JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE-001 -- OMNIBUS GUIDANCE

S E C R E T STATE 055556 GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2029 TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE-001 -- OMNIBUS GUIDANCE Classified By: Jerry Taylor, Director VCI/SI. Reason 1.4B and D ¶1. (U) These instructions must be received by the JCIC Delegation in Geneva by opening of business June 8, 2009, for use during the JCIC session that convenes that day. The United States proposed that the Parties meet for JCIC-XXXIV (State 043464) and the Russian Federation accepted (State 046486). Belarus (State 048909),Ukraine (State 048003),and also agreed to meet. This cable contains JCIC-XXXIV-Guidance-001, which consists of paragraphs 1-28. ================= PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ================= ¶2. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, previous instructions for all JCIC issues are unchanged. ================ LIST OF GUIDANCE ================ ¶3. (S) BEGIN LIST OF GUIDANCE: Closure of Points of Entry (paragraphs 4-7); Completion of Continuous Monitoring (paragraphs 8-11); U.S. Concerns with the Russian Federation Declaration of a prototype of a new type ICBM and SS-27 Launch Canister MOU Photographs (paragraphs 12-16); U.S. Activity at the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility in the context of Treaty Obligations (paragraphs 17-20; Data Update Inspection Results at Davis-Monthan (paragraphs 21 and 22); SS-27 Reentry Vehicle Inspections (Paragraphs 23-25; SS-25 eliminations (paragraphs 26-28). ========================== CLOSURE OF POINTS OF ENTRY ========================== Refs: A) 08 Geneva 0592 (JCIC-XXXII-006) B) 08 Geneva 0583 (JCIC-XXXII-010) C) 08 Geneva 0607 (JCIC-XXXII-017) ¶4. (S) Background: During JCIC-XXXII, at a Heads of Delegation Meeting (Ref A) ON July 17, 2008 and at a Working group meeting ON July 21, 2008 (Ref B),the parties discussed completion of continuous monitoring at Votkinsk and the closure of points of entry (POEs) under the START Treaty. The parties agreed that much work remained to be done to accomplish the two tasks and that further discussion should be undertaken by experts. ON July 23, 2008, the Russian delegation provided a non-paper outlining the tasks that needed to be accomplished (Ref C) for the completion of continuous monitoring at Votkinsk and closure of POEs. ¶5. (S) The Russian paper requested that the United States provide proposals regarding the removal of inspection and 
other equipment (including radiation detection equipment) from the points of entry, as well as the U.S. side's thoughts ON the Russian side's role in carrying out this work, including funding of the work. The paper continued that this information will enable the Russian side to determine the scope of the measures needed to assist the United States of America in carrying out its plans and to identify the national-level entities responsible for their implementation. ¶6. (S) Washington has studied the issue of closure of POEs and has concluded that there is in fact little advance work that needs to be accomplished to effect the closure of POEs. Procedures are in place that would permit the removal of any inspection equipment stored at the POEs, including radiation sources. The view of the United States is that all equipment, stored at the POEs can be removed with the last few inspection teams when they exit the POEs. There is no equipment being stored within Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine. ¶7. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation should inform the other parties that the view of the United States is that no special procedures need to be agreed to, nor are changes needed to any documents associated with the Treaty related to the closure of the POEs. The U.S. view is that all Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE) currently stored at the Moscow and Ulan Ude POEs can be removed with the last few inspection teams exiting from those POEs. In addition to the RDE stored at the Moscow POE, there is a radiation source which will either have to be removed via a commercial shipping company or extracted via an inspection aircraft associated with one of the final inspections through that POE. The United States prefers to use the commercial shipping option and DTRA is currently working with a Lufthansa shipping agent to coordinate that procedure which was the same method used to ship the