IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA

S E C R E T STATE 060334

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2029
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SYR TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA

REF: MADRID 514

Classified by: ISN - C. S. Eliot Kang, Reasons
1.4(b),(d)


1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraphs 6-10.

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SUMMARY
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2. (SBU) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director General (DG) ElBaradei released his latest
reports on the status of the IAEA's investigations into
Iran and Syria's nuclear programs on 5 June 2009. Both
reports conformed to expectations in describing the
absence of any meaningful steps by either country to
address the serious issues that exist with respect to
their nuclear programs.


3. (SBU) The activities described in the DG's latest
Iran report underscore Iran's continued defiance of its
international obligations and its progress toward a
nuclear weapons capability. DG ElBaradei notes that
Iran is now enriching uranium using approximately 5,000
centrifuges (up from nearly 4,000 centrifuges in March
2009),testing an additional 2,000 centrifuges,
continuing to install new centrifuge cascades, and
proceeding with research and development work on
advanced centrifuge designs. Even more troubling, Iran
has produced over 1,300 kilograms of low enriched
uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6). This is sufficient
material for one nuclear weapon, were Iran to enrich it
further to weapons-grade.


4. (SBU) At the same time, the report notes, Iran has
refused even to meet to discuss the IAEA's outstanding
questions regarding its past efforts to develop a
nuclear warhead. Nor has Iran accepted the full
implementation of safeguards, including access to the
Arak reactor, which ElBaradei stresses "could adversely
impact the Agency's ability to carry out effective
safeguards at that facility." ElBaradei concludes with
a request to Iran to cooperate with the IAEA without
further delay.


5. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's report on Syria reinforces our
conclusion that Syria was engaged in a clandestine
effort to construct and operate a nuclear reactor at Al
Kibar. It also highlights the litany of fruitless
attempts by the IAEA to solicit additional information
and clarifications from Syria. The list of unanswered
questions appears to be growing. The IAEA notes in this
report that it detected traces of chemically-processed
uranium in the hot cells of Syria's declared Miniature
Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus. Like the
uranium found at Al Kibar, these traces do not match
uranium in Syria's declared nuclear material inventory.
According to the report, the Agency is conducting
further analysis to determine a possible connection
between the uranium detected at the MNSR and that
detected at the Al Kibar site. The presence of
additional, unexplained particles of uranium in Syria is
a potential source of concern and could indicate more
widespread undeclared nuclear activities in the country.
These particles also reinforce the IAEA's assessment
that the particles at Al Kibar were not introduced by
Israeli munitions, as Syria maintains, though the IAEA
also notes that further Israeli cooperation in this
regard would be helpful.

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Action Requests
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6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS: Posts are
requested to convey U.S. views regarding the IAEA
reports to appropriate host government officials. Posts
should underscore that these reports demonstrate that
neither Iran nor Syria has taken any meaningful step to
cooperate with the IAEA since the last report was issued
in February 2009. Posts should stress that while Iran
has stalled the IAEA's investigation and still refuses
to provide the IAEA with requested transparency, its
centrifuge program continues to make progress. The net
result is that for both cases the international
community continues to lack confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of these nuclear programs.
For Iran, the UN Security Council has imposed a
mandatory requirement that Iran suspend specified
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities [those are:
(1) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
and (2) work on all heavy-water related projects. See
UNSCR 1737 OP 2.] and cooperate fully with the IAEA. We
believe that Iran's failure to do so yet again is
another opportunity lost. With respect to Syria, Posts
should emphasize that that Syria's ongoing refusal to
cooperate with the Agency deepens concerns regarding the
nature and extent of its clandestine nuclear activities,
particularly in light of new findings of chemically-
processed uranium at a declared nuclear facility in
Damascus.


7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS EXCEPT LONDON,
PARIS, BERLIN, MOSCOW, BEIJING CONT: With respect to
the upcoming 15-19 June IAEA Board of Governors meeting,
Posts should stress the need for the following from host
governments:

-- Strong national statements on Iran and Syria to
demonstrate unity in the Board in demanding Iran and
Syria immediately comply with their international
obligations. Statements should underscore the need for
full transparency with the IAEA (including Iran's
implementation of the Additional Protocol) and
cooperation with the IAEA's investigation, as well as
suspension of all proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities. Statements should also highlight the degree
to which both Iran and Syria have refused to cooperate
with the IAEA by listing the unanswered questions noted
in the Agency's reports; and,

-- Strengthened statements on Iran and Syria from
regional or other groups, e.g., European Union, the
Group of 77 and China, the Non-Aligned Movement, the
Group of Latin America and the Caribbean; the Africa
Group, etc. To the extent possible, Posts should
encourage host governments to instruct their delegations
not to accept statements from any group to which they
are a member that would downplay the factual reports of
the IAEA, or undercut the Agency's ability to obtain the
necessary information and access needed to resolve these
serious issues.


8. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR LONDON, PARIS, BERLIN,
MOSCOW, BEIJING CONT: P5+1 posts should draw on
paragraph 7 points to encourage host governments to
deliver strong national statements on Syria. Posts
should also note that we are pursuing a joint P5+1
statement on Iran. Such a statement would be negotiated
among capitals.


9. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR MADRID: In addition to the
above guidance, Post is requested to follow-up with the
MFA officials who were briefed on Syria's clandestine
nuclear activities on May 18 (See Reftel). Post should
note that the discovery of additional traces of
undeclared uranium at the MNSR in Damascus is yet
another piece of evidence that Syria's clandestine
nuclear activities went beyond the Al Kibar reactor.
Post is also requested to strongly encourage Spain to
give a strong national statement on Syria even if they
are associated with an EU statement.


10. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR UNVIE: In addition to
conveying these messages to local IAEA Missions, UNVIE
should continue promoting support within the IAEA
Secretariat and among IAEA Board Members for continuing
and expanding the investigation into both Iran and
Syria's nuclear activities and pressuring both to
cooperate with the respective investigations. Mission
is requested to place maximum effort into securing
strong national statements demanding Iranian and Syrian
cooperation with the IAEA by as many Board members as
possible, particularly those in the EU. Mission should
bear in mind that we continue to explore the possibility
of a P5+1 joint statement regarding Iran, but would
negotiate any such statement directly among capitals.

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POCS AND REPORTING DEADLINE
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11. (SBU) Posts are requested to report any substantive
reactions at the earliest possible date. UNVIE is
requested to report on the status of its efforts related
to Iran and Syria in advance of the Board. Richard
Nephew (202-647-7680) and Jim DeTemple (202-736-7930)
are the Department's POCs for this issue.
CLINTON