IAEA: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U. S. DELEGATION

UNCLAS STATE 061325

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC ENRG IAEA KNNP PREL UN
SUBJECT: IAEA: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U. S. DELEGATION
PARTICIPATING IN IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BOG) MEETING,
JUNE 15-19, 2009.

REF: A. REF A: UNVIE 253

B. REF B: U.S. POSITION PAPERS EMAILED TO UNVIE BY
IO/T JUNE 10 2009


1. Department appreciates the Mission's preview and
analysis for the June IAEA BOG meeting (ref A).
Instructions for the U.S. Delegation (USDel) in
paragraphs 2-13 follow the revised agenda (GOV/2009/33/Rev.1)
issued on June 12, 2009. (Note: UNVIE should renumber the U.S.
position papers in ref B according to the revised
agenda.)


2. AGENDA ITEM 1 - DG's INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The statement will be available after delivery. No U.S.
action necessary. USDel should fax the Director
General's
statement to IO immediately following delivery.


3. AGENDA ITEM 2 - THE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2008

ISSUE: The Board will be requested to transmit the 2008
IAEA Annual Report, GOV/2009/23, to the 2009 General
Conference (GC) in September, as required under Article
VI.J of the Statute. The IAEA Annual Report serves not
only as the statutorily required report from the Board to
the GC, but also constitutes the Agency report to the
United Nations General Assembly.

U.S. POSITION: USDel should join anticipated Board
consensus to transmit the 2008 Annual Report
(GOV/2009/23)to the fifty-third (2009) regular session
of the GC. USDel may make a statement, inter alia,
welcoming the report and noting the remarkable diversity
of the Agency's work, as reflected in the Report, which
is a documented reminder of the IAEA's important role
in many aspects of international nuclear cooperation.
Of special interest to Washington are Agency efforts to
promote nuclear safety,security and safeguards and the
development of a sound infrastructure by countries
newly considering the development of nuclear power for
peaceful purposes.

USDel should not comment on the anticipated Israeli
intervention.


4. AGENDA ITEM 3 - THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION REPORT FOR
2008 ISSUE: The Board will be asked to take note of the
Technical Cooperation Report for 2008 (GOV/2009/27) and
to request that it be transmitted, with modifications as
necessary, to the 2009 GC.

U.S. Position: The USDel should read the statement in the
U.S. position paper (ref B) reaffirming our strong
Support for the TC Program, including TC activities focused
on:nuclear applications in human health; safety, including
safety at Iran's Bushehr power plant; security; and
support for infrastructure development in countries with
emerging nuclear power programs.


5. AGENDA ITEM 4 - REPORT OF THE PROGRAM AND BUDGET
COMMITTEE

ISSUE: The Board is asked to take note of the Report of
the Program and Budget Committee (GOV/2009/26) and
endorse the following recommendations:

-- To transmit the Agency's Accounts for 2008 together
with the draft resolution for adoption by the General
Conference;-- To approve a target for voluntary contributions
For 2010 to the Technical Cooperation Fund of $85,000,000;
-- To approve keeping the Working Capital Fund at the
level of 15,210,000 Euros;
-- To approve use of the 2009 Equipment Replacement Fund;
and
-- To approve the terms and conditions for the
Appointment of the Director General.

U.S. POSITION: USDel should join consensus in supporting
the recommendations of the Program and Budget Committee.
USDel should make the statement on the 2010-11 Program
and Budget found in the U.S. position paper (ref B).


6. AGENDA ITEM 5 - NUCLEAR VERIFICATION

(A) THE CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND
ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS

ISSUE: The BOG will have before it for approval a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) GOV/2009/37) and
Additional Protocol (AP) (GOV/2009/38) for Rwanda, and an
Additional Protocol for Serbia (GOV/2009/41). All
conform to the standard texts contained in GOV/INF/276/Mod.1
and INFCIRC/540, respectively. The safeguards agreement also
contains a small quantity protocol, which conforms to the
new model adopted by the Board in 2005. Mission should
advise if other safeguards agreements and Additional
Protocols are submitted in advance of the June Board.

