HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR MAY 26-28 AWAY DAY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 053816

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR MAY 26-28 AWAY DAY

REF: A) STATE 41124 (U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE
STATUS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CFE PARALLEL ACTIONS
PACKAGE); B) JCG.JOUR/693/CORR.1 ANNEX 3 (RF AIDE
MEMOIRE)


1. (SBU) The NATO High Level Task Force (HLTF) will meet
from May 26-28 at the NATO School in Oberammergau to
take stock of the current situation with CFE and
brainstorm on possible ways forward. During the April
29 meeting, Allies agreed that discussion at the Away
Day would be based on the U.S. non-paper on the status
of bilateral discussions on the Parallel Actions Package
(ref A),the Russian Aide Memoire (ref B),and Germany's
latest revision of its concept paper for the June 10
Berlin meeting on the future of conventional arms
control and European security. The International Staff
has not circulated a detailed agenda for the Away Day,
but indicated verbally that intentions for framing the
meeting include: three presentations ? current state of
play of NATO-Russia relations, of Russian Federation
military forces (by Norway),and of NATO military
forces; discussion of contacts and status of bilateral
negotiations; point-by-point review of Russian positions
outlined in its Aide Memoire; and synthesis of
conclusions that should shape a common approach for
Berlin.

U.S. goals for the May 26-28 HLTF Away Day and related
meetings are to:

-- review in detail the Russian position on the elements
of the Parallel Actions Package to delineate the
distance between our positions and identify areas that
require further clarification from Russia and further
thought from Allies;

-- focus discussion on the core issues in considering
near-term steps on CFE, and elicit views and ideas for
moving forward;

-- reinforce the continued need for a unified NATO
message to Russia on CFE and other security issues;

-- shape discussion to reach agreement on a common NATO
message for the June 10 German-hosted meeting in Berlin;

-- as appropriate, use opportunities at the away day to
shape plans for U.S.-Russia-Allies meeting on the
margins of the June 10 seminar; and

-- with Quad Allies, comment on Germany's draft
"chairman's statement" for the June 10 event.

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PRESENTATIONS
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2. (SBU) The three presentations ? current state of
play of NATO-Russia relations, of Russian Federation
military forces (by Norway),and of NATO military forces
? will primarily serve as scene-setters for the core of
the discussion which will focus on the Russian Aide
Memoire, brainstorming on ideas for moving forward, and
shaping a common message for Berlin. U.S. del may draw
from the following observations in contributing to
discussions on the presentations:

-- NATO-Russia Relations: U.S. thinking on next steps
in the NATO-Russia relationship is well reflected in the
Strasbourg-Kehl summit communique and in the U.S.-
German-Czech paper on charting renewed, better focused
and more effective NATO-Russia relations. Our openness
to dialogue on cooperative approaches to enhance
European security and to invigorate dialogue with Russia
to resolve problems, address concerns, and build
practical cooperation should serve to lend a positive
dynamic as we engage Russia on arms control. We are
open to engaging in discussions with the Russians about
their ideas in appropriate fora,
such as the NATO-Russia Council. At the same time, we
agree with Allies that the OSCE, with its inclusive
membership and comprehensive concept of security which

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includes human and economic dimensions, as well as
political-military aspects, is the most appropriate
forum for discussion of ways to improve Euro-Atlantic
security. Our aim should be to enhance the
effectiveness of existing Euro-Atlantic institutions and
agreements, not replace them with new ones. Russia's
decision not to implement its CFE obligations is
particularly significant and must be addressed in
parallel with broader discussions on Euro-Atlantic
security.

-- Status of Russian and NATO Military Forces: Overall
trends indicate a significantly different security
situation in Europe as compared to the early 1990s. We
all appreciate the role the CFE regime has played in
achieving the force reductions, transparency, and the
stability and predictability which contribute to Euro-
Atlantic security. How to maintain this positive
environment and to promote stability in this
significantly different security situation in Europe
must factor into our considerations of ideas for moving
forward. But we also need to take into account that
despite this positive aggregate picture, including the
unprecedented level of transparency and predictability
that is a benefit of CFE, Europe has experienced
devastating regional conflicts in the last 20 years.
There is an argument that it is precisely the detailed,
disaggregated information and transparency provided by a
regime like CFE that can help to assuage security
concerns that can lead to conflict. But the fact that
those conflicts occurred also points to its limits.

