JCIC-XXXIV GUIDANCE-002: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE

S E C R E T STATE 058439 GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2029 TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV GUIDANCE-002: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE REF: STATE 055556 (JCIC-XXXIV GUIDANCE-001) Classified By: Jerry Taylor, Director, VCI/SI. Reason: 1.4B and D ¶1. (U) This is the second tranche of guidance for JCIC-XXXIV. These instructions must be received by the JCIC Delegation in Geneva by opening of business June 8, 2009, for use during the JCIC session that convenes that day. JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE-001 (Omnibus Guidance) is contained in Reftel. ================ LIST OF GUIDANCE ================ ¶2. (C) BEGIN LIST OF GUIDANCE: Conversion of the B-1 Heavy Bomber (paragraphs 3-16); Peacekeeper Silo Conversion (paragraphs 17-24); Minuteman III ICBM RVOSI Demonstration (paragraphs 25-32); Various Telemetry Issues (paragraphs 33-36). END LIST OF GUIDANCE. ================================== CONVERSION OF THE B-1 HEAVY BOMBER ================================== REF: A. OIR for Conversion Inspection at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ January 19, 2008 ¶B. 08 State 59143 (JCIC-DIP-08-002): U.S. Response to Russian Federation Aide-Memoire on Conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber ¶C. OIR for Distinguishability Exhibition Dyess AFB, Texas February 21, 2008 ¶D. 08 Geneva 0590 (JCIC-XXXII-013) ¶E. 08 Geneva 0612 (JCIC-XXXII-026) ¶F. OIR for Data Update Inspection Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, July 10, 2008 ¶G. 08 Geneva 1005 (JCIC-XXXIII-017) ¶H. State 054967 (U.S. Response to Russian Federation Aide-Memoire on Conversion of the B-1 Heavy Bomber) ¶3. (S) BACKGROUND. On November 28, 2007, the USAF began the process of converting 67 B-1 heavy bombers from the category of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (LRNA) to the category of heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments using the procedures provided in the START Treaty. The conversion is being carried out at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB) Heavy Bomber Conversion or Elimination Facility in Arizona. ¶4. (S) Upon completion of the conversion of the first B-1 heavy bomber, the Russian Federation conducted a conversion inspection of the newly converted B-1 heavy bomber on January 19, 2008, at Davis-Monthan AFB. In the official inspection report (OIR) (Ref A), Russian inspectors declared three ambiguities and made one comment. ¶5. (S) On February 15, 2008, the Russian Federation delivered an aide-memoire (Ref B) stating its concerns and raising questions regarding the status of the converted B-1 heavy bomber including the conversion procedures used, the ability of Russian inspectors to confirm distinguishing features during inspections, and the subsequent basing of converted B-1 heavy bombers. ¶6. (S) On February 21, 2008, the Russian Federation, along with representatives from Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus, participated in a distinguishability exhibition for the B-1 heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments at Dyess Air Force Base. In the official inspection report (Ref C),the inspectors confirmed all of the distinguishing features for the two categories of B-1 heavy bombers exhibited, i.e., the B-1 equipped for non-nuclear armaments and the B-1 equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA. The inspectors included a comment that the United States had not demonstrated the incompatibility of the pylon attachment joints of the B-1 equipped for non-nuclear armaments with the pylon attachment joints for the long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missile (LRNA). ¶7. (S) On June 3, 2008, the United States responded to ambiguities and comments that had been made during the conversion inspection, the distinguishability exhibition, and the aide-memoire. The United States explained the specific conversion procedures that are used and reiterated that the conversion procedures used to convert the B-1 heavy bomber from the category of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA to the category of heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments fully satisfy the requirements of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. ¶8. (S) During discussions at JCIC-XXXII (Refs D and E), the Russian delegation provided a non-paper which stated that inspectors had no knowledge of the "before" condition of the pylon attachment joints or the weapons bay. They also stated that inspectors were not permitted to view the "objects" that were removed from the pylon attachment joints or the weapons bays. Moreover, the paper asserted that, in the Russian view, the conversion process must be such that the B-1 cannot be returned to its former state, i.e. capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The conversion process must be irreversible. ¶9. (S) As an additional concern, the Russian paper stated that it should be noted that on July 10, 2008 (Ref F),the Russian Federation conducted an inspection at Davis-Monthan under paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty. From the results of that inspection, it was found that on one B-1 heavy bomber (No. 84055) equipped for nuclear armaments (which had been partially disassembled) one pylon attachment joint for long-range nuclear ALCMs was in plain view. The Russian inspectors were surprised that it looked exactly the same as the modified forward attachment joint. ¶10. (S) During JCIC-XXXIII (Ref G),the Parties again discussed the issue. The U.S. delegation provided the other Parties with a U.S.