source to Moscow in 1992. The United States will pay all costs associated with the removal of the source via commercial shipper. There is no radiation source stored at the Ulan-Ude POE nor is there any other U.S. equipment or radiation source stored at the POEs of the other Parties. It is the view of the United States that Russian equipment stored at U.S. POEs can be removed by inspection teams in a similar fashion. The radiation sources being stored and used by Russian inspection teams at U.S. POEs are the property of DTRA and will remain in the United States. Accordingly, there should be no funding impact ON any of the Parties related to POE closure. ============================================= ============= COMPLETION OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES AT VOTKINSK ============================================= ============= Refs: A) Russian-Proposed Text for a JCIC Agreement ON Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk, dated January 26, 2009, and Associated Letters ON Ground Transportation and Cost Settlement Procedures (e-mailed to Washington, no reporting cable) B) 08 State 115553 (JCIC-DIP-08-008A) C) 08 State 115554 (JCIC-DIP-08-008B) D) 08 Geneva 0987 (JCIC-XXXIII-009) ¶8. (S) Background: The United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have been negotiating a Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) agreement concerning the closure of the U.S. START Treaty Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring System (PPCMS) located near Votkinsk, Russia, and two exchanges of Letters, one on Ground Transportation and a second ON Settlement of Accounts. Washington has completed a detailed review of: (1) Russian proposals, dated January 26, 2009 (Ref A); and (2) original U.S. proposals delivered last year in capitals (Refs B and C),and also tabled at JCIC-XXXIII in Geneva ON November 13, 2008 (Ref D). Based ON this review, Washington believes that significant progress has been made in resolving any issues that may exist in the documents. ¶9. (S) Washington would note that the previous U.S. and Russian proposals for the draft JCIC correspondence ON settlement of accounts do not sufficiently extend START cost settlement procedures to permit the Parties to settle costs using Treaty procedures that are associated with non-monitoring Treaty activities (e.g., inspection costs) after the Treaty expires or is superseded by a subsequent agreement. ¶10. (S) Washington has drafted revised proposals to address any remaining issues in the documents, but given that negotiations are beginning ON a Treaty to replace the START Treaty, the United States has decided not to table the revised proposals or discuss the issue in the JCIC. Washington believes that any discussion of closure of the Votkinsk portal monitoring facility in the JCIC could prejudice discussion of the issue in the START Follow-On negotiations. ¶11. (S) Guidance. U.S. Delegation should inform the other delegations that, because of the on-going START Follow-on negotiations, any discussion ON this issue should be deferred. =========================================== U.S. CONCERNS WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S DECLARATION OF A PROTOTYPE OF A NEW TYPE OF ICBM; SS-27 LAUNCH CANISTER MOU PHOTOGRAPHS =========================================== Refs: A) 07 State 160336 (JCIC-XXXI-Guidance-001, Part A) B) 07 Geneva 002575 (JCIC-XXXI-012) C) 07 Geneva 002572 (JCIC-XXXI-027) D) 08 Geneva 0983 (JCIC-XXXIII-011) E) 07 State 34013 (JCIC-DIP-07-002) F) START IR 2009-003/Votkinsk Portal Monitoring/Road-Mobile SS-27 ICBMs and Associated Railcar Exits (21 January 2009) G) START IR 2008-075/Votkinsk Portal Monitoring/Road-Mobile SS-27 ICBMs and Associated Railcar Exits (5 December 2008) H) START IR 2008-066/Votkinsk Portal Monitoring/Road-Mobile SS-27 ICBMs and Associated Railcar Exits (19 October 2008) ¶12. (S) BACKGROUND: For detailed background, see Ref A. During JCIC-XXXI (Ref B),the U.S. delegation asked the Russian delegation: to clarify how the RS-24 would be different enough from the SS-27 to be considered a new type of ICBM under the Treaty; to describe external differences that might assist portal monitors in telling the RS-24 and SS-27 launch canisters apart; and to provide an updated picture of road-mobile SS-27 ICBMs that exit the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility (VPMF) to assist portal monitors in distinguishing between the RS-24 and SS-27 launch canisters. ¶13. (S) The