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CONTACTS and STATUS OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
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3. (SBU) Allies are already aware that State VCI A/S
Gottemoeller will meet with Russian Security and
Disarmament Director Antonov in Geneva on June 3 with
experts to discuss CFE. U.S. rep may indicate that this
senior-level bilateral dialogue on CFE will serve as an
opportunity for a substantive review of CFE issues
(which have been complicated by Russia's invasion of
Georgia and its failure to implement CFE for a year and
a half) and for seeking further details on the positions
outlined in Russia's paper while probing for potential
flexibility. We want to use this meeting to assist in
assessing Russia's willingness to engage seriously on
the Parallel Actions Package and to make progress on
core issues as we engage in the U.S.-Russia context. We
also hope to use the event to reach agreement with
Russia, if possible, on the idea of augmenting the
bilateral discussion with an expanded group discussion,
including a number of Allies who may be interested in
participating, on the model suggested by Turkey and
others at the last HLTF. This meeting will assist us in
gauging Russia's seriousness in engaging the new U.S.
administration on the Parallel Actions Package, while
underscoring the need to address the additional CFE-
related problems posed by expanded Russian military
presence on the territory of Georgia since August 2008.

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RUSSIAN AIDE MEMOIRE
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4. (SBU) The U.S. non-paper provided at the April 28
HLTF provided a summary of the core substantive
challenges that have emerged in the parallel actions
discussion to date. That analysis was reinforced by
Russia's Aide Memoire (provided to A/S Gottemoeller on
April 24 and distributed to all CFE States Parties at
the JCG in Vienna on May 5.) U.S. rep should seek
Allied views on the range of issues in both papers with
a view to reaching a common understanding of core
challenges: Russia's insistence on abolishing the flank
for itself; Russia's continuing failure to implement
CFE; and Russia's continued disregard for the principle
of host-nation consent in both Georgia and Moldova. In
addition to a point-by-point discussion of Russia's Aide
Memoire, we would also welcome new ideas for a way
forward on these individual issues. U.S. del may draw
from the following and from ref A, as appropriate, in
discussion of Russia's position generally and point-by-
point while also eliciting input from Allies on each
element:

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-- General Comments: Russia's Aide Memoire states that
the Parallel Actions Package could serve as a basis for
restoring the viability of CFE. Substantively the Aide
Memoire does not reflect significant new ideas or
flexibility; rather, it largely repeats familiar
positions. It is fair, however, to say that the Aide
Memoire is not a step backward regarding Russian
positions articulated since 2007. In at least one case
- regarding transparency for Moldova and the
Transcaucasus - it will be useful to probe details of
Russian thinking, since Russia has invited the
possibility of such measures, which will be essential in
finding a way forward. In another case - the question
of a collective ceiling - it is not clear whether the
Russians have moved toward NATO's proposal to consider
reductions in national ceilings in lieu of a collective
ceiling, or continues to seek the latter. We hope we
can build on Russia's apparent interest in re-engaging
to try to redirect CFE negotiations to a positive
trajectory. In responding to the Russian Aide Memoire,
we must ensure the continuation of a unified NATO
message to Russia on CFE and other security issues.

-- Point 1 ? Ratification of the Agreement on
Adaptation: Russia remains focused on eliciting as much
certainty as possible regarding Allies' plans for
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty -- with
particular interest in ratification by the U.S., the UK,
Germany, and France, as well as Georgia and Moldova. In
the fall of 2007, Allies developed a three-phase matrix
of ratification plans and processes. Russia does not
mention this approach in its Aide Memoire. We should
think creatively about what assurances we can provide
regarding ratification plans. It is also worth
highlighting that Russia has sought to insist that
"ratification" means deposit of instruments, as well as
parliamentary/executive approval. Allies had, in the
matrix process, envisioned a staggered series of NATO
ratifications, culminating in a moment when all Allies
would deposit instruments together. This is because
Allies wanted to maintain a unified position on this key
matter. We would be interested in any further Allied
thinking on this point.

