GEORGIA - GUIDANCE FOR UNOMIG RESOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 056222 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2019 TAGS: UNSC PREL GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA - GUIDANCE FOR UNOMIG RESOLUTION NEGOTIATIONS Classified By: IO A/S Esther D. Brimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) This is an action request: USUN should work with the Quad,Croatia, Austria and Turkey as necessary to reach and maintain consensus on a draft resolution to revise the current security regime and mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) according to the objectives, goals, and redlines outlined below. In addition, USUN should seek and maintain unity within the Quad on negotiation tactics for securing Council adoption of an acceptable resolution. If Quad consensus cannot be reached and/or the negotiations become stalled, USUN should approach the Department for further guidance, especially as it relates to possible bilateral engagement with Russia. Objectives -------------- ¶2. (C) Post should pursue the following objectives during consultations: -- Secure and maintain Quad consensus on a draft resolution that revises UNOMIG's security regime and mandate based on the elements and redlines outlined below, avoiding language that may weaken the Council,s support for Georgia's territorial integrity. -- Secure and maintain Quad unity on negotiation tactics, including agreement on our approach with Russia. Background -------------- ¶3. (C) Our long-term interest in preserving a UN Mission in Georgia is to lay the foundation for eventual restoration of Georgia,s territorial integrity through peaceful means and through a policy of non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Achieving these interests will require strategic patience and the gradual evolution of Georgia into a more attractive partner for the separatists. Our short-term goals are to avoid armed conflict and the further separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia, as well as to address humanitarian and human rights concerns. To achieve these goals, we seek a UNOMIG mandate that will: (implicitly) support Georgia,s territorial integrity; maintain an institutional connection between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia; avoid a statement or suggestion that Russia is not a party to the conflict(s); and contribute to addressing key humanitarian and human rights issues. We will not support a continued UN presence in Georgia that compromises these goals by crossing our redlines, which are listed in paragraph 5. Redlines and Elements for Resolution Negotiations -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) During negotiations, USUN should pursue inclusion of the following elements in the resolution text. The following elements are desirable, but ultimately are not redlines to our support for a continued UN presence in Georgia: -- language calling for the return of IDPs and refugees; -- language calling for unhindered humanitarian aid; -- "strengthened8 UN police and human rights capabilities; -- monitoring of the Kodori valley - this is among the elements of the security regime as recommended by the UN Secretary General,s report; -- references to the EUMM, OSCE, and Geneva talks; -- preserving the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) as the name of the Mission (if the name cannot be preserved explicitly, our preference is to maintain it implicitly or leave the matter ambiguous. If pressed on the establishment of a new name, USUN should seek further guidance); -- monitoring of Ochamchire (a key port Russian naval forces use for reinforcement); -- access to South Ossetia - USUN should make every effort to retain language in the resolution that provides a "hook" for a future UN presence in the South Ossetian region; -- headquarters in Tbilisi (vice Sukhumi); -- references to &Abkhazia, Georgia8 and &South Ossetia, Georgia.8 ¶5. (C) During negotiations, the following are U.S. redlines: -- security regime must include symmetrical security zones on both sides of the ceasefire line with some restrictions on the numbers of military personnel and weapons in these zones; -- resolution text must include mention of the need for implementation of the August 12 ceasefire agreement (our strong preference is for an operative paragraph calling for implementation of the ceasefire agreement and requesting the SYG to report on implementation); -- security regime must include freedom of movement for UN personnel across the administrative boundary line (ABL); -- resolution text must include either direct or indirect mention of Georgia,s territorial integrity (e.g. endorsement of UNSCR 1808 is not preferred, but acceptable). -- we will not accept/support any reference that implies conditional or incomplete support for Georgia,s territorial integrity; -- we will not accept/support any caveat explicitly allowing for Russian troops and/or military equipment in the security zones; -- we will not accept/support any implication that Russia is not a party to the conflict (e.g. reference to &the Abkhaz and Georgian sides8 versus &all parties to the conflict8 or &the parties8); -- we will not accept/support any references to Abkhazia or South Ossetia that imply or assume statehood. Whither the Arria-style Meeting -------------- ¶6. (C) The U.S. will not support an appearance by Abkhaz and/or South Ossetian de facto leaders at a formal Security Council meeting under Rule 39. However, during the course of negotiations, should Russia raise the issue of their appearance at an informal "Arria-style" meeting, the U.S. is willing to consider supporting such an appearance, but only with a major substantive Russian concession in advance of the meeting (e.g., a UN executive police force or access by the UN mission to South Ossetia). Prior to reaching such an agreement, USUN should seek Department approval. Department Point of Contact -------------- ¶7. (U) Please contact IO/UNP K.G. Moore, 202-647-0042, moorekg@state.gov for additional background, guidance or with questions. CLINTON