GUIDANCE: PROPOSED U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 054779 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 TAGS: MARR NATO PREL PGOV SUBJECT: GUIDANCE: PROPOSED U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF) OPTION CHARLIE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FORCE (IRF) REF: A. A.(SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ACTION MEMO ¶B. 15 APR 09) ¶C. B. (OPTION CHARLIE IRF FORCE LIST) ¶D. C. (NRF 15 CONTRIBUTIONS TO IRF RFP) Classified By: EUR/RPM Office Director Bruce Turner for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (SBU) In general, Washington concurs that a robust, usable, and collectively sourced NRF is an important Alliance crisis response and transformation capability. The primary challenge to the NRF has been and remains sourcing the force. Establishing national targets for NRF resourcing is a promising way to address NRF sourcing shortfalls. Additional guidance is provided below. ¶2. (C/NF) U.S. NATIONAL TARGET/IRF CONTRIBUTION. Washington supports a voluntary U.S. national target of 20 percent for the roughly 12,000-member Option CHARLIE IRF ( 2,400 personnel) proposed. The remainder of the roughly 4,500 personnel referred to in SECDEF's 15 April 09 Action Memo (ref A) should be assigned to the Option CHARLIE NRF Response Force Pool (RFP). ¶3. (C/NF) Should the Option Charlie IRF vary in size, adjust the proposed U.S. national target force to remain roughly 20 percent of the final size. The balance of the U.S., roughly 4,500-member NRF contribution approved by SECDEF should go to the NRF RFP. ¶4. (C/NF) Should the Alliance ultimately choose to reject SACEUR's Option Charlie in favor of retaining the current NRF, the proposed U.S. national target will revert to 18 percent of the current NRF, per ref A. ¶5. (C/NF) FORCE SOURCING REDLINE. Due to our unique global responsibilities, the U.S. will not identify specific units for given NRF (including IRF and RFP) rotations nor deploy them to NRF/IRF-related training or exercises except on a case by case basis. That is consistent with U.S. policy for current NRF contributions. ¶6. (C) DISCUSSION. This proposal implements SECDEF's 15 April 2009 decision (ref A) as well as underscoring U.S. commitment to a robust, usable, and collectively sourced NRF to meet Alliance needs. In fact, SECDEF is the one who put national targets on the table at Krakow -- it would look awkward for SECDEF to push for national targets for the NRF, then have the U.S. end up with a zero-percent commitment. ¶7. (C/NF) The clarification on the U.S. decision to decline to identify specific units for the IRF/NRF is consistent with current U.S. policy for the NRF (also reiterated in the 15 Apr 09 memo). That will likely cause some comment by Allies, but it is a standing U.S. position that has long been acceptable for the NRF. Although it would be desirable to have U.S.forces participate in NRF training/exercises, it has long been noted in NATO that the U.S. has unique global responsibilities. ¶8. (C/NF) Lacking a precise list of IRF requirements, USNATO has cross-referenced current NRF force offerings with the proposed IRF &element list8 in order to determine force allocation to the IRF and the RFP (see ref B and C). The baseline commitment approved by SECDEF at tab C of the 15 Apr 09 action memo) includes roughly 2,500 personnel that meet specific IRF force elements. Therefore, slotting 2,400 personnel against the IRF is executable within the game plan already approved by SECDEF. ¶9. (SBU) Talking points. Put in bullet format, the logic trail behind this guidance is as follows: - (SBU) The fundamental challenge for the NRF has been sourcing. - (SBU) National targets provide a way to shift the burden for that sourcing from SACEUR (who has no forces of his own) to the Nations - (SBU) National targets as a percentage can only apply to the IRF (SACEUR has stated that it will consist of roughly 12,000 personnel in the latest version),not the RFP (which has no &denominator" or fixed force size).. Without identifying a specific size for the force, no percentage contribution can be meaningful. - (C/NF) Without a U.S. national target contribution to the IRF, it is highly unlikely that other nations will accept national targets of their own that come anywhere close to resourcing the IRF. - (SBU) Without national targets or some other mechanism that boosts IRF (and thus NRF) sourcing, the NRF will once again be viewed as a un-resourced mandate -- undermining the credibility of the Alliance to respond to crises, including Article 5 situations (as well as failing to meet SECDEF intent for the NRF, as stated in his Budapest and Krakow interventions). -- (SBU) There is no guarantee that national targets will generate a fully-resourced NRF/IRF, of course. However, with national targets the onus is put on the Nation(s) that habitually undercontribute, rather than on SACEUR, to fix the problem. Furthermore, a national target gives member nations a target to aim at in their planning/budgeting processes. - (C/NF) The U.S. therefore must make a significant commitment to the NRF Option CHARLIE IRF to make national targets (and thus the IRF and the broader NRF) work. Fortunately, SECDEF has already approved such a commitment with the proviso that we (the U.S.) do not source our NRF contributions until time of incident. CLINTON