-- Point 2 - Provisional Application: The first phase
of Russia's two-phased approach seems to be in keeping
with the generalized political commitment proposed by
NATO, that all parties would act in a manner consistent
with the object and purpose of the Adapted Treaty
(A/CFE) until it enters into force. Russia's idea of
provisional application within 6 months of agreement on
the package raises serious concerns for the U.S.: it
would be politically impossible for the U.S. to
provisionally apply a Treaty prior to the Senate
providing advice and consent for its ratification. The
notion that Allies would provisionally apply A/CFE while
Russia fails to implement CFE is unreasonable,
especially in light of Russia's actions in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia since August 2008. It would be useful to
know in what circumstances other Allies could
provisionally apply A/CFE.

-- Point 3 - Abolish the Flank regime for Russia: Along
with Russia's suspension of its implementation of CFE,
the flank is the core issue now in play. The Russian
proposal would change a fundamental element of the
Adapted Treaty prior to its ratification, which could
imperil prospects for entry into force of A/CFE. Russia
remains firm making clear the flank is a high-level
political issue and a sine qua non for achieving
agreement on the package. The Aide Memoire is the first
time Russia has indicated in writing the possibility of
confidence-building measures to address concerns about
abolition of the flank for Russia. We would be very
interested in Allies' thinking on this Russian idea,
which appears to us to imply the possibility that Russia
would consider substitution of political commitments for
the legal limits and related provisions concerning the
flank in the Adapted CFE Treaty, on the basis of
reciprocity, a reference presumably to political
commitments NATO States have made. However, there is no
indication that Russia is prepared to forego legally
binding flank limits on NATO states.

- U.S. team should also elicit discussion of other

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implications of the Russian proposal: the implications
for Ukraine, for stability in the Caucasus, for
accession by the Baltic states.

-- Point 4 - Equipment Reductions for NATO States
Parties: It is not clear whether Russia has moved
toward the U.S./NATO idea of considering lowering
national equipment ceilings rather than establishing a
collective ceiling for NATO. It would be useful to
clarify this point in further discussions with Russia.

- We would be interested in knowing whether individual
Allies envision possible reductions in ceilings in any
equipment category.

-- Point 5 - Conditions for Accession: Russia continues
to insist on establishing the conditions of accession to
CFE in the near term for the Baltic states and Slovenia,
and now Croatia and Albania as well. This remains an
issue of timing. U.S. team should elicit thinking from
the Baltics and others directly concerned, and engage
Croatia and Albania on their thinking as well.

-- Point 6 - Definition of "Substantial Combat Forces":
Insistence on defining this term as part of the package
is yet another unwavering Russian position. Definition
of "substantial combat forces," as the phrase is used in
the NATO-Russia Founding Act, should only be developed
in the context of a deal on CFE. Such a discussion is
not appropriate for the OSCE in Vienna - this is a NATO-
Russia, not a CFE or OSCE issue.

-- Point 7 - Future Review: Russia's position goes
beyond the NATO position to review the operation of the
Adapted Treaty once it is in force by calling for a
guarantee to update the Treaty after it is in force and
the possibility of including a sample list of (yet to be
specified) issues as part of the package. The NATO
position calls for a political commitment to review the
Treaty after its entry into force and specifies the
consideration of changes to equipment ceilings and sub-
ceilings (e.g., flank limits). Including in the package
a specific commitment to change, following Allied
ratification, key provisions of the Adapted Treaty would
make ratification highly problematic.

-- Point 8 - Moldova: NATO Allies should continue to
give primacy to Moldova's position on the status of the
1992 ceasefire agreement. The Istanbul commitments
required withdrawal of Russian military forces from
Moldova by the end of 2002; that deadline was extended
to 2003. The withdrawal was not completed. The
language of the Parallel Actions Package was a
significant change in the U.S./NATO position, which
previously had simply insisted on fulfillment of that
withdrawal commitment as a prerequisite for ratification
of the Adapted Treaty by NATO Allies.

- In general, it seems that progress is possible on the
Moldova portion of the Parallel Actions Package. The
package does not require that Russia withdraw its PKF
from Moldova as the basis for agreement, but instead
focuses on establishing a structure to promote
demilitarization of the conflict, eventual replacement
of the existing PKF with multinational observers, and
enhanced transparency.

