CFE/VCC: GUIDANCE FOR JUNE 4, 2009 VCC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 056790 NOFORN, SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/15 TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE SUBJECT: CFE/VCC: GUIDANCE FOR JUNE 4, 2009 VCC REF: (A) STATE 36077, (B) USNATO 174, (C) 90USNATO 3160 Classified by: Johnathan Beckett, Acting Office Director, VCI/CCA. Reasons 1.4B and D. ¶1. (C/NF) This is an action request, see para 5. Aside from standard agenda items, the June VCC will include a focused discussion on future work of the VCC group of experts. The NATO IS added this topic to the agenda following an April 23 VCC discussion concerning the U.S. non-paper on the status of experts (Ref A). At the conclusion of the exchange on April 23, the VCC Chair (Miggins) recommended that Allies base a future discussion on the roles and functions of various groups of experts and their relationship with the VCC on the U.S. non-paper. With this in mind, USDel's primary objective will be to seek Alliance agreement on the positions presented in Ref A, namely: a. the United States sees the VCC as the main Allied venue in which to hold discussions and seek agreement concerning verification and some aspects of implementation of certain arms control treaties and agreements. b. the VCC has established sub-groups to address continuing technical issues or called for experts to address specific issues, on an as-needed basis. In all cases, these sub-groups' activities should be based on consensus-based taskings from the VCC. c. the VCC is responsible for coordinating and making recommendations on all arms control verification activities which have been agreed to be handled on a cooperative basis within the Alliance. When issues arise in the VCC that have potential policy implications, it is appropriate for the VCC to seek advice from the HLTF before proceeding itself, or tasking experts to address the issue. - - - - - - Background - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Ref A maintained that the VCC should remain the primary forum for discussion of implementation issues, that experts are tasked by the VCC as needed to support discussions in the VCC, and finally that the ad hoc group of experts, having completed their tasking to review VD 1999 implementation issues, should adjourn until called on again by the VCC. ¶3. (C) In assessing the 2009 AIAM, Allies agreed that experts' preparation of NATO positions on implementation issues enhanced overall Allied participation in the event. Drawing on this feedback, several delegations at ;the level of experts, as well as the Experts group Chair (IS rep Wiederholtz),expressed a desire to continue working on VD99 implementation issues throughout 2009. The U.S. is not convinced that this is a productive use of Alliance resources. Thus, the U.S. introduced its non-paper at the April VCC in order to check what seemed to be growing support within the group of experts to develop its own agenda for 2009, independent of direction from the VCC. ¶4. (C) Allies are far from united, however, in their views on how to employ ad hoc experts. Some delegations see value in the collaborative process demonstrated by experts in 2008 regardless of whether there are concrete results or VCC-directed tasks at hand. Others have promoted the concept of treating the group of ad hoc experts as an informal forum in which to tackle specific projects, such as a general review of VD 1999. Still others only seem interested in keeping experts occupied. In contrast, preliminary comments indicate that the more traditional role of experts outlined in the U.S. non- paper is supported by France, the UK and Germany. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - STATE 00056790 002 OF 008 Expanding on the U.S. Non-Paper - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) In general, USDel should use the points found in paras 6-9 to build support for the positions expressed in the U.S. non-paper. At the same time, Washington is interested in the substance and motives behind alternative views, especially if those views find wide support. The supplemental material located in paras 10- 19 should be used as required to respond to specific Allied concerns. Notes are provided for background, but may also be used as necessary to support U.S. interests. ¶6. (C/REL NATO) What is the purpose of the VCC? (Note. The 1990 TOR includes the following specific objective and tasks for the VCC: "Objective: To provide a forum in which National plans can be co-ordinated to ensure that co-operative verification measures are carried out without unwanted duplication of National efforts and that the most efficient use is made of the collective resources of Alliance countries." ¶A. Specific tasks with respect to the CFE Treaty: -- Exchanging information on national inspection plans -- Coordination and deconfliction