-Proposed Joint Statement ?On The Conversion Of A Heavy Bomber So That It Is No Longer Equipped For Nuclear Armaments.? The U.S. delegation explained that the draft Joint Statement would facilitate understanding of the term ?incapable of carrying? as used in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. There was essentially no discussion of the conversion of the pylon attachment joint. ¶11. (S) On March 10, 2009, the Russian Federation provided an aide-memoire which stated that analysis of the U.S.-proposed Joint Statement showed that, ?... as in its earlier clarifications, the U.S. side is proposing to use the criterion of ?operational deployment of nuclear armaments? in order to resolve the problem related to U.S. non-compliance with paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol in carrying out the conversion of B-1 heavy bombers. ¶12. (S) In Russia?s view, the use of new criteria and corresponding concepts not provided for in the START Treaty is unacceptable. Moreover, Russia continues to believe that the B-1 heavy bombers converted by the U.S. side are still capable of carrying nuclear armaments. On the question of heavy bomber basing, Russia believed it was necessary to remind the United States that heavy bombers must be based at air bases, whose status is defined by the relevant term in the Definitions Annex to the START Treaty. The Davis-Monthan facility, which has been declared as a conversion or elimination facility, is not an air base. ¶13. (S) On December 10, 2008, the Air Force hosted representatives from State, OSD, and JCS at Davis- Monthan AFB during which a status update briefing on the B-1 Hard Point Conversion Program was provided. The briefing contained before and after photographs of the conversion of the pylon attachment joints, but only a single photograph of the weapons bay before conversion. A photograph of the weapons bay after conversion is not included in the briefing. Additional photographs of the intermediate steps of the pylon attachment joint conversion process are also included in the briefing. ¶14. (S) GUIDANCE. Delegation may draw from the non- paper in Ref H, stressing the need to come to agreement on the draft JCIC Joint Statement which addresses the definition of ?incapable of carrying nuclear armaments.? Delegation should reiterate that ?incapable of carrying? within the weapons bay does not mean ?will not physically fit? within the weapons bay. Delegation should stress that the conversion process to make the weapons bay ?incapable of carrying nuclear armaments? does not imply that the capability to deliver non-nuclear armaments must also be removed from the B-1. Delegation should make clear that this aspect of the issue must be resolved if the Parties are to resolve the B-1 conversion issue (weapons bay and pylon attachment joints). In attempting to resolve the weapons bay aspect of the issue, delegation may draw on the one photograph depicting the weapons bay prior to conversion from the briefing that was provided at Davis-Monthan AFB on December 10, 2008. ¶15. (S) If the parties are able to resolve the weapons bay aspect of the issue, and the Russian Delegation has further questions regarding the conversion of the pylon attachment joints, the delegation is authorized to draw on the photographs depicting the pylon attachment joint conversion process from the December 10, 2008, briefing to describe the actions taken to convert the B-1 to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Delegation may use the photographs to emphasize the appearance of the pylon attachment joints before and after the conversion process. ¶16. (S) Delegation is not authorized to provide copies of the photos to the Russian Delegation. =========================== PEACEKEEPER SILO CONVERSION =========================== Refs: A) 08 State 087779 (ANC/STR 08-660/3) B) 08 Moscow 2636 (Russian Federation Aide- Memoire, ?Russian Concern Over U.S. Conversion of 50 Peacekeeper ICBM Launchers Into Minuteman III ICBM Launchers,? dated September 2, 2008) C) Russian Federation Aide-Memoire on ?Russian Concerns Regarding U.S. Compliance with Certain Provisions of the START Treaty,? dated March 10, 2009 (No Reporting Cable) D) 08 State 103412 (RNC/STR 08-323/135) E) 08 Geneva 0983 (JCIC-XXXIII-011) F) State xxxxx (JCIC-DIP-09-005) G) State 057616 (ANC/STR 09-411/143) ¶17. (S) BACKGROUND: The U.S. Air Force placed the 50 Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers located at F.E. Warren Missile Complex, Wyoming, in caretaker status in August 2006 as part of the Peacekeeper ICBM deactivation process. This allows the U.S. Air Force to minimize personnel and maintenance costs to maintain the Peacekeeper silo launchers. The procedures to place the silo launchers into caretaker status included, but were not limited to, removal of the launch eject gas generators, launch systems controller computers, ballistic actuators, and other launch critical electrical equipment. These procedures removed the capability for the silo launchers to launch Peacekeeper ICBMs. The inability of the silo launchers to launch Peacekeeper ICBMs is consistent with the START Treaty requirement under paragraph 7 of Article III that the converted ICBM launchers be incapable of launching