensus decision on Cuba. Most importantly, the resolution addressed key U.S. concerns: Cuba could not return to the OAS unless it requested to do so, and unless all OAS member states determined after a dialogue with Cuba that its reintegration was consistent with Organization's core "practices, purposes and principles." ¶9. (C) In an extraordinarily well-received plenary speech to the OASGA, Assistant Secretary Shannon stressed that the United States sought improved relations with Cuba. Through our willingness to dialogue, we desired heightened cooperation with the region, but we would not waver on preserving the democratic principles that lie at the heart of today's OAS. The day went to the United States, as delegation after delegation heaped praise and compliments. Even the Nicaraguan Deputy Permanent Representative commented in private that the United States had won a major and historic victory that would disarm our opponents. ¶10. (C) Comment: Success has many fathers and, not surprisingly, many delegations sought to take credit for the Cuba resolution. Many delegations had helped, notably Mexico and Chile. Brazil also played an important role, but vacillated at times: in the run up to the OASGA, Brazil accepted a leadership role in the Working Group, but when it appeared to stall, they withdrew. At the OASGA, when it appeared we had a possibility for consensus, Brazil re-emerged - in large part due to Secretary Clinton's conversations with Foreign Minister Amorim. We found CARICOM, particularly Belize, as well as Canada, Mexico, and Chile very helpful throughout the GA. During the night of June 2, Chilean FM Fernandez played an important role in convincing Venezuela and Nicaragua that they had become isolated on the Cuba issue; he told them bluntly they did not have the votes to win. Argentina, Costa Rica, and Guatemala also proved helpful at key moments. Lamentably, the Hondurans were very unhelpful and terribly disorganized. President Zelaya failed to communicate with FM Rodas, often giving conflicting signals, while FM Rodas further complicated the Plenary and the Working Group with her interminable interventions and constant, overt pro-ALBA/Cuba bias. ¶11. (C) Comment continued: In the end, the OAS achieved consensus on lifting Resolution VI, but more importantly, there was a 34-country commitment to the OAS' core commitments to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. The result was an important victory for the Organization. For the United States, the result was also an important achievement. We demonstrated a willingness to listen to other countries in the region, to negotiate and collaborate, but at the same time defend and preserve the OAS' hard-fought core principles and values. End comment. CLINTON