JCIC-XXXIV GUIDANCE-002: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE

S E C R E T STATE 058439


GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2029
TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV GUIDANCE-002: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE

REF: STATE 055556 (JCIC-XXXIV GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: Jerry Taylor, Director, VCI/SI. Reason:
1.4B and D


1. (U) This is the second tranche of guidance for
JCIC-XXXIV. These instructions must be received by the
JCIC Delegation in Geneva by opening of business June
8, 2009, for use during the JCIC session that convenes
that day. JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE-001 (Omnibus Guidance)
is contained in Reftel.

================
LIST OF GUIDANCE
================


2. (C) BEGIN LIST OF GUIDANCE: Conversion of the B-1
Heavy Bomber (paragraphs 3-16); Peacekeeper Silo
Conversion (paragraphs 17-24); Minuteman III ICBM RVOSI
Demonstration (paragraphs 25-32); Various Telemetry
Issues (paragraphs 33-36). END LIST OF GUIDANCE.

==================================
CONVERSION OF THE B-1 HEAVY BOMBER
==================================

REF: A. OIR for Conversion Inspection at
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ January 19, 2008

B. 08 State 59143 (JCIC-DIP-08-002):
U.S. Response to Russian Federation
Aide-Memoire on Conversion of the
B-1 heavy bomber

C. OIR for Distinguishability Exhibition
Dyess AFB, Texas February 21, 2008

D. 08 Geneva 0590 (JCIC-XXXII-013)

E. 08 Geneva 0612 (JCIC-XXXII-026)

F. OIR for Data Update Inspection
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, July 10, 2008

G. 08 Geneva 1005 (JCIC-XXXIII-017)

H. State 054967 (U.S. Response to Russian
Federation Aide-Memoire on Conversion of
the B-1 Heavy Bomber)


3. (S) BACKGROUND. On November 28, 2007, the USAF
began the process of converting 67 B-1 heavy bombers
from the category of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments other than long-range nuclear air-launched
cruise missiles (LRNA) to the category of heavy bomber
equipped for non-nuclear armaments using the procedures
provided in the START Treaty. The conversion is being
carried out at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB)
Heavy Bomber Conversion or Elimination Facility in
Arizona.


4. (S) Upon completion of the conversion of the first
B-1 heavy bomber, the Russian Federation conducted a
conversion inspection of the newly converted B-1 heavy
bomber on January 19, 2008, at Davis-Monthan AFB. In
the official inspection report (OIR) (Ref A),Russian
inspectors declared three ambiguities and made one
comment.


5. (S) On February 15, 2008, the Russian Federation
delivered an aide-memoire (Ref B) stating its concerns
and raising questions regarding the status of the
converted B-1 heavy bomber including the conversion
procedures used, the ability of Russian inspectors to
confirm distinguishing features during inspections, and
the subsequent basing of converted B-1 heavy bombers.


6. (S) On February 21, 2008, the Russian Federation,
along with representatives from Ukraine and the
Republic of Belarus, participated in a
distinguishability exhibition for the B-1 heavy bomber
equipped for non-nuclear armaments at Dyess Air Force
Base. In the official inspection report (Ref C),the
inspectors confirmed all of the distinguishing features
for the two categories of B-1 heavy bombers exhibited,
i.e., the B-1 equipped for non-nuclear armaments and
the B-1 equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA.
The inspectors included a comment that the United States
had not demonstrated the incompatibility of the pylon
attachment joints of the B-1 equipped for non-nuclear
armaments with the pylon attachment joints for the
long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missile (LRNA).


7. (S) On June 3, 2008, the United States responded to
ambiguities and comments that had been made during the
conversion inspection, the distinguishability
exhibition, and the aide-memoire. The United States
explained the specific conversion procedures that
are used and reiterated that the conversion procedures
used to convert the B-1 heavy bomber from the category
of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other
than LRNA to the category of heavy bomber equipped
for non-nuclear armaments fully satisfy the requirements
of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or
Elimination Protocol.