Russian delegation confirmed that when an RS-24 exited the VPMF, it was equipped with a removable "technological section" ON the forward end of the launch canister, and that this technological section equated to the red painted area described by Russia as one of the distinguishing features of the RS-24. The section was used only to facilitate transport in existing railcars and was replaced at the Plesetsk Test Range with a longer canister section (not further identified). In response to U.S. concerns, the Parties issued a Coordinated Plenary Statement documenting Russian assurances that the RS-24 would have "external and functional differences that will make it possible to distinguish these launch canisters from other items of continuous monitoring" when it exits the VPMF (Ref C). The Russian delegation also provided photographs that "could be used by monitors and inspectors that would clearly differentiate this ICBM (launch canister) from another type of ICBM" (Ref C). ¶14. (S) The issue was briefly discussed during JCIC-XXXIII (Ref D) with no resolution. Washington still has concerns with regard to the Russian Federation's plans for testing and deployment of the RS-24 prototype ICBM and the ability of monitors and inspectors to distinguish an RS-24 launch canister from an SS-27 launch canister despite the RS-24 photographs provided by the Russian Federation. Washington notes that the Russian Federation has not provided updated MOU SS-27 launch canister photographs, and has not provided its rationale for why the SS-25 should be used as the baseline for declaration of the new type. Moreover, there have been varied configurations of the SS-27 Launch canisters exiting from Votkinsk. Differences in the launch canisters have been documented in the inspection reports (Refs F, G, and H) ¶15. (S) GUIDANCE: Drawing from applicable points in the U.S. paper (Ref E),"U.S. Concerns Regarding Russia's Declaration of a Prototype for a New Type of Road-Mobile ICBM and the Conversion of a Road-Mobile Test Launcher," delegation should continue to seek information from the Russian Federation with respect to its plans in conjunction with the testing and deployment of the RS-24 prototype ICBM. In this regard, delegation may also note that the acceleration profiles provided by the Russian Federation for the flight tests of the SS-27 (RS-12MV2) and the RS-24 are very similar. Delegation should also stress that the existing MOU photographs for the SS-27 ICBM in its launch canister no longer correspond to the configuration of these missiles as they currently exit Votkinsk and request up-to-date MOU photographs. Delegation should stress that more up-to-date MOU photographs for the SS-27 may assist monitors and inspectors in the future to differentiate between the SS-27 and the RS-24 ICBMs. ¶16. (S) Delegation should provide the Russian delegation with the following list of differences in SS-27 launch canisters that have been observed by portal monitors and documented in inspection reports: -- The pair of black cables ON the forward end of the non-UID side were missing. -- Two white cables running from and under the first box from the left ON the forward end of the non-UID side and running lengthwise down the canister under the cable raceway were missing. -- The two large raceways visible ON the non-UID side of the canister, towards the tope of the canister, were separated by a gap roughly 2/3 down the canister towards the LAD in the MOU photograph. The gap was noticeably smaller ON the inspected launch canister. -- Extending from the second box ON the non-UID side were three large conduits not present in the MOU photos. -- ON top of the canister and running the length of the canister to a point above the UID, monitors observed a long narrow rectangular raceway over ten supporting boxes and then another long narrow rectangular raceway over nine additional supporting boxes with 4 cables attached to the forward end. -- The white cable running from the second box from the right ON the forward end of the UID side to the LAD end of the UID side was missing. -- ON the UID side extending from the first box forward of the LAD were fourteen cables not visible ON the MOU photograph. -- Just forward of the first box in item "G" were eight cables not visible in the MOU photographs. -- A new box was present just aft of the UID and is not visible in the MOU photos. ============================================= ============== ======== U.S. ACTIVITY AT