JUNE 3 U.S.-RUSSIA CFE MEETING: NO BREAKTHROUGHS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 059424 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2014 TAGS: GG KCFE MD NATO PARM PREL RS SUBJECT: JUNE 3 U.S.-RUSSIA CFE MEETING: NO BREAKTHROUGHS, COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS REF: A. USOSCE 118 (JCG CABLE DESCRIBING RUSSIAN A-M) ¶B. 08 STATE 133417 (DEC 2008 CFE MEETING CABLE) Classified By: VCI A/S Gottemoeller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. U.S. and Russian CFE Teams led by VCI A/S Gottemoeller and Russian MFA Director for Disarmament Antonov met in Geneva in the afternoon of June 3 to review ideas for moving forward on CFE. The meeting had an introductory character, as it was the first time U.S. and Russian interagency teams met in 2009 on CFE. Discussion keyed off of the ideas in Russia's recent Aide-Memoire on a "Way Forward" on CFE, which is based on the U.S/NATO "Parallel Actions Package." Discussion focused on elements of the Russian Aide-Memoire dealing with possible provisional application of CFE, the flank regime, Moldova, and Georgia. A/S Gottemoeller raised, but there was no time to explore, the conditions under which Russia would resume implementation of CFE. Gottemoeller and Antonov agreed, with regard to Germany's June 10 high-level meeting on "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe," that they did not expect any significant developments but hoped it would be possible to avoid a restatement of maximalist positions. Antonov told Gottemoeller that the Russian government wants to keep CFE. They agreed on the importance of the U.S.-Russia bilateral process to finding a way forward. Gottemoeller said that, on the margins of upcoming START exchanges, she and Antonov could follow up on the question of future bilateral meetings. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) VCI A/S Rose Gottemoeller and Russian MFA Director for Disarmament Anatoly Antonov, supported by interagency delegations, met at the U.S. Mission in Geneva to discuss CFE during the afternoon of June 3. Gottemoeller outlined two goals for the meeting: to explore in a bilateral context some of the ideas outlined in the Russian Aide-Memoire (ref A), and to discuss how to move forward. She welcomed Russia's willingness to use the Parallel Actions Package (which the Aide-Memoire refers to at the &Russian-U.S. draft8) as the basis for resolving the CFE impasse, while noting noted that Russia's Aide-Memoire also repeated previously-stated Russian positions. She suggested focusing on four core issues: Russia's ideas on provisional application, the flank, Moldova, and Georgia. �0A;¶3. (SBU) In his opening remarks, Antonov welcomed the effort to revitalize bilateral discussions on CFE. He said it was important for Russia to know what the new Administration's policy is on CFE. Despite "resetting" the relationship, he said that he has not yet seen any changes in the U.S. approach on CFE, and he noted the U.S. continues to complain about Russian non-compliance in Vienna. He asked if the U.S. Administration needs arms control in Europe. Antonov then made a plea for finding a way to address the "most important disarmament issue in Europe" separate from the frozen conflicts, adding that we will not succeed in linking all of these issues. (Comment: He returned to this point several times, noting at one point that while Russia had agreed to inclusion of Georgia and Moldova in the parallel actions package, Russia considers itself to have fulfilled all the Istanbul commitments. End Comment.) Antonov suggested that if Gottemoeller reviewed the history of the bilateral discussions on CFE, she would see how the Russian position (now expressed in the Aide-Memoire) has softened. He claimed that some of the Russian ideas have been supported by U.S. (CFE) experts, but asserted that parts of the original parallel actions package had been walked back by the U.S. Antonov was looking for two things from this meeting: to understand what is new in the U.S. approach to CFE and to discuss how to reenergize the bilateral dialogue. In one difficult moment of his opening presentation, Antonov asserted that Russia's suspension of CFE implementation had not changed the actual military situation in Europe ) war had not broken out, there had been no build-up of Russian forces. Gottemoeller countered that this assessment appeared to set aside events in Georgia in 2008, which she characterized as tragic for all sides. ¶4. (U) Gottemoeller said the U.S. is committed to the CFE Treaty and the CFE regime, which continues to be an important contributor to European security - including Russian STATE 00059424 002 OF 004 security. She noted the U.S. remains committed to other European security instruments, for example the OSCE, Vienna Document 1999, and the Open Skies Treaty. Gottemoeller asserted that the U.S. is ready to discuss new ideas for improving European security, as evidenced by comments by President Obama and Secretary Clinton on our willingness to engage in discussions about President Medvedev's proposals for European security. She cautioned that our problem is in making all these pieces fit together, including the "frozen conflicts" and