8. (S) During discussions at JCIC-XXXII (Refs D and E),
the Russian delegation provided a non-paper which
stated that inspectors had no knowledge of the "before"
condition of the pylon attachment joints or the weapons
bay. They also stated that inspectors were not permitted to
view the "objects" that were removed from the pylon
attachment joints or the weapons bays. Moreover,
the paper asserted that, in the Russian view, the
conversion process must be such that the B-1 cannot
be returned to its former state, i.e. capable of
delivering nuclear weapons. The conversion process
must be irreversible.


9. (S) As an additional concern, the Russian paper
stated that it should be noted that on July 10, 2008
(Ref F),the Russian Federation conducted an inspection
at Davis-Monthan under paragraph 3 of Article XI of the
Treaty. From the results of that inspection, it was
found that on one B-1 heavy bomber (No. 84055) equipped
for nuclear armaments (which had been partially
disassembled) one pylon attachment joint for long-range
nuclear ALCMs was in plain view. The Russian
inspectors were surprised that it looked exactly the
same as the modified forward attachment joint.


10. (S) During JCIC-XXXIII (Ref G),the Parties again
discussed the issue. The U.S. delegation provided the
other Parties with a U.S.-Proposed Joint Statement ?On
The Conversion Of A Heavy Bomber So That It Is No
Longer Equipped For Nuclear Armaments.? The U.S. delegation
explained that the draft Joint Statement would
facilitate understanding of the term ?incapable of
carrying? as used in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of Section VI of
the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. There was
essentially no discussion of the conversion of the
pylon attachment joint.


11. (S) On March 10, 2009, the Russian Federation
provided an aide-memoire which stated that analysis of
the U.S.-proposed Joint Statement showed that, ?... as
in its earlier clarifications, the U.S. side is
proposing to use the criterion of ?operational
deployment of nuclear armaments? in order to resolve
the problem related to U.S. non-compliance with paragraph
11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol
in carrying out the conversion of B-1 heavy bombers.


12. (S) In Russia?s view, the use of new criteria and
corresponding concepts not provided for in the START
Treaty is unacceptable. Moreover, Russia continues to
believe that the B-1 heavy bombers converted by the
U.S. side are still capable of carrying nuclear armaments.
On the question of heavy bomber basing, Russia believed it
was necessary to remind the United States that heavy
bombers must be based at air bases, whose status is
defined by the relevant term in the Definitions Annex
to the START Treaty. The Davis-Monthan facility, which
has been declared as a conversion or elimination facility,
is not an air base.


13. (S) On December 10, 2008, the Air Force hosted
representatives from State, OSD, and JCS at Davis-
Monthan AFB during which a status update briefing on the B-1
Hard Point Conversion Program was provided. The briefing
contained before and after photographs of the
conversion of the pylon attachment joints, but only a single
photograph of the weapons bay before conversion. A
photograph of the weapons bay after conversion is not
included in the briefing. Additional photographs of
the intermediate steps of the pylon attachment joint
conversion process are also included in the briefing.


14. (S) GUIDANCE. Delegation may draw from the non-
paper in Ref H, stressing the need to come to agreement
on the draft JCIC Joint Statement which addresses the
definition of ?incapable of carrying nuclear
armaments.? Delegation should reiterate that
?incapable of carrying? within the weapons bay does not
mean ?will not physically fit? within the weapons bay.
Delegation should stress that the conversion process to
make the weapons bay ?incapable of carrying nuclear
armaments? does not imply that the capability to
deliver non-nuclear armaments must also be removed from
the B-1. Delegation should make clear that this aspect
of the issue must be resolved if the Parties are to
resolve the B-1 conversion issue (weapons bay and pylon
attachment joints). In attempting to resolve the
weapons bay aspect of the issue, delegation may draw on
the one photograph depicting the weapons bay prior to
conversion from the briefing that was provided at
Davis-Monthan AFB on December 10, 2008.


15. (S) If the parties are able to resolve the weapons
bay aspect of the issue, and the Russian Delegation has
further questions regarding the conversion of the pylon
attachment joints, the delegation is authorized to draw
on the photographs depicting the pylon attachment joint
conversion process from the December 10, 2008, briefing
to describe the actions taken to convert the B-1 to a
heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
Delegation may use the photographs to emphasize the
appearance of the pylon attachment joints before and
after the conversion process.