COURTLAND MISSILE ASSEMBLY FACILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS ============================================= ============== ======== Refs: A) 08 State 74953 (JCIC-XXXII-GUIDANCE-002) B) 08 State 120346 JCIC-XXXIII-GUIDANCE-001) C) 08 Geneva 0572(JCIC-XXXII-008) D) 08 Geneva 0998 (JCIC-XXXIII-015) E) Russian aide-memoire ON Russian Concerns Over The U.S. Side's Declaration of the Courtland Facility and the Activity Being Conducted There, dated October 20, 2008 (No Reporting Cable) F) Russian aide-memoire ON Russian Concerns Regarding U.S. Compliance with Certain Provisions of the START Treaty, dated March 10, 2009 (No Reporting Cable) G) State 040874 (JCIC-DIP-09-002) ¶17. (S) BACKGROUND: See Refs A and B for background and previous guidance. The issue was discussed at a Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting (Ref C) during JCIC-XXXII ON July 18, 2008 and also discussed during a HOD meeting during JCIC-XXXIII (Ref D) ON November 8, 2008. During JCIC-XXXIII meeting, the U.S. delegation responded to an aide memoire that was delivered ON October 20, 2008 (Ref E). ON March 10, 2009, the Russian Federation provided an aide-memoire that again addressed Russian concerns with U.S. Compliance With Certain Provisions of the START Treaty, including the Courtland facility. The aide-memoire ON Courtland raises no new concerns, but is essentially a repackaging of previous arguments. Paragraph 18, below, contains the official translation of the portion of the aide-memoire addressing Courtland. ¶18. (S) Begin official translation of Russian aide-memoire ON Courtland (Begin Comment: The aide-memoire addressed Russian concerns with Conversion of B-1 Heavy Bombers in addition to U.S. Activities at Courtland as well as noting that the Russian Federation was also awaiting comments ON the situations involving the redeclaration of Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers and arranging a demonstration of the front section of the Minuteman III ICBM. End Comment): Official Translation Russian Concerns Regarding U.S. Compliance with Certain Provisions of the START Treaty (Aide-Memoire) ¶2. U.S. Activities at Courtland. The Russian side has reviewed the U.S. Response to Russian Concerns Regarding the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility of November 19, 2008. We consider it necessary to note the following. The U.S. side has never answered the question as to how the status of the Courtland facility correlates with the START definition of the term "production facility." In this connection, we believe that U.S. activities at Courtland are not consistent with paragraph (a) of the definition of this term. Consequently, Courtland cannot be considered a production facility, as provided for in the START Treaty. In the Russian side's view, it is also incorrect to assert that a target missile incorporating a Trident I SLBM first-stage motor can be regarded as a Trident I SLBM in accordance with paragraph 3(a) of Article III of the Treaty. This paragraph deals with first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs of a specific type, while according to the U.S. side's clarifications, Trident I SLBM first-stage motors or a target vehicle incorporating such a motor will exit the Courtland facility. Obviously, a target missile and a Trident I SLBM are not the same thing. Following the U.S. side's logic, any missile system that incorporates the first-stage motor of an ICBM or SLBM can be classified as an ICBM or SLBM of the corresponding type. Such an approach is contrary to the fundamental criteria defined in the Treaty for confirming the type of an item of SOAs. As you know, these include external appearance, dimensions (including in assembled form),and technical characteristics. The U.S. side's clarifications still do not answer the question as to which launchers will launch the target missiles and do not provide technical data for the new item. In this connection, the issue concerning inspection of the new items containing a Trident I SLBM first-stage motor remains unresolved. What is the inspection team to do if they encounter this item? What type of strategic offensive arms is it to be considered? The START Treaty does not provide for the category "target vehicle," and, as we understand it, its technical characteristics will not correspond to any of the items declared under the START Treaty. End Text. ¶19. