DEMARCHE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE CORFU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 059226 SIPDIS BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019 TAGS: OSCE PREL EU NATO PGOV PHUM KDEM ECON SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE CORFU MINISTERIAL Classified By: Stu Jones, Acting EUR Assistant Secretary ¶1. (C) Summary and Action Request: The Greek OSCE Chairmanship has called an informal Ministerial on the Island of Corfu to discuss European Security Architecture, responding primarily to Russian calls for a radical overhaul of current institutional arrangements and focused primarily on "hard" security. The U.S., while always open to constructive ideas for improving security, believes that the current security architecture, based on NATO, the OSCE, and the EU, has been extraordinarily successful in promoting a stable and prosperous Europe. The Corfu Ministerial presents an opportunity for the U.S. to channel discussion in a productive direction, locating the security dialogue firmly within the OSCE framework, and basing it on the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security. We envision Corfu as launching a positive, wide-ranging dialogue on European security, but one which does not pre-judge the outcome of the talks (e.g., we do not/not presume the result of these discussions will be a summit or even a new political document) nor set a timetable. Our focus will be on establishing guidelines for dialogue aimed at strengthening where possible an already very robust institutional system, with the results of this dialogue to be assessed at the December 1-2 OSCE Ministerial in Athens and decisions taken at that time on how to proceed. The U.S. has conducted initial consultations at NATO in Brussels, as well as in EU and NATO capitals, where our proposals have generally been well received. Action Addressees in the remaining OSCE participating States are requested to demarche their host governments based on the points in paragraph 8. Embassy Moscow should present the points in paragraph 9 only. In addition to paragraph 8 points, Embassy Astana should present the additional points in paragraph 10. USOSCE also should draw on these points in its consultations in Vienna. End summary and action request. ¶2. (C) In a speech in Berlin on June 5, 2008, and again in an April 20, 2009 speech in Helsinki, Russian President Medvedev called for a new set of formal (preferably treaty-based) European hard security arrangements covering conflict resolution, arms control, and alliances. Medvedev provided few details at that time, and details remain scarce. The �00A;U.S. is and will remain open to constructive ideas. Russian explanations of its proposal, however, have focused largely on general principles -- territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and non-use of force in settling disputes -- that Russia's actions in Georgia since August 2008 appear to contradict. Russia's call for adherence to new obligations under international law would also appear to contradict its unilateral "suspension" of its implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. ¶3. (C) Russia has also pressed for language that seems designed to circumscribe NATO, such as guarantees: not to secure one's own security at the expense of others; not to allow the development of any military alliance that would be to the detriment of the security of others; not to allow one state or international organization to have exclusive rights to support peace and stability in Europe. Russian authorities have asserted that the potential accession of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO is a violation of previous commitments made by Allies after the breakup of the Soviet Union -- a claim that we have consistently rejected. The Russians also claim the placement of missile defense elements in the Czech Republic and Poland are the beginning of a structure that could potentially threaten its strategic capabilities - a view that we also have countered. Because of these concerns, Russia has sought an effective veto over NATO expansion, and a say in the placement of elements of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Europe. ¶4. (C) The Russian proposals do not address the "soft" side STATE 00059226 002 OF 004 of security -- the human and economic security dimensions, as defined by the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents -- which are of particular importance to the U.S. and Europeans. Nor is it clear where security arrangements like CFE or the Vienna Document fit in Russia's envisioned architecture, since Moscow has said the European Security Treaty idea is not an arms control proposal. Russia has recently indicated that it is prepared to engage on CFE on a separate track on the basis of the parallel actions package -- an approach endorsed by all Allies. Still, these and other issues -- including in particular Russian actions in Georgia -- will continue to color the context in which discussions on European security will move forward. ¶5. (C) Despite the lack of specificity in Medvedev's proposals and suspicions of Russian motivations, most European countries are pressing for -- or at least willing to undertake -- a dialogue on Medvedev's proposal. ¶6. (C) We view this as an opportunity. Europe,s network of security institutions is the most elaborate and mature anywhere in the world, and yet this fact did not prevent the outbreak of hostilities in Georgia in August 2008. Key European institutions were hampered in responding to the crisis, and still are (as Russia continues to obstruct continuation of the OSCE Mission in Georgia). Nor is it clear to us that Europe,s institutions are as well-positioned as they could be to respond to new threats, including transnational challenges like climate change, migration, cyber-security and terrorism/intolerance, to name only a few. Some of OSCE,s historic missions, including the protection of basic human freedoms, are being undermined through action/inaction by OSCE participating states today. The European desire for dialogue provides an opportunity for U.S. leadership in defining the scope of the discussion. We seek to create a positive agenda for dialogue, based on the OSCE,s comprehensive concept of security and focused on strengthening existing security institutions to better deal with new and old challenges. At Corfu, the Secretary