16. (S) Delegation is not authorized to provide copies
of the photos to the Russian Delegation.

===========================
PEACEKEEPER SILO CONVERSION
===========================

Refs: A) 08 State 087779 (ANC/STR 08-660/3)
B) 08 Moscow 2636 (Russian Federation Aide-
Memoire, ?Russian Concern Over U.S. Conversion of 50
Peacekeeper ICBM Launchers Into Minuteman III
ICBM Launchers,? dated September 2, 2008)
C) Russian Federation Aide-Memoire on ?Russian
Concerns Regarding U.S. Compliance with Certain
Provisions of the START Treaty,? dated March 10,
2009 (No Reporting Cable)
D) 08 State 103412 (RNC/STR 08-323/135)
E) 08 Geneva 0983 (JCIC-XXXIII-011)
F) State xxxxx (JCIC-DIP-09-005)
G) State 057616 (ANC/STR 09-411/143)


17. (S) BACKGROUND: The U.S. Air Force placed the 50
Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers located at F.E. Warren
Missile Complex, Wyoming, in caretaker status in August
2006 as part of the Peacekeeper ICBM deactivation
process. This allows the U.S. Air Force to minimize
personnel and maintenance costs to maintain the
Peacekeeper silo launchers. The procedures to place
the silo launchers into caretaker status included, but were
not limited to, removal of the launch eject gas
generators, launch systems controller computers,
ballistic actuators, and other launch critical electrical
equipment. These procedures removed the capability for
the silo launchers to launch Peacekeeper ICBMs. The
inability of the silo launchers to launch Peacekeeper
ICBMs is consistent with the START Treaty requirement
under paragraph 7 of Article III that the converted
ICBM launchers be incapable of launching an ICBM of the
previous type.


18. (S) On August 15, 2008, the United States provided
a START Notification Format Number 3 that declared the
conversion of 50 Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers into
50 Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers at F.E. Warren
Missile Complex, Wyoming (Ref A). The decision to convert
these silo launchers was purely for accounting purposes. At
this time, the United States has no intention of
installing Minuteman III ICBMs in the converted silo
launchers.


19. (S) The Notification Protocol states that the
Party conducting the silo launcher conversion shall provide
notifications in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3
of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. These
paragraphs provide for a thirty day advance
notification of the initiation of a conversion process,
a notification five days after initiation of the
process, and a notification five days in advance of the
installation of a different type of ICBM.


20. (S) With respect to the notification of the silo
launcher conversions at F.E. Warren Missile Complex on
August 15, 2008, there was no conversion process to
initiate since the silo launchers were deactivated in
2006 and the United States had no plans to actually
install Minuteman III ICBMs in these silos. The United
States view was that only a START Notification Format
Number 3 was required to alert the other Parties of the
change in accountability of the silo launchers at F.E.
Warren Missile Complex, Wyoming, from Peacekeeper ICBM
silo launchers to Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers.


21. (S) On September 2, 2008 (Ref B),the Russian
Federation provided an aide-memoire asking why the
United States did not provide notifications in accordance with
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Section IV of the
Notification Protocol in conjunction with the silo launcher
conversions at F.E. Warren Missile Complex. The United
States view was that it had satisfied the Treaty
requirement for notifying the Parties about the change
in accountability.

No notifications were provided for the initiation of
the conversion process since the silo launchers had been
deactivated and there would be no process undertaken to
physically change the silo launchers so that they
could, in fact, be made capable of launching a Minuteman III
ICBM. Similarly, no notifications were provided for
the emplacement of a new missile since the launchers remain
in a deactivated status with no missiles of the
different type was installed in the launchers.


