GUIDANCE: PROPOSED U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 054779

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: MARR NATO PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE: PROPOSED U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO
RESPONSE FORCE (NRF) OPTION CHARLIE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
FORCE (IRF)

REF: A. A.(SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ACTION MEMO

B. 15 APR 09)

C. B. (OPTION CHARLIE IRF FORCE LIST)

D. C. (NRF 15 CONTRIBUTIONS TO IRF RFP)

Classified By: EUR/RPM Office Director Bruce Turner for
reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (SBU) In general, Washington concurs that
a robust, usable, and collectively sourced NRF
is an important Alliance crisis response and
transformation capability. The primary challenge
to the NRF has been and remains sourcing the force.
Establishing national targets for NRF resourcing
is a promising way to address NRF sourcing shortfalls.
Additional guidance is provided below.


2. (C/NF) U.S. NATIONAL TARGET/IRF CONTRIBUTION.
Washington supports a voluntary U.S. national target of
20 percent for the roughly 12,000-member Option CHARLIE
IRF ( 2,400 personnel) proposed. The remainder of the
roughly 4,500 personnel referred to in SECDEF's
15 April 09 Action Memo (ref A) should be assigned to
the Option CHARLIE NRF Response Force Pool (RFP).


3. (C/NF) Should the Option Charlie IRF vary in size,
adjust the proposed U.S. national target force to remain
roughly 20 percent of the final size. The balance of the
U.S., roughly 4,500-member NRF contribution approved by
SECDEF should go to the NRF RFP.


4. (C/NF) Should the Alliance ultimately choose to reject
SACEUR's Option Charlie in favor of retaining the current
NRF, the proposed U.S. national target will revert to 18
percent of the current NRF, per ref A.


5. (C/NF) FORCE SOURCING REDLINE. Due to our unique global
responsibilities, the U.S. will not identify specific units
for given NRF (including IRF and RFP) rotations nor deploy
them to NRF/IRF-related training or exercises except on a
case by case basis. That is consistent with U.S. policy for
current NRF contributions.


6. (C) DISCUSSION. This proposal implements SECDEF's 15
April
2009 decision (ref A) as well as underscoring U.S. commitment
to
a robust, usable, and collectively sourced NRF to meet
Alliance
needs. In fact, SECDEF is the one who put national targets on
the table at Krakow -- it would look awkward for SECDEF to
push
for national targets for the NRF, then have the U.S. end up
with
a zero-percent commitment.


7. (C/NF) The clarification on the U.S. decision to decline
to
identify specific units for the IRF/NRF is consistent with
current
U.S. policy for the NRF (also reiterated in the 15 Apr 09
memo).
That will likely cause some comment by Allies, but it is a
standing
U.S. position that has long been acceptable for the NRF.
Although
it would be desirable to have U.S.forces participate in NRF
training/exercises, it has long been noted in NATO that the
U.S.
has unique global responsibilities.


8. (C/NF) Lacking a precise list of IRF requirements, USNATO
has
cross-referenced current NRF force offerings with the
proposed IRF
&element list8 in order to determine force allocation to
the IRF
and the RFP (see ref B and C). The baseline commitment
approved
by SECDEF at tab C of the 15 Apr 09 action memo) includes
roughly
2,500 personnel that meet specific IRF force elements.
Therefore,
slotting 2,400 personnel against the IRF is executable within
the
game plan already approved by SECDEF.


9. (SBU) Talking points. Put in bullet format, the logic
trail
behind this guidance is as follows:

- (SBU) The fundamental challenge for the NRF has been
sourcing.

- (SBU) National targets provide a way to shift the burden
for that
sourcing from SACEUR (who has no forces of his own) to the
Nations

- (SBU) National targets as a percentage can only apply to
the IRF
(SACEUR has stated that it will consist of roughly 12,000
personnel
in the latest version),not the RFP (which has no
&denominator" or
fixed force size).. Without identifying a specific size for
the
force, no percentage contribution can be meaningful.

- (C/NF) Without a U.S. national target contribution to the
IRF,
it is highly unlikely that other nations will accept national
targets of their own that come anywhere close to resourcing
the
IRF.

- (SBU) Without national targets or some other mechanism that
boosts IRF (and thus NRF) sourcing, the NRF will once again be
viewed as a un-resourced mandate -- undermining the
credibility
of the Alliance to respond to crises, including Article 5
situations (as well as failing to meet SECDEF intent for the
NRF, as stated in his Budapest and Krakow interventions).

-- (SBU) There is no guarantee that national targets will
generate a fully-resourced NRF/IRF, of course. However, with
national targets the onus is put on the Nation(s) that
habitually
undercontribute, rather than on SACEUR, to fix the problem.
Furthermore, a national target gives member nations a target
to aim at in their planning/budgeting processes.

- (C/NF) The U.S. therefore must make a significant
commitment
to the NRF Option CHARLIE IRF to make national targets (and
thus
the IRF and the broader NRF) work. Fortunately, SECDEF has
already approved such a commitment with the proviso that we
(the U.S.) do not source our NRF contributions until time of
incident.
CLINTON