of those plans -- Identification of verification shortfalls -- Ensuring maximum verification of destruction -- Early identification of unused Allied quotas to facilitate their redistribution to obtain optimal use of the overall Alliance quotas -- Setting standards for reporting, including common reporting formats -- Reviewing reports and maintaining a master schedule -- Reviewing the results of [verification measures] to contribute to a proper judgment on compliance -- Providing a forum for Alliance discussion of issues to be forwarded to the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) if desired -- Setting guidelines for establishing and maintaining a common database ¶B. With Respect to the implementation of the 1986 Stockholm Document (Note. This 1986 document was the operative CSBM document at the time of adoption of the TOR. End Note.): -- To provide a forum in which countries will exchange information on national plans for inspections and in which, where potential conflicts are identified, these are resolved bilaterally or multilaterally between the countries concerned; and -- To review the results of observation and inspections in order to contribute to a proper judgment on compliance issues. ¶C. To examine and make recommendations for consideration by the Council on new proposals for Alliance co- operation in the implementation of verification provisions in the framework of the arms control agreements mentioned above, or in future multilateral arms control treaties." In addition to the specified tasks mentioned above, the VCC provides a forum for the coordination of multinational inspection teams and the resolution of quota problems arising from non-Allied inspections. While these tasks go beyond the 1990 TOR list, they are consistent with the TOR's objective. End Note.) -- The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the VCC, as found in C-M(90)42, states that The VCC has "responsibility for STATE 00056790 003 OF 008 coordination and making recommendations on all activities in arms control verification which have been agreed by countries as being appropriate for handling on a cooperative basis within the Alliance." The United States sees the VCC as the main Allied venue in which to hold discussions and seek agreement concerning verification and implementation of existing arms control measures. ¶7. (C/REL NATO) What are the roles of groups of experts? -- When informal coordination, specific technical expertise, and/or extended discussion of a particular topic are required, the VCC has turned to experts. -- The VCC has established sub-groups to deal with continuing technical issues, such as the Data Management Experts Group (DMEG),or the group addressing Outstanding Implementation Issues (OII). -- In addition, the VCC has called for experts to meet on an as needed basis to perform such functions as allocating inspection opportunities, deconflicting inspection schedules, and evaluating specific issues. ¶8. (C/REL NATO) What is the relationship between the VCC and groups of experts? (Note. DMEG: The DMEG is a forum for the exchange of views of NATO nations' ADP experts and serves as an advisory body to the VCC. The origin of what became the DMEG predates the establishment of the VCC. As Allies developed NATO positions for the CFE negotiations, an "ADP subcommittee" of the HLTF Red Team/Blue Team was established to coordinate ADP activities and planning in support of the HLTF. After the VCC was established in mid-1990 it created an ADP Experts Group, the efforts of which were initially concentrated on collecting national views on ADP systems for use in CFE Treaty verification. In late 1990, the ADP Expert's Group became the Data Management Expert's Group (DMEG). When the VCC agreed to create and maintain a database to support the verification activities of the Allies, the requirements, development, operation, and further enhancement of the database (subsequently named "Verity") became--and continue to be--the main focus of the DMEG. OII: Open-ended meetings of experts on The Working Paper on "Outstanding Implementation Issues" (OII) have taken place since early 1996, when the Alliance was preparing for the first CFE Review Conference (May 1996). Modeled on the Alliance's prior work on an annual report on reductions, the resulting substantial report--the product of several meetings of experts--was used by Allies as a reference document for the Review Conference and issued in final form in 1997. Experience with the reductions report had shown that not all Allies appeared to have the resources to analyze fully the details of States Parties' Treaty obligations. The resulting document provided Allies with an agreed compendium of factual information on which nations could base their compliance judgments. Therefore, work has continued annually to produce an updated version of the paper and associated