- The U.S. will continue to engage with both Moldova and
Russia to see if more common ground is possible. We are
mindful of Romanian concerns regarding status of the
PKF. Obviously, appropriate assurances are necessary
for Moldova's neighbors as well as for Chisinau.

-- Point 9 - Regional Transparency-related Issues: We
welcome Russia's readiness to consider possible
transparency measures for Moldova and the Transcaucasus.
The U.S. plans to probe Russian thinking on this point
when we meet in the bilateral format, and seek
clarification on how this element of the Aide Memoire
applies to specific ideas advanced by the U.S. in the
Georgia and Moldova contexts. We note that Russia used
the word "Transcaucasus" rather than mentioning Georgia;
this may be a step that can be built upon, if it
provides a way to avoid problem issues relating to the
status of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions of
Georgia.

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- The U.S.-Georgia proposals developed in December 2008
to update the Georgia portion of the package did not
propose a full Russian military withdrawal from the
regions of South Osetia and Abkhazia, nor did they
require resolution of their political status. Rather,
the U.S.-Georgia points offered a way forward that would
eliminate the heavy equipment associated with the
Russian presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, provide
transparency regarding Russian and other military forces
throughout the region, and offer international
observation where there are significant new
concentrations of forces. In addition to disbanding and
withdrawing the Russian military base at Gudauta by 1
July 2001, Istanbul required Russia and Georgia to agree
on the utilization of remaining military facilities and
infrastructure at Gudauta, which is located in Abkhazia.
That deal will not happen; Georgia will not recognize
Russian ownership of the base as legitimate. The three
elements developed by Georgia and the U.S. in effect
leapt over this problem, and thus provide a conceptual
basis for seeking ratification of the Adapted Treaty.

-- Point 10 ? Mechanism for Approving Package: Russia
suggests using the Final Document of a new Extraordinary
Conference of CFE States Parties as the mechanism. This
seems like a viable option assuming core issues are
resolved in advance. It is also an idea previously
advanced by Russian authorities. We will want to
consider how some of the elements of the package would
be handled in the context of a Final Document of CFE
States Parties, considering some, such as defining
"substantial combat forces," do not fall strictly within
the purview of CFE.

-- Point 11 - Russian Implementation of CFE: Russia's
failure to implement is, along with the flank, a core
issue that hinders prospects for ratification of A/CFE,
and agreement on a way forward. In the Aide Memoire,
Russia indicates openness to some level of
implementation of reciprocal transparency measures on a
bilateral basis after agreement on the package (likely
based on our suggestion that fulfillment of data
exchange/information and inspection provisions would be
a useful step.) This is another element that will be
explored with Russia to probe for maximum flexibility.

- We would be interested in Allied views on whether
Russian implementation of elements of the Adapted Treaty
on a bilateral basis would facilitate agreement on a
package or ratification by Parliaments.

-- Point 12 - Intensified Efforts to Resolve the
Impasse: The Aide Memoire stresses the importance of the
bilateral channel to make progress. While we welcome
Russia's reaffirmation of its willingness to step up
efforts, we do not concur that disaggregating the
package for discussion in Vienna would be beneficial to
achieving resolution. It would risk Russia pocketing
further gains or even derailing the process entirely.
In terms of variable geometry, if Russia seriously
engages, we agree with the idea - that Allies have
proposed in recent HLTF discussions - of augmenting the
bilateral track by engaging with the Russians together
with a small group of Allies in discussing the full
range of issues.

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COMMON APPROACH FOR BERLIN
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5. (SBU) Allies agreed that the Away Day would serve as
a key event to prepare for the June seminar. U.S. rep
should encourage Allies to agree on an approach for
Berlin that strives to achieve maximum benefit for
efforts to resolve the impasse ? rather than an extended
meeting in which familiar maximalist positions are
repeated and a negative tone is perpetuated. We might
seek to emphasize the value of transparency and mutual
confidence, and the contribution that conventional arms
control has made to security and stability in Europe.
The June 10 meeting should not be allowed to turn into a
negotiating session and there should not be any effort
to conduct an element-by-element examination of either
the Package or the Aide Memoire.


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6. (SBU) Themes. U.S. team should suggest that Allies
agree on a set of themes for discussion on June 10, on
the following lines:

-- The importance of military transparency as a
contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and stability,
and the key role that arms control, including CFE, has
played in providing it.

