DEMARCHE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE CORFU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 059226

SIPDIS
BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: OSCE PREL EU NATO PGOV PHUM KDEM ECON
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE CORFU
MINISTERIAL

Classified By: Stu Jones, Acting EUR Assistant Secretary


1. (C) Summary and Action Request: The Greek OSCE
Chairmanship has called an informal Ministerial on the Island
of Corfu to discuss European Security Architecture,
responding primarily to Russian calls for a radical overhaul
of current institutional arrangements and focused primarily
on "hard" security. The U.S., while always open to
constructive ideas for improving security, believes that the
current security architecture, based on NATO, the OSCE, and
the EU, has been extraordinarily successful in promoting a
stable and prosperous Europe. The Corfu Ministerial presents
an opportunity for the U.S. to channel discussion in a
productive direction, locating the security dialogue firmly
within the OSCE framework, and basing it on the OSCE's
comprehensive concept of security. We envision Corfu as
launching a positive, wide-ranging dialogue on European
security, but one which does not pre-judge the outcome of the
talks (e.g., we do not/not presume the result of these
discussions will be a summit or even a new political
document) nor set a timetable. Our focus will be on
establishing guidelines for dialogue aimed at strengthening
where possible an already very robust institutional system,
with the results of this dialogue to be assessed at the
December 1-2 OSCE Ministerial in Athens and decisions taken
at that time on how to proceed. The U.S. has conducted
initial consultations at NATO in Brussels, as well as in EU
and NATO capitals, where our proposals have generally been
well received. Action Addressees in the remaining OSCE
participating States are requested to demarche their host
governments based on the points in paragraph 8. Embassy
Moscow should present the points in paragraph 9 only. In
addition to paragraph 8 points, Embassy Astana should present
the additional points in paragraph 10. USOSCE also should
draw on these points in its consultations in Vienna. End
summary and action request.


2. (C) In a speech in Berlin on June 5, 2008, and again in an
April 20, 2009 speech in Helsinki, Russian President Medvedev
called for a new set of formal (preferably treaty-based)
European hard security arrangements covering conflict
resolution, arms control, and alliances. Medvedev provided
few details at that time, and details remain scarce. The
U.S. is and will remain open to constructive ideas. Russian
explanations of its proposal, however, have focused largely
on general principles -- territorial integrity, inviolability
of frontiers and non-use of force in settling disputes --
that Russia's actions in Georgia since August 2008 appear to
contradict. Russia's call for adherence to new obligations
under international law would also appear to contradict its
unilateral "suspension" of its implementation of the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.


3. (C) Russia has also pressed for language that seems
designed to circumscribe NATO, such as guarantees: not to
secure one's own security at the expense of others; not to
allow the development of any military alliance that would be
to the detriment of the security of others; not to allow one
state or international organization to have exclusive rights
to support peace and stability in Europe. Russian
authorities have asserted that the potential accession of
Georgia and Ukraine to NATO is a violation of previous
commitments made by Allies after the breakup of the Soviet
Union -- a claim that we have consistently rejected. The
Russians also claim the placement of missile defense elements
in the Czech Republic and Poland are the beginning of a
structure that could potentially threaten its strategic
capabilities - a view that we also have countered. Because
of these concerns, Russia has sought an effective veto over
NATO expansion, and a say in the placement of elements of a
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Europe.


4. (C) The Russian proposals do not address the "soft" side

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of security -- the human and economic security dimensions, as
defined by the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE
documents -- which are of particular importance to the U.S.
and Europeans. Nor is it clear where security arrangements
like CFE or the Vienna Document fit in Russia's envisioned
architecture, since Moscow has said the European Security
Treaty idea is not an arms control proposal. Russia has
recently indicated that it is prepared to engage on CFE on a
separate track on the basis of the parallel actions package
-- an approach endorsed by all Allies. Still, these and
other issues -- including in particular Russian actions in
Georgia -- will continue to color the context in which
discussions on European security will move forward.


5. (C) Despite the lack of specificity in Medvedev's
proposals and suspicions of Russian motivations, most
European countries are pressing for -- or at least willing to
undertake -- a dialogue on Medvedev's proposal.


6. (C) We view this as an opportunity. Europe,s network of
security institutions is the most elaborate and mature
anywhere in the world, and yet this fact did not prevent the
outbreak of hostilities in Georgia in August 2008. Key
European institutions were hampered in responding to the
crisis, and still are (as Russia continues to obstruct
continuation of the OSCE Mission in Georgia). Nor is it clear
to us that Europe,s institutions are as well-positioned as
they could be to respond to new threats, including
transnational challenges like climate change, migration,
cyber-security and terrorism/intolerance, to name only a few.
Some of OSCE,s historic missions, including the protection
of basic human freedoms, are being undermined through
action/inaction by OSCE participating states today. The
European desire for dialogue provides an opportunity for U.S.
leadership in defining the scope of the discussion. We seek
to create a positive agenda for dialogue, based on the
OSCE,s comprehensive concept of security and focused on
strengthening existing security institutions to better deal
with new and old challenges. At Corfu, the Secretary plans
to note that while we are prepared to have an airing of
concerns about European security, debate should focus on
concrete steps the international community should take to
address real security challenges we face today, including
implementation of existing commitments. The U.S. also
believes that a summit should be held only when there is
summit-worthy substance to announce, not as a precursor to a
process that may or may not achieve real results.