the complex situation in Georgia since last August. Gottemoeller concluded by suggesting that our objectives should be to resolve issues and return Russia to the CFE regime and that we have an opportunity to work together toward these goals. -------------- -- Specific Elements of the Aide-Memoire -------------- --- ¶5. (U) Provisional Application: Gottemoeller asked Antonov to explain the point on provisional application. Antonov indicated that the Aide-Memoire builds on an idea that he first expressed at the CFE seminar in Paris in November 2007; namely, allowing for the equivalent of provisional application while ratification is underway. (Note: At the Paris CFE seminar, Antonov suggested that provisions could be made to allow parties to "abide by" the terms of the agreement until its entry into force, up to the limits of their domestic legislation. The example he used was the November 2006 "Agreement on Provisional Application of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization for the Joint Implementation of the ITER Project," which includes Russia and the U.S. as signatories. End Note.) Antonov pointed out that there had been a period of provisional application for the original CFE Treaty, and he saw no reason why the same could not be done for A/CFE. As for the timing, which he said has decreased to six months in the Aide-Memoire from twelve months in earlier versions of the Russian position, Antonov noted that after seeing that all Allies could complete ratification for Albania and Croatia to join NATO in less than nine months, it became clear that something as important as ratification of A/CFE could be done in six months if NATO really considered it to be a priority. What's important, he said, is that Parliaments actively take up the CFE ratification issue. Antonov clarified that provisional application would be for those who had not completed ratification ) those who had already ratified A/CFE would simply move to (full) implementation. -- In the discussion that followed, the U.S. team underscored that for the U.S. and many Allies, provisional application of an entire Treaty was nearly impossible prior to its ratification by parliaments. Gottemoeller recalled private comments in which Antonov had appeared to suggest a concept short of provisional application. The sides agreed that the issue was very difficult and would require further exploration. ¶6. (C) Flank: Gottemoeller noted that the Russian desire to abolish the flank regime (for Russia) is a core issue and one that is very important to NATO. She highlighted that there would be significant complications resulting from any effort to change a core element of the Adapted CFE Treaty (A/CFE) before ratification, but noted the reference to possible transparency measures in the Aide-Memoire and asked for any further Russian thinking. Antonov responded that the idea of possible transparency measures was in fact the "raisin" or sweet spot in the Russian Aide-Memoire on this point. He noted that Russia has made clear that there is no need to apply the flank regime to Russia, but that he had no objection to retaining the flank for others. Although the U.S. has repeatedly mentioned problems with the flank, Antonov said that no other state has raised such concerns with Russia, including Turkey and Norway. He had no idea what kind of confidence-building measures would be useful because he does not understand what the specific concerns may be. He said that Putin had provided the original position as a political decision and that Russia had tried to find some complementary measures to allay the concerns of its neighbors. He declined to be drawn into any discussion of what possible political commitments or stabilizing measures Russia might suggest as an alternative to the flank limits for Russia, claiming he preferred to hear what NATO Allies wanted to propose. Russia had included this point in the Aide-Memoire to demonstrate willingness to address the issue. STATE 00059424 003 OF 004 Regarding the problem of changing a core element of the Adapted Treaty before it is ratified, Antonov reverted to a familiar argument; that the Baltic states had been dropped from the original CFE Treaty in 1991 via a JCG chairman's statement; and asserted that the flank regime was no more momentous. He said that if there is a political will, everything can be solved. -- During this discussion Antonov returned to a theme he voiced earlier; at present, without CFE, nothing bad had happened; it was hard to imagine that Russia would invade Norway or Turkey. Gottemoeller suggested that although the Aide-Memoire could be interpreted as showing that Russia is interested in maintaining CFE, it appears to express familiar Russian positions. Was Russia committed to CFE, she asked? Antonov responded unambiguously ("da, da"),noting that Russia needs the Treaty and needs to build relations with all European countries (not just those currently in the Treaty) on a reliable basis. CFE can provide that basis, although we are at a difficult time and seem to be watching CFE on its deathbed. ¶7. (SBU) Georgia and Moldova: Turning to Georgia and Moldova, Gottemoeller asked how the ideas in the Aide-Memoire related to the proposal the