U.S. POSITION: USDel should support safeguards
Agreements and Additional Protocols, provided they conform
to the respective models. USDel should join consensus in
approving any safeguards agreements or Additional
Protocols that conform to the standard models and deliver
statement contained in the U.S. position paper (ref B)
urging all NPT states that have not yet done so to
conclude and bring into force the required safeguards
agreements; and bring into force Additional Protocols,
which represent the new safeguards standard. USDel
should also address the slow pace in adoption of the revised
Small Quantity Protocol (SQP),which as of the end of
2008 was in force in only 19 of 80 countries with SQPs (as
contained U.S. position paper, ref B).

(B) THE SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION REPORT (SIR) FOR 2008

ISSUE: The Board will have before it, in document
GOV/2009/24, the Safeguards Implementation Report for

2008. The report provides a description and analysis of
the Agency?s safeguards operations in 2008 and summarizes
problems encountered. The Board will be asked to take
note of the SIR and to authorize the release of the
Safeguards Statement for 2008 and of the Background to
the Safeguards Statement and Summary.

U.S. POSITION: The Safeguards Implementation Report
(SIR) provides a description of the Agency's safeguards
operations in 2008. It reports on the Agency's efforts
to implement safeguards for the past year, noting
achievements and areas needing improvement. USDel should
join consensus to take note of the SIR and to authorize
the release of the safeguards statement and the executive
summary of the SIR. USDel should provide general remarks
on safeguards implementation, as indicated in the
statement in the U.S. position paper (ref B). The SIR
statement addresses the need for progress in safeguards
adherence, welcomes the work of the IAEA and cooperation
by Egypt in resolving its safeguards questions, and urges
the secretariat to continue to look toward ways of making
the SIR more transparent. The U.S. may subsequently
provide by letter more specific and detailed comments on
the SIR for 2008.

(C) STAFF OF SAFEGUARDS DEPARTMENT TO BE USED AS AGENCY
INSPECTORS

ISSUE: The IAEA Secretariat is required to obtain Board
approval for lists of Agency staff to be used as
safeguards inspectors. The list of proposed inspectors
became available on 28 May 2009. U.S. review of the list
will not be complete before the Board meeting on 15 June.
However, like all Member States, the United States has a
separate opportunity after Board approval of the list to
reject individuals on the list for designation as
inspectors to the United States. Objection within three
months prevents designation, and the United States can
also revoke designation at any time. Hence, the timing
of the list's release does not affect the U.S. ability to
complete its internal reviews before acceptance of the
inspectors named.

U.S. POSITION: The U.S. should join consensus on the
adoption of the list. No statement is needed.

(D) REPORT BY THE DG ON SAFEGUARDS IN THE DPRK

ISSUE: The Secretariat will not provide a written report
on the implementation of safeguards in North Korea for
the June Board meeting. We expect the Director General's
introductory remarks will address the significant
developments that have taken place since the March Board,
including the termination of the IAEA?s monitoring and
verification of the shutdown of key facilities at
Yongbyon and Taechon, followed by the departure of IAEA
inspectors, and the reported nuclear test on May 25.
Although his remarks in March were markedly short, these
recent events will likely prompt the DG to underline the
urgency of the situation. After the North's first nuclear
test in October 2006, the DG noted "deep regret and concern,
"and said the test was a serious challenge to the nuclear
non-proliferation regime. The DG also used the
opportunity to "re-emphasize" the urgent need to
establish a universal ban on nuclear testing and cited
UNSCR 1172 (1998),in which the UN Security Council reaffirmed
"the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty as the cornerstones of the international regime on
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential
foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament."

U.S. POSITION: We call on the DPRK to refrain from
further provocative actions, to uphold its commitments to
abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs, and to abide by its international obligations. We
deplore North Korea's decision to reverse disablement activities
and cease cooperation with the IAEA. The May 25 nuclear
test was a violation of UN Security Council Resolution
1718 and a threat to international peace and security.
Such provocation will only serve to deepen North Korea's
isolation. North Korea will not find international
acceptance unless it abandons its pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery. We have
been and will continue working with our allies and
partners in the Six-Party Talks as well as other members
of the U.N. Security Council in our pursuit for the
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and
the peace and stability of the North East Asian Region.