22. (S) The Russian Federation placed this issue on
the agenda for JCIC-XXXIII (November 2008) (Ref D) and
raised the issue during a Heads of Delegation meeting (Ref E).
After reviewing Treaty provisions and reminding the
U.S. delegation that Russia had not received a response to
its September 2008 aide-memoire, Russian delegation member
Kashirin stated that the results of a September 19-20,
2008, reentry vehicle inspection conducted at F. E.
Warren ICBM Base had increased Russian concerns.
Russian inspectors had reported that a senior site official
declared that modifications of the Peacekeeper silos
had not been carried out. Kashirin added that Russian
inspectors viewed silo launcher P6 which formerly
contained a Peacekeeper ICBM, but were unable to see
any signs that a conversion process occurred. In fact, the
launcher still contained a Peacekeeper canister; the
launch canister was braced by elements of the
suspension system. Therefore, Kashirin concluded, no conversion
took place and the virtual declaration to Minuteman III
ICBM silo launchers occurred in violation of the
Treaty. Kashirin asked for an explanation. The U.S. delegation
responded that the United States was still studying the
issue.


23. (S) On March 10, 2009, the United States received
an aide-memoire from the Russian Federation on ?Russian
Concerns Regarding U.S. Compliance with Certain
Provisions of the START Treaty.? In the aide-memoire,
the Russian Federation reminded the United States that
the Russian Federation was awaiting comments on the
situation involving the ? . . . redeclaration of
Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers at Warren . . ..? The
United States provided an initial response (Ref F) to
the aide-memoire (Ref B),along with initial responses
to other issues that had been raised in the aide-
memoire in May 2009. That response stated that the
United States will provide a START Format 143
notification that rescinds notification of conversion
of the Peacekeeper silo launchers to Minuteman III silo
launchers. The United States view is that rescinding
the notification resolves the issue.


24. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation should state that a NRRC
Format 143 was provided on June 4, 2009 (Ref G) that
rescinded the original notification of the 50
Peacekeeper silo launchers to Minuteman III silo launchers.
Delegation should state that, in the U.S. view,
rescinding the notification resolves the issue. If the
other parties insist on additional discussion,
Delegation should reiterate that the issue has been
resolved.

======================================
MINUTEMAN III ICBM RVOSI DEMONSTRATION
======================================

Refs: A) 08 State 074953
(JCIC-XXXII-Guidance-002)
B) Russian Non-paper: ?On the One-time
Demonstration of the Minuteman III
Front Section,? March 4, 2008
C) 08 Geneva 0585 (JCIC-XXXII-009)
D) 08 Geneva 0976 (JCIC-XXXIII-010)
E) Russian Federation Aide-Memoire on
?Russian Concerns Regarding U.S.
Compliance with Certain Provisions of
the START Treaty,? dated March 10, 2009
(No Reporting Cable)


25. (S) BACKGROUND: Russian complaints about
Minuteman III (MM III) RVOSI date almost to the beginning of
START Treaty implementation. The United States made changes
to the manner in which it conducts MM III RVOSI to assuage
Russian concerns. After the changes in procedures were
made, MM III RVOSI were conducted for several years
with no complaints. However, Russian inspectors began again
to declare ambiguities. The Russian delegation began
reiterating concerns about MM III RVOSI in JCIC-XXII
(June-August 2000). Russia asserted that the U.S.
method of presenting the front section of a MM III ICBM for
viewing during an RVOSI was not Treaty-compliant
because it did not allow Russian inspectors to ascertain that
the front section contains no more RVs than the number of
warheads attributed to a MM III ICBM. For additional
background see Ref A.


26. (S) On March 4, 2008, the Russian Federation
delivered a non-paper that proposed a one-time MM III
RVOSI demonstration (Ref B). During JCIC-XXXII, the
Russian delegation stated that it would agree with the
United States conducting a demonstration at a
specially-allocated site, but believed it was better to
approximate actual RVOSI procedures. Such a
demonstration should follow the procedures contained in
Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol for conducting an
RVOSI. The U.S.delegation reiterated its position that
it had not agreed to such a demonstration but continued
to review this issue (Ref C).