small papers which continue to provide Allies with agreed factual information on implementation of the CFE Treaty. Allocation/Deconfliction: Experts are convened according to the annual cycles for CFE and Vienna Document to allocate among Allies available opportunities for CFE inspections and, more recently, Vienna Document inspections and evaluation visits and to deconflict those activities. These meetings also provide a forum for making arrangements for exchanges of inspectors and evaluators. Other: Other groups of experts have been convened as needed by the VCC to discuss specific issues with limited scope and duration. End Note.) -- In our view, experts respond to consensus-based taskings of the VCC. This is true regardless of whether the group is one that operates continually to perform standing tasks, intermittently, or on an ad hoc basis. STATE 00056790 004 OF 008 That being said, the DMEG and OII have been working. And their aims and operations do not appear to be in question. ¶9. (C/REL NATO) What is the relationship between the VCC and HLTF? -- The HLTF was formed for the specific purpose of developing and coordinating Alliance negotiating positions on conventional arms control and providing guidance for Allied delegations in Vienna on a policy level. The HLTF considers CFE and CSBM issues from a strategic/policy perspective. -- The VCC primarily looks at verification and some aspects of implementation of certain treaties and agreements, but it also provides assessments and recommendations to Allied delegations in Vienna to support negotiations. -- While one is not subordinate to the other, the U.S. expects the VCC to take notice of and work to support policy positions agreed in the HLTF. ¶10. (C/REL NATO) When is it appropriate for the VCC to request guidance from the HLTF? -- We feel that it is appropriate for the VCC to seek advice from the HLTF when issues have potential policy implications. Specifically, we believe that it would be appropriate for the VCC to seek Alliance policy perspective before engaging in detailed discussions on issues related to A/CFE, opening VD 1999 for revision, or new Russian CSBM proposals. This list is non- exhaustive and Allies should be prepared to add additional issues as appropriate. - - - - - - - - - - - Supplemental Material - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C/REL NATO) Is there a need to create a mandate for (in essence, to formalize) recurring experts groups such as the DMEG and OII? (Note. The VCC Chair (Miggins) suggested that Allies consider whether it is necessary to formalize the work of recurring groups of experts. Washington believes that both the DMEG and the OII Experts Group operate well. Therefore, an attempt to construct new TOR for these groups is not necessary and could easily become counterproductive. End Note.) -- The DMEG and OII have been working well. We see no specific requirement to formalize their work through the creation of new formal mandates, which would take some time to develop. We would be reluctant to support efforts to develop new mandates. -- Likewise, experts groups called to coordinate and deconflict CFE and VD 1999 verification schedules annually have worked successfully with minimum guidance. The agreed procedures for implementation coordination, which were developed by experts and recommended to the VCC for approval, further improved this group's ability to efficiently coordinate Alliance activities. As such, we do not see a need to create a formal mandate and we would be reluctant to engage in an effort to do so. ¶12. (C/REL NATO) Is there a need to construct a mandate for a group of experts to more broadly review implementation? (Note. Norway, Denmark, Canada and possibly others might favor creation of a broad mandate for experts to look at implementation issues. End Note) -- We view the VCC as the principal forum for discussion and Alliance agreement on verification and implementation concerns. We welcome other views that might explain the benefits of moving discussion of new concerns from the VCC to a group of experts. -- We should be cautious about creating a broad mandate STATE 00056790 005 OF 008 for experts with regard to implementation issues. The JCG, FSC and their related working groups serve as open forums for discussion of CFE and VD 1999 implementation issues in Vienna. Alliance positions are often coordinated in Vienna at the JCG-T and the NATO mini- caucus (now combined into the NATO-T). Discussions in Brussels should augment/support Allied missions in Vienna, not create another layer of discussion that could complicate efforts in Vienna. ¶13. (C/REL NATO) Does the VCC need to reach consensus on whether to convene an ad hoc group of experts for all issues passed to experts? (Note. Canada was particularly adamant that Allies should be able to raise issues at the level of either the VCC or experts