(E) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
AND RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
1737(2006),1747(2007),1803 (2008),and 1835 (2008) IN
IRAN

ISSUE: The Board will discuss the Director General's
latest report on the status of the implementation of the
IAEA's Safeguards Agreement in Iran, Iran's compliance
with UN Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803,
and 1835, and the Secretariat's investigation into Iran's
nuclear activities.

U.S. POSITION: Instructions will be sent septel.

(F) IMPLEMENTATION OF NPT SAFEGUARDS IN SYRIA

ISSUE: For the third time since the IAEA began
investigating Syria's undeclared nuclear activities,
Syria is an official item on the Board's agenda. On June 5,
the Director General submitted the third Syria report to
Board members (GOV/2009/36),which describes Syria's steadfast
refusal to cooperate with the IAEA's investigation into
its nuclear activities. El Baradei lists the litany of
fruitless attempts by the IAEA to obtain additional
information and clarifications from Syria. The list of
unanswered questions appears to be growing. The IAEA
notes in this report that it detected traces of
chemically processed uranium in the hot cells of Syria's declared
Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus.
Like the uranium found at al Kibar, these traces do not match
uranium in Syria's declared nuclear material inventory.
According to the report, the Agency is conducting further
analysis to determine a possible connection between the
uranium detected at the MNSR and that detected at the al
Kibar site. The presence of additional, unexplained
particles of uranium in Syria is a potential source of
concern and could indicate more widespread undeclared
nuclear activities in the country. These particles also
reinforce the IAEA?s assessment that the particles at al
Kibar were not introduced by Israeli munitions, as Syria
maintains, though the IAEA also notes that further
Israeli cooperation in this regard would be helpful. Consistent
with past practice, Syria delivered an eleventh-hour
letter related to the finding at the MNSR on 1 June
attempting to demonstrate a degree of cooperation
immediately before the report's release. The IAEA's
report, however, notes that the Syrian letter "did not
address the presence and origin of the uranium" detected
at the MNSR. The report also notes that Syria continues
to refuse to grant Agency inspectors access to debris and
equipment removed from the Dair al Zour site or access to
sites believed to be related to the destroyed reactor.

At the November 2008 and March 2009 Board of Governors
meetings, Syria, supported by Cuba, Iran and Egypt,
successfully prevented the public release of the previous
Director General's reports on Syria (GOV/2008/60 and
GOV/2009/9). The U.S. delegation should expect a similar
effort at this Board meeting.

U.S. POSITION: USDel should deliver the cleared
Statement (to be provided septel) and coordinate with like-minded
states to deliver strong national and regional group
statements highlighting in detail the growing evidence
that Syria was constructing a clandestine reactor and
concern that new evidence suggests that its activities
went beyond the destroyed reactor. Statements should
also highlight Syria's ongoing efforts to hinder the IAEA
investigation.

USDel should call for the DG?s report on Syria to be
released publicly and encourage the like-minded to do the
same. As it may be detrimental to other key objectives
at the Board, primarily public release of the Iran report,
delegation should not call for a vote on this matter if,
as expected, some states object to releasing the Syria
report. However, if a like-minded member state calls for
a vote, delegation is instructed to vote in favor of
publicly releasing the report.

USDel should keep Washington apprised of any developments
and seek further guidance as needed.


7. AGENDA ITEM 6 - ASSURANCE OF SUPPLY

(A) Proposal by the IAEA DG for establishment of an IAEA
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank
(B) Russian Initiative to establish a reserve of LEU for
supply to the IAEA for its Member States
(C) German proposal on Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary
Project (MESP)

ISSUE: For items 6(a) and 6(b),the Board will be asked
to take note of two Secretariat reports, "Proposal by the
Director General for the Establishment of an IAEA Low
Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank' (GOV/2009/30),and "Russian
Federation Initiative to Establish a Reserve of Low
Enriched Uranium (LEU) for the Supply of LEU to the IAEA
for its Member States' (GOV/2009/31),and to request the
Director General to submit detailed proposals for the
Board's subsequent consideration. For Item 7(c) the
Board will be asked take note of a German paper (GOV/2009/32)
on that country's Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project
(MESP).