an ICBM of the previous type. ¶18. (S) On August 15, 2008, the United States provided a START Notification Format Number 3 that declared the conversion of 50 Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers into 50 Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers at F.E. Warren Missile Complex, Wyoming (Ref A). The decision to convert these silo launchers was purely for accounting purposes. At this time, the United States has no intention of installing Minuteman III ICBMs in the converted silo launchers. ¶19. (S) The Notification Protocol states that the Party conducting the silo launcher conversion shall provide notifications in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. These paragraphs provide for a thirty day advance notification of the initiation of a conversion process, a notification five days after initiation of the process, and a notification five days in advance of the installation of a different type of ICBM. ¶20. (S) With respect to the notification of the silo launcher conversions at F.E. Warren Missile Complex on August 15, 2008, there was no conversion process to initiate since the silo launchers were deactivated in 2006 and the United States had no plans to actually install Minuteman III ICBMs in these silos. The United States view was that only a START Notification Format Number 3 was required to alert the other Parties of the change in accountability of the silo launchers at F.E. Warren Missile Complex, Wyoming, from Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers to Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers. ¶21. (S) On September 2, 2008 (Ref B),the Russian Federation provided an aide-memoire asking why the United States did not provide notifications in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol in conjunction with the silo launcher conversions at F.E. Warren Missile Complex. The United States view was that it had satisfied the Treaty requirement for notifying the Parties about the change in accountability. No notifications were provided for the initiation of the conversion process since the silo launchers had been deactivated and there would be no process undertaken to physically change the silo launchers so that they could, in fact, be made capable of launching a Minuteman III ICBM. Similarly, no notifications were provided for the emplacement of a new missile since the launchers remain in a deactivated status with no missiles of the different type was installed in the launchers. ¶22. (S) The Russian Federation placed this issue on the agenda for JCIC-XXXIII (November 2008) (Ref D) and raised the issue during a Heads of Delegation meeting (Ref E). After reviewing Treaty provisions and reminding the U.S. delegation that Russia had not received a response to its September 2008 aide-memoire, Russian delegation member Kashirin stated that the results of a September 19-20, 2008, reentry vehicle inspection conducted at F. E. Warren ICBM Base had increased Russian concerns. Russian inspectors had reported that a senior site official declared that modifications of the Peacekeeper silos had not been carried out. Kashirin added that Russian inspectors viewed silo launcher P6 which formerly contained a Peacekeeper ICBM, but were unable to see any signs that a conversion process occurred. In fact, the launcher still contained a Peacekeeper canister; the launch canister was braced by elements of the suspension system. Therefore, Kashirin concluded, no conversion took place and the virtual declaration to Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers occurred in violation of the Treaty. Kashirin asked for an explanation. The U.S. delegation responded that the United States was still studying the issue. ¶23. (S) On March 10, 2009, the United States received an aide-memoire from the Russian Federation on ?Russian Concerns Regarding U.S. Compliance with Certain Provisions of the START Treaty.? In the aide-memoire, the Russian Federation reminded the United States that the Russian Federation was awaiting comments on the situation involving the ? . . . redeclaration of Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers at Warren . . ..? The United States provided an initial response (Ref F) to the aide-memoire (Ref B),along with initial responses to other issues that had been raised in the aide- memoire in May 2009. That response stated that the United States will provide a START Format 143 notification that rescinds notification of conversion of the Peacekeeper silo launchers to Minuteman III silo launchers. The United States view is that rescinding the notification resolves the issue. ¶24. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation should state that a NRRC Format 143 was provided on June 4, 2009 (Ref G) that rescinded the original notification of the 50 Peacekeeper silo launchers to Minuteman III silo launchers. Delegation should state that, in the U.S. view, rescinding the notification resolves the issue. If the other parties insist on additional discussion, Delegation should reiterate that the issue has been resolved. ====================================== MINUTEMAN III ICBM RVOSI DEMONSTRATION ====================================== Refs: A) 08 State 074953 (JCIC-XXXII-Guidance-002) B) Russian Non-paper: ?On the One-time Demonstration of the Minuteman III Front Section,? March 4, 2008 C) 08 Geneva 0585 (JCIC-XXXII-009) D) 08 Geneva 0976 (JCIC-XXXIII-010) E) Russian Federation Aide-Memoire on ?Russian Concerns Regarding