groups and that it should not require a consensus in the VCC to do so. End Note) -- Since the VCC is the principal venue for discussing verification and implementation concerns, we feel that experts should be responsive to the VCC. Requiring consensus on a decision to move an issue from the VCC to an experts group will assist in prioritizing work of experts and ensure that their work conforms to those tasks established in the TOR. -- The VCC Chair has the latitude to recommend that a given issue be forwarded to experts, but again, this should be agreed by Allies. -- Finally, there may be occasions when experts could submit recommendations to the VCC (for example, for unforeseen issues related to existing tasking). -- For all of these cases, we believe it is important for nations to agree that it would be more productive to task experts than to continue the discussion in the VCC. As in the past, this would typically be reflected in the VCC decision sheet with a standard entry. ¶14. (C/REL NATO) Should all implementation issues raised in Vienna be considered in the VCC or group of experts? (Note. Many Allied delegations in Vienna depend on the expertise of the VCC to support their national decision making on implementation issues. In some cases, advice has been provided on the initiative of the VCC. Norway has repeatedly called for experts to routinely review issues under discussion in Vienna, something that would fall under the idea of a broad mandate to review implementation issues, noted in para 12. End Note.) -- We believe that the VCC is a forum where any Ally can raise any concern over verification and implementation of arms control agreements/treaties. -- Although we do not think that the VCC should necessarily review an issue simply because it has been raised in Vienna, one of the VCC's tasks, according to the TOR, is to provide a forum for Alliance discussion of issues to be forwarded to the JCG (if desired). We believe it is important to keep open the lines of communication between the VCC and delegations in Vienna. -- From time to time, the JCG-T or NATO-T requests assessments from the VCC. The VCC has always responded to requests from the predecessors of the NATO-T. ¶15. (C/REL NATO) Would it be appropriate for the VCC to conduct a broad review of VD 1999 implementation? (Note. This idea has been championed by Norway and Denmark, who argue that the Alliance should reply to Russian statements regarding the relevance of VD 1999 in its current form. They suggest that in order to respond, the Alliance should either conduct its own analysis or critique Russia's. End Note.) -- Factual and statistical reviews of participating States' implementation of VD 1999, such as those conducted by NATO ACCS and the OSCE CPC Secretariat, have been useful tools in VCC discussions each year. But the idea of a broad review of implementation is STATE 00056790 006 OF 008 something different. For example a review of the relevance of VD 1999, such as that proposed by Russia in Vienna, would clearly have policy implications that would have to be considered. It would be prudent for the VCC to seek advice from the HLTF before undertaking such a review. ¶16. (C/REL NATO) Should the criteria for making a determination on whether an issue is passed to experts include "importance"? (Note. Canada suggested that it was appropriate for Allies to raise "important" issues in the VCC, but that Allies should be free to raise issues regarding day-to- day implementation at the level of experts. End Note.) -- The VCC is the primary forum in which to raise issues of verification of implementation of existing arms control measures. -- We see no criteria for an issue or threshold it should meet to warrant discussion in the VCC. -- The decision on whether to send an issue to experts should be made in the VCC based on a determination that discussion/study at the level of experts would add value. -- Nevertheless, regarding the meeting of experts, we believe it would be appropriate for an Ally to raise at the experts level a matter or concern connected to work on tasks agreed by the VCC. ¶17. (C/REL NATO) Is there any value to holding an open- ended meeting of experts with an open agenda (i.e., an informal forum for discussion of any implementation topic or concern by interested parties?) (Note. Turkey suggested that Allies could consider holding "open-ended" meetings for experts, in which only those interested in the agenda would attend. End Note.) -- We prefer initial discussion of verification and implementation issues to take place in the VCC. This would allow a determination on whether an issue merits additional attention, including from experts. -- We would be interested to hear what value would be added by discussions by limited groups of experts. ¶18. (C/REL NATO) If the work of experts last year was useful, why not continue the practice in 2009 in