27. (S) During a Heads of Delegation meeting during
JCIC-XXXIII (Ref D),the Russian delegation stated
there were four main points of the Russian side?s position
regarding a one-time demonstration of the MM III ICBM
front section: 1) the Russian side was interested in a
one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front
section in order to ascertain that the space inside the
lower portion of the missile front section could not
contain items commensurate with reentry vehicles and
was prepared to participate in this event; 2) in the
Russian side?s view, it did not appear possible to resolve this
concern without holding a one-time demonstration; 3)
the mere fact of conducting a demonstration, without
analyzing its results, could not guarantee resolution
of the problem; and 4) based on the results of the
demonstration, the Russian side was also prepared to
consider the U.S. position that any additional devices
(for example, mirror-type devices) used during the
demonstration would not be used in future inspections.


28. (S) On March 10, 2009, the United States received
an aide-memoire from the Russian Federation. One of the
four issues raised in the aide-memoire concerned
Minuteman III RVOSI. The official translation of that
portion of the aide-memoire is at paragraph 29, below.


29. (S) Begin text:

Official Translation

Russian Concerns Regarding U.S. Compliance with Certain
Provisions of the START Treaty (Aide-Memoire)

In view of the foregoing, we again direct the U.S.
side?s attention to our continuing concerns. At the
same time, we remind you that we are also awaiting comments
on the situations involving re-declaration of Peacekeeper
ICBM silo launchers at Warren and arranging a
demonstration of the front section of the Minuteman III
ICBM.

Moscow, March 10, 2009

End text.


30. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation should inform the other
Parties that the United States has determined that it
will organize a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman
III front section. This one-time demonstration will be
conducted outside the obligations of the Treaty and
will not be counted against the quotas of inspections
allocated to the other Parties. The procedures used to
conduct the demonstration will mimic procedures listed
in Annex 3 of the Inspection Protocol. After
separation from the ICBM, the front section will be
transported to a Specially allocated Site where
inspectors will be permitted to view the space inside
the lower portion of the front section to determine
that it cannot contain items corresponding to reentry
vehicles. Shrouding of sensitive elements may be
present and will not impede any determination that
additional reentry vehicles cannot be located within in
the space of the lower portion of the front section of
a Minuteman III ICBM. Delegation should stress that no
additional devices or equipment will be used during the
one-time demonstration. Delegation should also inform
the other Parties that the U.S. expectation for the
results of the demonstration will be a factual report
documenting the conduct of the demonstration, including
procedures used and what inspectors observed.


31. (S) Delegation should explain that the Minuteman
III ICBM RVOSI demonstration is a one-time event and will
not be a demonstration of a new method of presenting the
Minuteman III ICBM front section for use during future
RVOSIs. This is intended as a demonstration for the
purpose of fostering confidence and predictability in
the existing Minuteman III RVOSI procedures. The United
States does not intend that any new procedures specific
to this one-time demonstration will be codified. The
United States expects that satisfactory conduct of the
demonstration will allow the Parties to resolve this
issue, that the Parties will record this result in
Coordinated Statements, and that this issue accordingly
will be removed from the JCIC agenda.


32. (S) Based on issues raised by the Russian
Federation (Ref B),additional details concerning the modalities
of the demonstration are as follows:


1. The United States will select the ICBM base
for silo launchers of ICBMs at which the demonstration will
be conducted.


2. The Russian Federation inspectors will
designate the silo launcher of ICBMs containing the Minuteman III
front section for the demonstration.


3. The procedures set forth in Annex 3 to the
Inspection Protocol will be followed up to the point of
front section separation. The procedures set forth in
paragraph 1 of Annex 2 to the Inspection Protocol will
be used to view a silo launcher declared not to contain a
Minuteman III ICBM.


4. Following completion of the demonstration, a
narrative report will be prepared documenting the
conduct of the demonstration, including what procedures were
used and what inspectors observed.


5. Based on the satisfactory completion of the
demonstration, the Parties will exchange Coordinated
Statements recording the resolution of this issue and
its removal from the JCIC agenda.