U.S. Compliance with Certain Provisions of the START Treaty,? dated March 10, 2009 (No Reporting Cable) ¶25. (S) BACKGROUND: Russian complaints about Minuteman III (MM III) RVOSI date almost to the beginning of START Treaty implementation. The United States made changes to the manner in which it conducts MM III RVOSI to assuage Russian concerns. After the changes in procedures were made, MM III RVOSI were conducted for several years with no complaints. However, Russian inspectors began again to declare ambiguities. The Russian delegation began reiterating concerns about MM III RVOSI in JCIC-XXII (June-August 2000). Russia asserted that the U.S. method of presenting the front section of a MM III ICBM for viewing during an RVOSI was not Treaty-compliant because it did not allow Russian inspectors to ascertain that the front section contains no more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to a MM III ICBM. For additional background see Ref A. ¶26. (S) On March 4, 2008, the Russian Federation delivered a non-paper that proposed a one-time MM III RVOSI demonstration (Ref B). During JCIC-XXXII, the Russian delegation stated that it would agree with the United States conducting a demonstration at a specially-allocated site, but believed it was better to approximate actual RVOSI procedures. Such a demonstration should follow the procedures contained in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol for conducting an RVOSI. The U.S.delegation reiterated its position that it had not agreed to such a demonstration but continued to review this issue (Ref C). ¶27. (S) During a Heads of Delegation meeting during JCIC-XXXIII (Ref D),the Russian delegation stated there were four main points of the Russian side?s position regarding a one-time demonstration of the MM III ICBM front section: 1) the Russian side was interested in a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front section in order to ascertain that the space inside the lower portion of the missile front section could not contain items commensurate with reentry vehicles and was prepared to participate in this event; 2) in the Russian side?s view, it did not appear possible to resolve this concern without holding a one-time demonstration; 3) the mere fact of conducting a demonstration, without analyzing its results, could not guarantee resolution of the problem; and 4) based on the results of the demonstration, the Russian side was also prepared to consider the U.S. position that any additional devices (for example, mirror-type devices) used during the demonstration would not be used in future inspections. ¶28. (S) On March 10, 2009, the United States received an aide-memoire from the Russian Federation. One of the four issues raised in the aide-memoire concerned Minuteman III RVOSI. The official translation of that portion of the aide-memoire is at paragraph 29, below. ¶29. (S) Begin text: Official Translation Russian Concerns Regarding U.S. Compliance with Certain Provisions of the START Treaty (Aide-Memoire) In view of the foregoing, we again direct the U.S. side?s attention to our continuing concerns. At the same time, we remind you that we are also awaiting comments on the situations involving re-declaration of Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers at Warren and arranging a demonstration of the front section of the Minuteman III ICBM. Moscow, March 10, 2009 End text. ¶30. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation should inform the other Parties that the United States has determined that it will organize a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III front section. This one-time demonstration will be conducted outside the obligations of the Treaty and will not be counted against the quotas of inspections allocated to the other Parties. The procedures used to conduct the demonstration will mimic procedures listed in Annex 3 of the Inspection Protocol. After separation from the ICBM, the front section will be transported to a Specially allocated Site where inspectors will be permitted to view the space inside the lower portion of the front section to determine that it cannot contain items corresponding to reentry vehicles. Shrouding of sensitive elements may be present and will not impede any determination that additional reentry vehicles cannot be located within in the space of the lower portion of the front section of a Minuteman III ICBM. Delegation should stress that no additional devices or equipment will be used during the one-time demonstration. Delegation should also inform the other Parties that the U.S. expectation for the results of the demonstration will be a factual report documenting the conduct of the demonstration, including procedures used and what inspectors observed. ¶31. (S) Delegation should explain that the Minuteman III ICBM RVOSI demonstration is a one-time event and will not be a demonstration of a new method of presenting the Minuteman III ICBM front section for use during future RVOSIs. This is intended as a demonstration for the purpose of fostering confidence and predictability in the existing Minuteman III RVOSI procedures. The United States does not intend that any new procedures specific to this one-time demonstration will be codified. The United States expects that satisfactory conduct of the demonstration will allow the Parties to resolve this issue, that the Parties will record this result in Coordinated Statements, and that this issue accordingly will be removed from the