U.S. POSITION: USDel may join consensus to note the three
documents and should support requests for the Secretariat
to provide agreement texts for consideration by the
September BOG. However, an agreement based solely on the
concepts in GOV/2009/30 would be flawed since it would
allow the IAEA to disperse LEU without attaching
sufficient nonproliferation conditions. It would not,
for example, reflect the export guidelines adopted by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group by requiring full-scope
Safeguards in the recipient state, nor would it require
Compliance with UNSC resolutions on proliferation issues.
The IAEA will also need to clarify the conditions for disbursal
Of fuel from the bank (e.g., what is a "supply disruption
unrelated to technical or commercial considerations") and
how it will manage a physical stockpile (including
liability issues). We should therefore call for
consultations on the content of the agreement and other
details of implementation with the NTI donors (U.S., EU,
Norway, UAE, Kuwait),some 31 states, many of which are
on the Board, other suppliers (including Russia),and
potential beneficiary states between the June BOG and the
September meeting. Our key goal during these
consultations would be to develop terms and conditions
for the NTI fuel bank for Board consideration in September
that correct the deficiencies of the IAEA paper. In
particular, we would push to add the full-scope
safeguards criterion that is already in the Russian paper on
Angarsk. As appropriate, we should also seek to
establish the principle that supplier states could impose criteria
required by their own laws and policies for retransfer of
donated LEU by the IAEA.

The German MSEP proposal (GOC/2009/32) is fundamentally
flawed. Among other problems, it would interfere with
the international commercial market, and it is not clear that
the IAEA could assume duties under this proposal
consistent with the IAEA Statute (e.g., governing
territory and licensing exports).

USDel should oppose any effort to raise the procedural
argument that the General Conference rather than the
Board must or should approve IAEA involvement in any
multilateral nuclear arrangements. The delegation may
draw upon the following points as appropriate:

-- Article XI of the Statute assigns to the Board the
authority to approve Agency projects. (The General
Conference has authority to approve agreements between
the Agency and other international organizations, which is
not relevant to this situation.)

-- Rule 50 of the Board?s Provisional Rules of Procedure
provides a mechanism by which Member States can
contribute their views on this issue. Several states did
so in past Board meetings. We encourage Member States to
contribute to the discussion when the Board has detailed
proposals before it.

-- This priority, identified by the Director General some
years ago, deserves the Board?s continued active
consideration, informed by expert views from the
Secretariat and all Member States that wish to
contribute.

U.S. STATEMENT: USDel should deliver the statement in
U.S. position paper (ref B),modified as appropriate.
USDel may, if desired, deliver an abbreviated statement,
with the entire statement made available to Member States
and the IAEA Secretariat. USDel should also encourage
other Board members to make similar statements.


8. AGENDA ITEM 7 - DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS TO SERVE ON THE
BOARD IN 2009-2010

ISSUE: Pursuant to Rule 47 of its Rules of Procedure,
the Board will be requested, in accordance with Article
VI.A.1 of the Statute, to designate members to serve on the
Board of Governors from the end of the fifty-first (2009)
regular session of the General Conference to the end of
the fifty-second (2010) General Conference. A draft
memorandum, by which the Board could notify the General
Conference of the names of the members which it
designates, will be before the Board in document
GOV/2009/28.

U.S. POSITION: USDel is authorized to join the expected
consensus in approving the designation of the thirteen
member states identified in GOV/2009/28 to serve on the
Board in 2009-2010. No statement is needed.


9. AGENDA ITEM 8 - APPOINTMENT OF DG

ISSUE/U.S. POSITION: The Board Chair will make a
statement on the status of the election for Director
Genera,l including the results of the latest straw poll.
No appointment will be made at this time. No statement
is necessary.