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation should clarify any misconceptions contained in the March 10, 2009, Russian Federation aide-memoire, such as the statement that any missile system that incorporates the first stage motor of an ICBM or SLBM can be classified as an ICBM or an SLBM of the corresponding type is contrary to the fundamental criteria in the Treaty for confirming the type of an item. The Trident first stages are being assembled into space launch vehicles which will be used as target vehicles. The Delegation should reaffirm that all Treaty required notifications will be made and that the Treaty's locational restrictions apply to these items. Delegation may also offer that the first exit of a space launch vehicle from the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility will occur this year, and that technical data (Ref G) for this vehicle has been provided to the other Parties. If the other Parties continue to question how the status of the Courtland Missile Assemble Facility correlates with the START definition of an SLBM production facility, the Delegation should use the points from Ref B in refuting Russian arguments. In particular, delegation should reinforce that U.S. activities at Courtland are consistent with the definition of a production facility by making the following points: -- Treaty definition (Number 82 paragraph (a) (iii)) states that "for ICBMs or SLBMs, a facility at which first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored and transported in stages are assembled." -- Trident I SLBM first stage motors, which had been used previously as part of accountable Trident I SLBMs, that are brought to Courtland will undergo activities consistent with work done at production facilities, including stage assembly. ¶20. (S) If the Russian delegation continues to insist that the United States also provide information ON where the LV-2 space launch vehicle, which will be used as a missile defense target vehicle, will be launched from, delegation should provide the following: -- The first such vehicle to exit the Courtland Missile Assemble Facility will be the LV-2 space launch vehicle. The initial use of the LV-2 space launch vehicle will be as a target vehicle for testing of the U.S. ballistic missile defense system, and other uses consistent with the START Treaty are possible. -- As this space launch vehicle remains accountable under the START Treaty, all required Treaty notifications will be provided and launch of the space launch vehicle will occur from facilities declared under the START Treaty. ============================================= == DATA UPDATE INSPECTION RESULTS AT DAVIS-MONTHAN ============================================= == Refs: A) START OIR 080711 (Davis-Monthan Air Force Base DUI) B) START OIR 081018 (Davis-Monthan Air Force Base DUI) C) GENEVA 002540 (JCIC-XXXI-013) D) STATE 162793 (JCIC-XXXI GUIDANCE-002) ¶21. (S) BACKGROUND. Russian inspection teams conducted Data Update Inspections at Davis-Monthan AFB ON July 11, 2008 (Ref A) and October 17, 2008 (Ref B). During the inspection, the Russians confirmed the declared number of B-52 bombers present at the facility (51). However, the inspection team declared two ambiguities at the conclusion of the inspection. In one ambiguity the inspection team stated that elimination had been initiated for six B-52s (by severing the tail section from the fuselage) in violation of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, stating that notification had not been provided by the United States to Russia of the initiation of the elimination. In the other ambiguity, the Russians alleged that elimination had been completed for one B-52 (tail section severed from fuselage, wings separated from fuselage and remainder of fuselage severed into two pieces),also in violation of Section IV of the Notification Protocol -- that notification had not been provided by the United States to Russia of the initiation of the elimination. Russian inspection teams have declared similar ambiguities during previous inspections. For more detailed background, see Ref C. This issue was not discussed in JCIC-XXXIII. ¶22. (S) GUIDANCE: While this issue was not placed ON the Russian agenda for JCIC-XXXIV, if the issue is raised by the other Parties, Delegation may draw from points in Refs C and D as appropriate to respond to any concerns that are raised. ================================ SS-27 RENTRY VEHICLE INSPECTIONS ================================ Refs: A) 03 State 057153 (JCIC-DIP-03-006) B) 03 Geneva 