JCIC agenda. ¶32. (S) Based on issues raised by the Russian Federation (Ref B),additional details concerning the modalities of the demonstration are as follows: ¶1. The United States will select the ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs at which the demonstration will be conducted. ¶2. The Russian Federation inspectors will designate the silo launcher of ICBMs containing the Minuteman III front section for the demonstration. ¶3. The procedures set forth in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol will be followed up to the point of front section separation. The procedures set forth in paragraph 1 of Annex 2 to the Inspection Protocol will be used to view a silo launcher declared not to contain a Minuteman III ICBM. ¶4. Following completion of the demonstration, a narrative report will be prepared documenting the conduct of the demonstration, including what procedures were used and what inspectors observed. ¶5. Based on the satisfactory completion of the demonstration, the Parties will exchange Coordinated Statements recording the resolution of this issue and its removal from the JCIC agenda. ======================== VARIOUS TELEMETRY ISSUES ======================== Refs: A) State 075306 (JCIC-XXXII-GUIDANCE-001) B) Geneva 000591 (JCIC-XXXII-014) C) 08 Geneva 0988 (JCIC-XXXIII-022) D) State 6012 (JCIC-DIP-09-001) ¶33. (S) BACKGROUND: Though Russia has not placed any telemetry items on the agenda for JCIC-XXXIV, it continues to raise concerns regarding its inability to playback U.S.-provided telemetry tapes associated with various U.S.flight tests. Those flight tests include the Trident II flight tests of November 4, 2004, and May 9, 2006. For detailed background on each of these flight tests, see Ref A. During JCIC-XXXII, the Russian delegation said that it had studied U.S. responses to questions regarding the Peacekeeper flight test of March 12, 2003, and the Trident II flight tests of November 4, 2004, and May 9, 2006, but still had questions (Ref B). The Russian delegation again raised questions during JCIC-XXXIII (Ref C),which the United States responded to through diplomatic channels (Ref D). The other flight tests in Ref A were not discussed during JCIC-XXXIII. ¶34. (S) On December 23, 2008, the Russian Federation provided a paper asking questions about the Minuteman Flight Test of August 13, 2008. (Begin note: the non-paper was not reported in a cable. End note.) The official translation of that paper is at paragraph X. below. ¶35. (S) Begin text: Official Translation Telemetric Information for the Minuteman III ICBM Flight Test on August 13, 2008 In connection with the Minuteman III ICBM flight test on August 13, 2008, we hereby inform you that Russian technical experts are unable to play back the telemetric information on radio link 2272.5 MHz for the time interval 08:21:15-08:29:32, recorded on Track 6 of Tape No. 12. The reason for this, it would appear, is the fact that the Microdyne 1400-MR telemetry receiver at the disposal of the Russian side?s experts does not have a BPSK Demodulator 1455-D. The ?Instruction Manual. Model 1400-MR. Telemetry Receiver. Part No. 105-316-01. July 1986? calls for the use of this demodulator in onjunction with the Microdyne 1400-MR telemetry receiver for working with BPSK modulated signals. The Russian side requests clarification of the following: ¶1. Is the inability to play back the telemetric information on radio link 2272.5 MHz for the time interval 08:21:15-08:29:32, recorded on Track 6 of Tape No. 12, due to the fact that the Microdyne 1400-MR telemetry receiver does not have a BPSK Demodulator 1455-D? ¶2. Is it possible for the U.S. side to provide a BPSK Demodulator 1455-D for the Microdyne 1400-MR telemetry receiver? Moscow, December 23, 2008 End text ¶36. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation should provide the U.S. response in the form of a delegation paper. Begin text of delegation paper: U.S. Response to Russian Non-paper on Telemetric Information for the Minuteman III ICBM Flight Test on August 13, 2008 On December 23, 2008, the Russian Federation Provided a paper asking questions about the Minuteman III Flight Test of August 13, 2008. This delegation paper responds to those questions. U.S. Response to Questions 1 and 2: In its December 23, 2008, non-paper, the Russian Federation asked whether its inability to play back the telemetric information on radio link 2272.5 MHz for the time interval 08:21:15-08:29:32, recorded on Track 6 of Tape No. 12 was due to the lack of a BPSK Demodulator 1455-D. The Microdyne 1455-D demodulator is an obsolete piece of equipment and cannot be provided. The Microdyne 1458-D multi-mode telemetry demodulator as noted in Annex I, Section III, Paragraph 3(d) of the Telemetry Protocol is an updated version of that demonstrated by the U.S. and is fully capable of serving as a substitute. The Microdyne 1458-D already in possession of the Russian Federation is capable of demodulating the signal recorded on the tape in question during the time period in question. In the course of our examination stemming from the Russian Federation?s questions, U.S. telemetry experts have discovered a discrepancy in the tape summary and associated drop-out report. The United States takes this opportunity to provide corrected materials. However, these discrepancies should have no bearing on the Russian Federation?s ability to play back the telemetric information in question. End text. CLINTON NNNN End Cable Text