preparation for the 2010 AIAM? -- In 2008, the VCC agreed to task the experts to look at implementation issues in preparation for the 2009 AIAM. -- Throughout 2008 we discussed 17 implementation issues, of which five eventually found broad support and two were presented at the AIAM. Of note, most if not all of these issues had been discussed previously. -- If there are additional implementation concerns that Allies wish to address in preparation for the 2010 AIAM, then Allies should raise them in the VCC with an eye toward preparing appropriate issues for discussion at the 2010 AIAM--or future AIAMs. -- With consensus in the VCC, such issues could be the subject of detailed review by experts. ¶19. (C/REL NATO) What topics are appropriate for experts? -- Recurring requirements such as those addressed in the DMEG, OII, and schedule coordination/deconfliction meetings. -- Issues determined by the VCC to be of a technical nature that would require recurring or extended study, and could be handled more efficiently at the level of technical experts. STATE 00056790 007 OF 008 -- Issues that the Chair deems appropriate for experts to review, which then are approved by the VCC. -- Issues which experts may recommend for consideration by the VCC in conjunction with an established tasking. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Reports on Verification Activities and Scheduling Updates - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶20. (C/REL NATO) VD 1999 VD99 Inspections Conducted by the United States: --(C/REL NATO) The United States conducted a Vienna Document 1999 inspection of a specified area in Azerbaijan during the week of 3 to 9 May 2009. The inspection team included four inspectors from the United States and one inspector from Turkey. The specified area for the inspection encompassed an area of approximately 22,000 square kilometers of eastern Azerbaijan and included the Ministry of Defense headquarters, the garrison of the 4th Army Corps at Mushvigabad, and the garrison areas of the following units: - 13th Motorized Rifle Brigade at Zeynalabdin - 14th Motorized Rifle Brigade at Pirekeshkyul - 20th Motorized Rifle Brigade at Kusari - Artillery Training Brigade at Baku - Security and Services Brigade at Baku - Separate Signal Brigade at Baku - Separate Logistics Brigade at Baku - Separate Engineer Brigade at Sangachali - Fighter Bomber Regiment at Kyurdamir - Helicopter Regiment at Gala --(C/REL NATO) The inspection team received briefings on the 4th Army Corps and all 10 of the units. In addition, the inspection team visited the garrisons of the 13th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 20th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the Separate Engineer Brigade, and the Fighter Bomber Regiment. Azerbaijani military representatives answered all questions posed by the inspection team, which judged that the conduct of the inspection met with the letter and the spirit of Vienna Document 1999. (C/REL NATO) Changes to the US Vienna Document 1999 Schedule: -- United States VD-99 inspection to Turkmenistan scheduled for CW-21 has been rescheduled for CW-24; -- United States VD-99 inspection to Finland for CW-24 has been canceled; -- United States to Kyrgyzstan in CW-28 will be rescheduled this fall. (CW TBD) ¶21. (C/REL NATO) Turkmenistan update: On 13 May the United States sent a notification to the GOT requesting a Specified Area inspection. The request, which was distributed to pS via OSCE message number CBM/US/09/15/F33/O, was also hand-delivered to the MFA in Ashgabat the same day. On 14 May the Turkmen MFA notified the U.S. that it had rejected our notification for technical reasons. After engaging the Turkmen Missions in Washington and Vienna, the GOT began processing the request on 15 May. By the close of business in Washington on Friday, 15 May the U.S. had not received assurances that the U.S. team would be accepted on Monday, and sent a notification CSB-US-09- 0016-F041 informing the GOT that the U.S. was postponing the inspection. Turkmenistan finally notified the U.S. Mission to the OSCE in Vienna on Saturday, May 16 that it would accept the U.S. inspection. United States has rescheduled its VD-99 inspection to Turkmenistan for CW- ¶24. STATE 00056790 008 OF 008 ¶22. (C/REL NATO) Based on the information available, it appears likely that this was an unintentional mishandling of the original U.S. notification and an isolated incident. We received assurances from Turkmenistan in Washington, Ashgabat and Vienna that future notifications will be processed within the timelines found in VD 1999. ¶23. (C/REL NATO) CFE -- The United States did not conduct any CFE inspections during this timeframe. -- (C/REL NATO) Changes to the United States CFE inspection schedule: -- The United States planned CFE declared site inspection to Armenia has been rescheduled from TB-15 to TB-24. CLINTON