========================
VARIOUS TELEMETRY ISSUES
========================

Refs: A) State 075306 (JCIC-XXXII-GUIDANCE-001)
B) Geneva 000591 (JCIC-XXXII-014)
C) 08 Geneva 0988 (JCIC-XXXIII-022)
D) State 6012 (JCIC-DIP-09-001)


33. (S) BACKGROUND: Though Russia has not placed any
telemetry items on the agenda for JCIC-XXXIV, it
continues to raise concerns regarding its inability to
playback U.S.-provided telemetry tapes associated with
various U.S.flight tests. Those flight tests include
the Trident II flight tests of November 4, 2004, and
May 9, 2006. For detailed background on each of these
flight tests, see Ref A. During JCIC-XXXII, the
Russian delegation said that it had studied U.S.
responses to questions regarding the Peacekeeper flight
test of March 12, 2003, and the Trident II flight tests
of November 4, 2004, and May 9, 2006, but still had
questions (Ref B). The Russian delegation again raised
questions during JCIC-XXXIII (Ref C),which the United
States responded to through diplomatic channels (Ref
D). The other flight tests in Ref A were not discussed
during JCIC-XXXIII.


34. (S) On December 23, 2008, the Russian Federation
provided a paper asking questions about the Minuteman
Flight Test of August 13, 2008. (Begin note: the
non-paper was not reported in a cable. End note.) The
official translation of that paper is at paragraph X.
below.


35. (S) Begin text:


Official Translation

Telemetric Information
for the Minuteman III ICBM Flight Test on August 13,
2008

In connection with the Minuteman III ICBM flight
test on August 13, 2008, we hereby inform you that
Russian technical experts are unable to play back the
telemetric information on radio link 2272.5 MHz for the
time interval 08:21:15-08:29:32, recorded on Track 6 of
Tape No. 12.

The reason for this, it would appear, is the fact
that the Microdyne 1400-MR telemetry receiver at the
disposal of the Russian side?s experts does not have a
BPSK Demodulator 1455-D. The ?Instruction Manual.
Model 1400-MR. Telemetry Receiver. Part No. 105-316-01. July
1986? calls for the use of this demodulator in
onjunction with the Microdyne 1400-MR telemetry receiver for
working with BPSK modulated signals.

The Russian side requests clarification of the
following:


1. Is the inability to play back the telemetric
information on radio link 2272.5 MHz for the time
interval 08:21:15-08:29:32, recorded on Track 6 of Tape
No. 12, due to the fact that the Microdyne 1400-MR
telemetry receiver does not have a BPSK Demodulator
1455-D?


2. Is it possible for the U.S. side to provide a
BPSK Demodulator 1455-D for the Microdyne 1400-MR
telemetry receiver?

Moscow, December 23, 2008

End text


36. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation should provide the U.S.
response in the form of a delegation paper. Begin text
of delegation paper:

U.S. Response to Russian Non-paper on
Telemetric Information for the Minuteman III ICBM
Flight Test on August 13, 2008

On December 23, 2008, the Russian Federation
Provided a paper asking questions about the Minuteman
III Flight Test of August 13, 2008. This delegation
paper responds to those questions.

U.S. Response to Questions 1 and 2: In its
December 23, 2008, non-paper, the Russian Federation asked
whether its inability to play back the telemetric information
on radio link 2272.5 MHz for the time interval
08:21:15-08:29:32, recorded on Track 6 of Tape No. 12
was due to the lack of a BPSK Demodulator 1455-D. The
Microdyne 1455-D demodulator is an obsolete piece of
equipment and cannot be provided. The Microdyne 1458-D
multi-mode telemetry demodulator as noted in Annex I,
Section III, Paragraph 3(d) of the Telemetry Protocol
is an updated version of that demonstrated by the U.S. and
is fully capable of serving as a substitute. The
Microdyne 1458-D already in possession of the Russian
Federation is capable of demodulating the signal
recorded on the tape in question during the time period
in question.

In the course of our examination stemming from the
Russian Federation?s questions, U.S. telemetry experts
have discovered a discrepancy in the tape summary and
associated drop-out report. The United States takes
this opportunity to provide corrected materials. However,
these discrepancies should have no bearing on the
Russian Federation?s ability to play back the telemetric
information in question.

End text.
CLINTON


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End Cable Text