10. AGENDA ITEM 9 - PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE 53rd
(2009) REGULAR SESSION OF THE GC

ISSUE: The Board will be consulted on the Provisional
Agenda for the 53rd regular session of the GC
(GOV/1009/29),scheduled to begin on Monday, 14
September, 2009.

U.S. POSITION: As the Board is only being "consulted" on
the agenda, no U.S. position is required.


11. AGENDA ITEM 10 - REPRESENTATION OF OTHER
ORGANIZATIONS AT THE 53rd (2009) REGULAR SESSION OF THE GC

ISSUE: The Board will be asked to invite the OPEC Fund
for International Development, the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, and the U.S. Civilian Research
and Development Foundation (listed in GOV/2009/21) to be
represented as observers at the forthcoming September
2009 General Conference.

U.S. POSITION: USDel is authorized to join the expected
consensus in recommending that the OPEC Fund for
International Development, the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, and the U.S. Civilian Research
and Development Foundation be invited to be represented
at the fifty-third (2009) regular session of the General
Conference. No statement is needed.


12. AGENDA ITEM 11 - DE-RESTRICTION OF DOCUMENTS OF THE
BOG

ISSUE: At its March session, the Board agreed to place
on the agenda of its next meeting an item on this matter.
It may be recalled that the Board approved in March 1996 a
proposal, contained in document GOV/2843 and dated 15
February 1996, for de-restriction of Board documents.
This document has been re-circulated in a report by the
Director General (GOV/2009/25).

U.S. POSITION: USDel should underscore the Board's
prerogatives with respect to early de-restriction of
Board Documents. To counter likely NAM rhetoric on this agenda
item, USDel may note that the IAEA Board decisions,
unlike UN Security Council resolutions or those of other UN
bodies, are not accessible to the public, i.e., they are
only available on GOVATOM once incorporated into the
record of the meeting, and call for greater transparency.

USDel should hold the line on release of the Iran reports
consistent with past Board practice and as a matter of
transparency on an issue of international concern, but
otherwise downplay the debate. USDel should reassert the
Board's authority to release its own reports on a
case-by-case basis, as noted in the cover note to the
DG's report on the de-restriction issue, which cites the Board
Chair's explicit statement in this regard upon adoption
of the policy in 1997. USDel should indicate that, in this
context, the United States remains supportive of
releasing the reports on Syria that have been provided by the
Secretariat. If appropriate, USDel is authorized to
deliver the brief statement in the U.S. position paper
(ref B).

In the unlikely event that a NAM member attempts to table
a decision on de-restriction, USDel is instructed to vote
as necessary to maintain the status quo and to protect
the Board's right to release documents as it deems
appropriate. Also, if deemed appropriate, USDel may
state:

-- The United States notes that the Agency has no
proactive policy for publishing de-restricted reports on
its website. IAEA Board decisions, unlike UN Security
Council resolutions or those of other UN bodies, are not
accessible to the public.

-- The United States believes strongly that the issues
being addressed by this Board are matters of interest to
the general public, particularly as the IAEA?s work
continues to gain prominence in international affairs.
As a matter of transparency and consistent with other UN
organizations, the Secretariat should publish the
decisions of the Board on the public website and
implement the current de-restriction policy by posting
de-restricted reports.

-- The basis for the confidentiality of safeguards
information is found in the safeguards agreements, all of
which require that the Agency protect "commercial and
industrial secrets and other confidential information,
coming to its knowledge in the implementation" of those
agreements, and subject to exceptions, not publish or
communicate to any State, organization or person any
information obtained by it in connection with the
"implementation of safeguards." The United States
Believes that the release to the public of the reports on Iran
(and Syria, if relevant) do not violate this obligation.


13. AGENDA ITEM 12 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS

ISSUE: Ref A reports few if any interventions may occur
under this agenda item.

U.S. POSITION: No action is needed at this time. If
issues arise for which guidance exists, USDel should draw
on existing guidance. If other issues arise, USDel
should immediately seek instructions from Washington.
CLINTON