7. (C) Our Objective, which Embassies and USOSCE should
build support for, is to:

-- Use Corfu to launch a constructive dialogue on ways to
enhance European security. A useful way forward would be to
propose an "agenda for dialogue" that addresses key issues --
including new threats to security -- in each of the three
interrelated security dimensions.

-- Ensure that this process remains open-ended. At least at
the outset, this dialogue would have no fixed timeline and no
fixed outcome; rather, the results of the discussions would
determine whether additional security arrangements, or
adjustments to current arrangements, might be necessary.

-- We should plan to review the results of this open-ended
dialogue at the December OSCE ministerial in Athens. That
will be an opportunity to considerresults of the dialogue to
date and provide further direction.


8. (SBU/REL) Begin Talking points:

- The United States hopes we can use the OSCE informal
Ministerial in Corfu to launch a constructive dialogue on
European security.

- We think the existing security institutions have done a
good job, although we recognize there may be some scope to
enhance their work -- perhaps by improving their ability to
respond to crises such as the Russia-Georgia conflict in

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August 2008 and to better promote peaceful settlement of the
protracted conflicts.

- We also recognize that many security issues that are major
concerns today (e.g., terrorism, radicalization, climate
change, energy security, non-state actors) either did not
exist or were less urgent when the Helsinki Final Act and
subsequent commitments were agreed; it is timely to discuss
whether Euro-Atlantic institutions can do more to address
them.

- In that context, we are ready to begin discussions and hope
to propose at Corfu an "agenda for dialogue" on European
security.

- This dialogue should take place at the OSCE and would
identify themes for discussion in each of the three
interrelated dimensions of security: political-military,
economic, and human.

- This dialogue must also include a discussion of existing
commitments and institutions and a review of how well we are
using these institutions and fulfilling our commitments.

- We believe that Corfu will be an important first
opportunity to identify issues and areas that merit further
discussion. We envision an open-ended process that would
allow for further consideration of those issues in the months
ahead. Perhaps, if over the next months all can agree on
areas for further work, it will be possible for the December
Ministerial to chart a way forward.

End talking points.


9. (SBU/REL) Points for Embassy Moscow

-- - The United States hopes we can use the informal OSCE
Ministerial at Corfu to launch a constructive dialogue on
European security.

- President Medvedev,s proposal has usefully drawn attention
to the need to explore whether there are steps we can take to
enhance European security.

- We think the existing security institutions have done a
good job, but recognize there may be some scope to perfect
their work -- perhaps by improving their ability to respond
to crises such as the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008
and to better promote the peaceful settlement of the
protracted conflicts.

- We also recognize that many security issues that are major
concerns today (e.g., terrorism, radicalization, climate
change, energy security, non-state actors) either did not
exist or were less urgent when the Helsinki Final Act and
subsequent commitments were agreed; it is timely to discuss
whether Euro-Atlantic institutions can do more to address
them.

- In that context, we are ready to begin discussions and hope
to propose at Corfu an "agenda for dialogue" on European
security.

- This dialogue should take place at the OSCE and would
identify themes for discussion in each of the three
interrelated dimensions of security: political-military,
economic, and human.

- This dialogue must also include a discussion of existing
commitments and institutions and a review of how well we are
using these institutions and fulfilling our commitments.

- We believe that Corfu will be an important first
opportunity to identify issues and areas that merit further
discussion. We envision an open-ended process that would
allow for further consideration of those issues in the months
ahead. Perhaps, if over the next months all can agree on
areas for further work, it will be possible for the December

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Ministerial to chart a way forward.

- We would like to suggest making a joint Russia-U.S.
statement outlining areas related to European security in
which we are already working together. This would help
create a constructive atmosphere at Corfu.


10. (SBU/REL) Additional Points for Embassy Astana:

-- The dialogue that is launched in Corfu will not be an easy
one. These are very complex issues, and OSCE participating
states will have a wide range of views.

-- The OSCE Ministers will evaluate at the time of the Athens
Ministerial how best to continue with this dialogue. The
challenge of overseeing whatever process emerges will fall,
at least initially, on the Kazakhstani OSCE chairmanship.

-- The United States would urge that this dialogue not be
rushed, or its final product prejudged. We are unlikely to
know by the time of the Athens ministerial, for example,
whether there will be enough substance to this dialogue to
justify a summit, a new political document or any other
particular outcome.

-- To guide this process in a constructive direction, we all,
and particularly the Chairman-in-Office, will need to
exercise patience and pragmatism as this dialogue proceeds at
its own pace, whatever that might be.

-- The United States also emphasizes the importance, both in
European security discussions and more generally, of the
Chairmanship charting an independent course, consistent with
OSCE commitments and the interests of the institution.
CLINTON