plans to note that while we are prepared to have an airing of concerns about European security, debate should focus on concrete steps the international community should take to address real security challenges we face today, including implementation of existing commitments. The U.S. also believes that a summit should be held only when there is summit-worthy substance to announce, not as a precursor to a process that may or may not achieve real results. ¶7. (C) Our Objective, which Embassies and USOSCE should build support for, is to: -- Use Corfu to launch a constructive dialogue on ways to enhance European security. A useful way forward would be to propose an "agenda for dialogue" that addresses key issues -- including new threats to security -- in each of the three interrelated security dimensions. -- Ensure that this process remains open-ended. At least at the outset, this dialogue would have no fixed timeline and no fixed outcome; rather, the results of the discussions would determine whether additional security arrangements, or adjustments to current arrangements, might be necessary. -- We should plan to review the results of this open-ended dialogue at the December OSCE ministerial in Athens. That will be an opportunity to considerresults of the dialogue to date and provide further direction. ¶8. (SBU/REL) Begin Talking points: - The United States hopes we can use the OSCE informal Ministerial in Corfu to launch a constructive dialogue on European security. - We think the existing security institutions have done a good job, although we recognize there may be some scope to enhance their work -- perhaps by improving their ability to respond to crises such as the Russia-Georgia conflict in STATE 00059226 003 OF 004 August 2008 and to better promote peaceful settlement of the protracted conflicts. - We also recognize that many security issues that are major concerns today (e.g., terrorism, radicalization, climate change, energy security, non-state actors) either did not exist or were less urgent when the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent commitments were agreed; it is timely to discuss whether Euro-Atlantic institutions can do more to address them. - In that context, we are ready to begin discussions and hope to propose at Corfu an "agenda for dialogue" on European security. - This dialogue should take place at the OSCE and would identify themes for discussion in each of the three interrelated dimensions of security: political-military, economic, and human. - This dialogue must also include a discussion of existing commitments and institutions and a review of how well we are using these institutions and fulfilling our commitments. - We believe that Corfu will be an important first opportunity to identify issues and areas that merit further discussion. We envision an open-ended process that would allow for further consideration of those issues in the months ahead. Perhaps, if over the next months all can agree on areas for further work, it will be possible for the December Ministerial to chart a way forward. End talking points. ¶9. (SBU/REL) Points for Embassy Moscow -- - The United States hopes we can use the informal OSCE Ministerial at Corfu to launch a constructive dialogue on European security. - President Medvedev,s proposal has usefully drawn attention to the need to explore whether there are steps we can take to enhance European security. - We think the existing security institutions have done a good job, but recognize there may be some scope to perfect their work -- perhaps by improving their ability to respond to crises such as the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008 and to better promote the peaceful settlement of the protracted conflicts. - We also recognize that many security issues that are major concerns today (e.g., terrorism, radicalization, climate change, energy security, non-state actors) either did not exist or were less urgent when the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent commitments were agreed; it is timely to discuss whether Euro-Atlantic institutions can do more to address them. - In that context, we are ready to begin discussions and hope to propose at Corfu an "agenda for dialogue" on European security. - This dialogue should take place at the OSCE and would identify themes for discussion in each of the three interrelated dimensions of security: political-military, economic, and human. - This dialogue must also include a discussion of existing commitments and institutions and a review of how well we are using these institutions and fulfilling our commitments. - We believe that Corfu will be an important first opportunity to identify issues and areas that merit further discussion. We envision an open-ended process that would allow for further consideration of those issues in the months ahead. Perhaps, if over the next months all can agree on areas for further work, it will be possible for the December STATE 00059226 004 OF 004 Ministerial to chart a way forward. - We would like to suggest making a joint Russia-U.S. statement outlining areas related to European security in which we are already working together. This would help create a constructive atmosphere at Corfu. ¶10. (SBU/REL) Additional Points for Embassy Astana: -- The dialogue that is launched in Corfu will not be an easy one. These are very complex issues, and OSCE participating states will have a wide range of views. -- The OSCE Ministers will evaluate at the time of the Athens Ministerial how best to continue with this dialogue. The challenge of overseeing whatever process emerges will fall, at least initially, on the Kazakhstani OSCE chairmanship. -- The United States would urge that this dialogue not be rushed, or its final product prejudged. We are unlikely to know by the time of the Athens ministerial, for example, whether there will be enough substance to this dialogue to justify a summit, a new political document or any other particular outcome. -- To guide this process in a constructive direction, we all, and particularly the Chairman-in-Office, will need to exercise patience and pragmatism as this dialogue proceeds at its own pace, whatever that might be. -- The United States also emphasizes the importance, both in European security discussions and more generally, of the Chairmanship charting an independent course, consistent with OSCE commitments and the interests of the institution. CLINTON