02523 (JCIC-XXV-025) C) Geneva 000572 (JCIC-XXXII-008) D) START Mission Report F-21-08: Tatishchevo Silo ICBM Base Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (16-17 August 2008) E) START Mission Report F-15-08: Teykovo Road-Mobile ICBM Base Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (16-17 May 2008) F) START IR 2009-015/Tatishchevo Silo ICBM Base/Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (RVOSI)/Site and System Information (21-22 April 2009) G) State 074953 (JCIC-XXXII-GUIDANCE-002) ¶23. (S) BACKGROUND: Since 2003, the United States has objected to the soft cover used during SS-27 Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspections (RVOSIs) because: 1) the RVOSI cover encloses a much larger volume than is needed to cover a single RV; 2) U.S. inspectors cannot determine where the RVOSI cover is attached to the front section; and 3) inspectors are not permitted to measure the cover. The Russian delegation has responded that Russia's practices reflect a balance between protecting sensitive information and inspection-related interests (Refs A-B). During JCIC-XXXII, the United States reiterated its concerns regarding the Russian soft cover used during SS-27 RVOSIs and reminded the Russian delegation that it was the Russian Federation's responsibility to find a solution to this problem. The Russian delegation responded that it "was looking for ways to address U.S. concerns and find an acceptable solution" (Ref C). ¶24. (S) To date, the Russian Federation has not changed its SS-27 RVOSI procedures. During SS-27 Reentry Vehicle inspections at both the Teykovo Road-mobile ICBM base in May 2008 and the Tatishchevo Silo ICBM Base in August 2008, U.S. inspectors included an ambiguity in the official inspection report, noting that "the RV cover, used during the inspection, prevented the inspection team from confirming that the front section contained no more than the one RV attributed to the SS-27 ICBM" (Refs D and E). During an SS-27 RVOSI conducted at Tatishchevo Silo ICBM Base ON April 21-22, 2009,(Ref F),U.S. inspectors were unable to confirm that no more than one RV attributed to the SS-27 ICBM was under the RV cover. For additional background, see Reference G. ¶25. (S) GUIDANCE: Previous guidance applies (Ref G). ================= SS-25 ELIMINATION ================= Refs: A) 08 State 074953 (JCIC-XXXII-GUIDANCE-002) B) 08 Geneva 000592 (JCIC-XXXII-006) C) START IR 2008-053 (221257Z SEP 08) D) F-30-08 Votkinsk SS-25 Elimin Insp CIA 518643 Nov 2008 E) State 005028 (RNC/STR 09-7/54) ¶26. (S) BACKGROUND: For detailed background ON this issue, see Ref A. The Parties discussed this issue briefly during JCIC-XXXII, but did not discuss the issue during JCIC-XXXIII. At a Heads of Delegation meeting ON July 17, 2008, the Russian HOD said "in January 2008, Russia began implementation of the new SS-25 elimination procedures in accordance with the closing plenary at JCIC-XXXI, which allowed U.S. inspectors the opportunity to inspect SS-25 SCDM casings that were to be eliminated (Ref B)." ¶27. (S) During a August 20 - 28, 2008, START SS-25 ICBM elimination inspection at Votkinsk, the Russian Federation, for the fourth time, presented the guidance section portion of the self contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) for elimination. This enabled the U.S. inspectors to confirm the elimination of all SS-25 missile components. The senior Russian site representative at Votkinsk added that the elimination of the previous 109 SCDM guidance sections would begin when the opportunity presented itself (Ref C). Eight SS-25 ICBMs were eliminated in November 2008 (Ref D) and an additional eight in February 2009 (Ref E) with the entire front section being presented for elimination. ¶28. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation should note the positive results of SS-25 Eliminations that have occurred this calendar year. To date, 54 missiles have been eliminated, including their SCDMs. Washington concurs with the removal from accountability of these 54 missiles. The Delegation should re-emphasize that as each of the 109 SCDMs is eliminated - the remaining step of the SS-25 ICBM elimination process - its associated SS-25 ICBM can be removed from accountability. If the Russian delegation does not make any formal pronouncements concerning the 109 SCDMs in question, delegation should inquire as to when SCDM elimination will be accomplished, including a timeline. CLINTON NNNN End Cable Text