U.S. had made in December updating the Georgia portion of the Parallel Actions Package (ref B). Antonov replied unequivocally that he viewed the December proposal as a non-starter, as a half-baked approach to solving serious, complicated issues. He decried any attempt to use CFE to resolve "Georgian aggression." Still, Antonov said, even though Russia wants to separate discussions on CFE from the frozen conflicts, and in its view has satisfied all Istanbul commitments related to CFE, Russia was open to transparency measures on Moldova and the Transcaucasus. Antonov said that he would like to end on a positive note, that Russia was ready to talk about what else was needed and then have states able to ratify. Gottemoeller noted that she had heard Antonov say that Russia does not like the U.S. proposal on Georgia; she would like to know what ideas Russia had as an alternative. Allies would want to know that, too. On Moldova, Antonov asserted that the U.S. and Russia were very close to resolution. Russia did not object to transparency; all that needed to be resolved were the details. Regarding the status of the Russian PKF in Moldova, the 2 1 statement (Medvedev, Voronin, Smirnov) suggested this was a resolved issue, but Russia was open to observers. Moldova, he asserted, was solvable. Gottemoeller welcomed this positive assessment but noted that details were important and would need to be worked out with the Moldovans as well as others. -------------- Next Steps -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Running out of time, Gottemoeller and Antonov looked at next steps. -- Antonov noted that Russia would like a written response to the Aide-Memoire, suggesting that such a response could show what elements of the Russian proposal are acceptable or not. Alternatively, the U.S. could provide its own version of what would be acceptable. (Note: We understand that Russia has been approaching some Allies in capitals with the same request for a written response to the Aide-Memoire. End Note.) -- In looking toward the immediate future, Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. was interested in a common approach to the Berlin meeting not only with Allies, but also with Russia. Our goal should be to find ways to resolve the CFE impasse and not lose time in Berlin by repeating maximalist positions. She highlighted that, as appropriate during the meeting, the U.S. planned to emphasize the key role of transparency in advancing European security, the utility of arms control for verifying information on defense arrangements, the importance of the entry into force of A/CFE, and the importance of implementing all legal and political commitments. Antonov appeared to agree that these themes were sound, but warned that, if provoked, he would have to strike back. This was what had happened at Bad Saarow and in Paris. -- In addition to future bilateral meetings on CFE, Antonov was receptive to the idea of meeting with a group of 8-10 NATO Allies. He suggested (in a tone that sounded STATE 00059424 004 OF 004 tongue-in-cheek) that the group might be expanded beyond NATO to include Russia's ally Belarus. -- Gottemoeller said that, on the margins of upcoming START exchanges, she and Antonov could follow up on the question of future bilateral meetings and the timing of an expanded session. The latter, which the U.S. had envisioned for the margins of Berlin, could not be accommodated due to the plans of the German organizers, who wanted to host a NATO-Russia meeting involving all Allies. ¶9. (C) Comment. Although Antonov had no interest in moving discussion beyond what was presented in the Aide-Memoire, he clearly wanted to demonstrate Russian willingness to engage the U.S. bilaterally on CFE. The meeting had an introductory character on both sides. But this did not mask what appeared to be a reality: that Antonov had a mandate to talk about CFE, but not to negotiate new ideas or solutions, or brainstorm beyond the elements of the Aide-Memoire. Antonov spent a lot of time explaining how comments made in previous meetings over the course of 2007 and 2008 were still valid for Russia. He repeated familiar complaints that the Parallel Actions Package called for concrete Russian actions in exchange for vague promises that the U.S. and NATO Allies would "consider" ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty. On one issue, Georgia, both the rhetoric and substance of his comments were tougher than in December 2008, when the Russian team had brainstormed freely on ideas advanced by the U.S. Antonov is clearly willing to continue to be personally involved in the effort to end the CFE impasse, and made no mention of passing any work to the Russian JCG delegation in Vienna. End comment. ¶10. (SBU) Delegation members: Russia: Amb. Anatoly Antonov Ms. Maria Ivanova (Russian Mission, Geneva) Ms. Inna Kotkova (Legal Department, MFA) Mr. Andrey Belyakov (Russian Mission, Geneva) Mr. Anton Mazur (MFA) Mr. Evgeny Ilin (MOD) Mr. Yuri Zaytsev (MOD) Mr. Alexander Trifonov (MFA) U.S.: A/S Rose Gottemoeller Mr. Richard Davis Mr. George Look Mr. Terryl Kron Ms. Donna Phelan Ms. Jennifer Laurendeau Ms. Jessica Kehl COL Darren Hartford Ms. Christa Leman Mr. Marshall Brown CLINTON