-- Readiness of Allies to work to resolve CFE issues in
a way that is acceptable to all CFE states and results
in implementation of the regime by all signatories.

-- Desirability of achieving entry into force of Adapted
CFE and to extend participation beyond the current 30
CFE states, recognizing that the CFE regime is important
to all of Europe, not only to the current States
Parties.

-- Importance of implementing all legal and political
commitments.

-- Utility of arms control in providing verifiable
information regarding the defense arrangements of
neighbors, so as to facilitate rational defense planning
in a time of limited economic resources.


7. (SBU) Meetings on the Margins. U.S. team should, as
appropriate, outline for Allies U.S. hopes for meetings
on the margins of the June seminar (including a meeting
of all Allies, and possibly an initial meeting of a
small, self-selected group of Allies, with Russia, as an
expansion of the U.S.-Russia bilateral dialogue, if
Russia agrees).


8. (SBU) Annotated Agenda. The Germans have circulated
an annotated agenda for the Berlin seminar that includes
two broad topics: "Stocktaking and Perspectives for
Conventional Arms Control in Europe" and "Challenges and
Options for the Future." The latter includes the
expected sub-categories of "Regional Crises" and
"Progress of Technology" as areas that could benefit
from additional new arms control measures without any
details as to which advances in technology and military
capabilities are up for discussion. U.S. rep should
seek further clarification from the German delegation on
this agenda item and in particular what it implies for
current NATO positions. We feel strongly that the first
step in exploring new ideas is an internal and Alliance
discussion, before brainstorming with an audience that
includes not only Russia but also non-CFE states. We
also have concerns with broaching any topics (such as
UAVs) for which there is not yet an Alliance position.


9. (SBU) Draft Chairman's Statement. U.S. team should
seek an opportunity with UK, French, and German
delegations, to provide comments on Germany's draft
"chairman's statement," circulated for comment to the
quad only.

-- In general we believe the German chairman's statement
makes sense in the context of a seminar that will
include a very wide net of participants, not all of
which are CFE states. It does not go into detail, which
is probably appropriate for an event which is not
intended to produce specific conclusions. It does not
set up an extension of the German meeting process, which
would be unhelpful. Future work needs to concentrate on
a CFE solution, not on generalized events lauding arms
control.

-- We note that the German paper does not mention the
importance of meeting Treaty and political obligations.
This seems to us an essential, basic point which a
number of delegations are certain to raise, and Germany
would do well to consider how to incorporate this theme
into its statement.

-- Point (3): the idea of comparable levels of security
for all nations, does not seem to us necessarily
problematic, but it also is not clear. What is required
for a small country to enjoy a comparable level of
security when its neighbor has a large military
organization which can easily menace its political
independence? Should the small country join a military
alliance with friends, and thus gain "comparable

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security?" This idea may raise more difficulties in
discussion than common ground.

-- Point (5): the call for further work to find a CFE
solution based on the Parallel Actions Package,
especially if Russia engages seriously on June 3, seems
likely to find favor with both Russia and NATO.

-- Point (6): the linkage between arms control and the
Georgia conflict raises conceptual problems. No arms
control regime will prevent a war. Arms control-like
steps may help to build confidence in Georgia now, but
only if all sides are prepared to implement them in good
faith.

-- Point (7): it is a fair point, in principle, that
arms control should take account of new technologies
where appropriate. We question, however, Germany's goal
in including this point. We doubt that Russian
authorities would welcome a call to set limits on a
number of new military technologies, such as armed
drones, and we consider it even more unlikely that
Russia would be prepared to endorse restrictions on
military-technical advances that cut equally against
Russia and NATO Allies.

-- Point (10): We are not fully comfortable with the
language of point 10: at this stage we should not
suggest that it is sufficient to preserve "the
substance" of the CFE regime. It may come to that. But
NATO's stated goal is to achieve entry into force of the
Adapted CFE Treaty, and then further modernize and
enhance it.

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DATE OF NEXT HLTF MEETING
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10. (SBU) The IS has indicated that July 9 is not
workable for all for the next HLTF and will propose July
16 as an alternate. This date is fine from the U.S.
perspective and will allow for drawing conclusions from
the preceding events and considering next steps in light
of any developments.
CLINTON