HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR MAY 26-28 AWAY DAY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 053816 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL SUBJECT: HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR MAY 26-28 AWAY DAY REF: A) STATE 41124 (U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE STATUS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CFE PARALLEL ACTIONS PACKAGE); B) JCG.JOUR/693/CORR.1 ANNEX 3 (RF AIDE MEMOIRE) ¶1. (SBU) The NATO High Level Task Force (HLTF) will meet from May 26-28 at the NATO School in Oberammergau to take stock of the current situation with CFE and brainstorm on possible ways forward. During the April 29 meeting, Allies agreed that discussion at the Away Day would be based on the U.S. non-paper on the status of bilateral discussions on the Parallel Actions Package (ref A),the Russian Aide Memoire (ref B),and Germany's latest revision of its concept paper for the June 10 Berlin meeting on the future of conventional arms control and European security. The International Staff has not circulated a detailed agenda for the Away Day, but indicated verbally that intentions for framing the meeting include: three presentations ? current state of play of NATO-Russia relations, of Russian Federation military forces (by Norway),and of NATO military forces; discussion of contacts and status of bilateral negotiations; point-by-point review of Russian positions outlined in its Aide Memoire; and synthesis of conclusions that should shape a common approach for Berlin. U.S. goals for the May 26-28 HLTF Away Day and related meetings are to: -- review in detail the Russian position on the elements of the Parallel Actions Package to delineate the distance between our positions and identify areas that require further clarification from Russia and further thought from Allies; -- focus discussion on the core issues in considering near-term steps on CFE, and elicit views and ideas for moving forward; -- reinforce the continued need for a unified NATO message to Russia on CFE and other security issues; -- shape discussion to reach agreement on a common NATO message for the June 10 German-hosted meeting in Berlin; -- as appropriate, use opportunities at the away day to shape plans for U.S.-Russia-Allies meeting on the margins of the June 10 seminar; and -- with Quad Allies, comment on Germany's draft "chairman's statement" for the June 10 event. - - - - - - - - - - PRESENTATIONS - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) The three presentations ? current state of play of NATO-Russia relations, of Russian Federation military forces (by Norway),and of NATO military forces ? will primarily serve as scene-setters for the core of the discussion which will focus on the Russian Aide Memoire, brainstorming on ideas for moving forward, and shaping a common message for Berlin. U.S. del may draw from the following observations in contributing to discussions on the presentations: -- NATO-Russia Relations: U.S. thinking on next steps in the NATO-Russia relationship is well reflected in the Strasbourg-Kehl summit communique and in the U.S.- German-Czech paper on charting renewed, better focused and more effective NATO-Russia relations. Our openness to dialogue on cooperative approaches to enhance European security and to invigorate dialogue with Russia to resolve problems, address concerns, and build practical cooperation should serve to lend a positive dynamic as we engage Russia on arms control. We are open to engaging in discussions with the Russians about their ideas in appropriate fora, such as the NATO-Russia Council. At the same time, we agree with Allies that the OSCE, with its inclusive membership and comprehensive concept of security which STATE 00053816 002 OF 007 includes human and economic dimensions, as well as political-military aspects, is the most appropriate forum for discussion of ways to improve Euro-Atlantic security. Our aim should be to enhance the effectiveness of existing Euro-Atlantic institutions and agreements, not replace them with new ones. Russia's decision not to implement its CFE obligations is particularly significant and must be addressed in parallel with broader discussions on Euro-Atlantic security. -- Status of Russian and NATO Military Forces: Overall trends indicate a significantly different security situation in Europe as compared to the early 1990s. We all appreciate the role the CFE regime has played in achieving the force reductions, transparency, and the stability and predictability which contribute to Euro- Atlantic security. How to maintain this positive environment and to promote stability in this significantly different security situation in Europe must factor into our considerations of ideas for moving forward. But we also need to take into account that despite this positive aggregate picture, including the unprecedented level of transparency and predictability that is a benefit of CFE, Europe has experienced devastating regional conflicts in the last 20 years. There is an argument that it is precisely the detailed, disaggregated information and transparency provided by a regime like CFE that can help to assuage security concerns that can lead to conflict. But the fact that those conflicts occurred also points to its limits. - - - - - - - - - - - - - CONTACTS and STATUS OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Allies are already aware that State VCI A/S Gottemoeller will meet with Russian Security and Disarmament Director Antonov in Geneva on June 3 with experts to discuss CFE. U.S. rep may indicate that this senior-level bilateral dialogue on CFE will serve as an opportunity for a substantive review of CFE issues (which have been complicated by Russia's invasion of Georgia and its failure to implement CFE for a year and a half) and for seeking further details on the positions outlined in Russia's paper while probing for potential flexibility. We want to use this meeting to assist in assessing Russia's willingness to engage seriously on the Parallel Actions Package and to make progress on core issues as we engage in the U.S.-Russia context. We also hope to use the event to reach agreement with Russia, if possible, on the idea of augmenting the bilateral discussion with an expanded group discussion, including a number of Allies who may be interested in participating, on the model suggested by Turkey and others at the last HLTF. This meeting will assist us in gauging Russia's seriousness in engaging the new U.S. administration on the Parallel Actions Package, while underscoring the need to address the additional CFE- related problems posed by expanded Russian military presence on the territory of Georgia since August 2008. - - - - - - - - - - - - - RUSSIAN AIDE MEMOIRE - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) The U.S. non-paper provided at the April 28 HLTF provided a summary of the core substantive challenges that have emerged in the parallel actions discussion to date. That analysis was reinforced by Russia's Aide Memoire (provided to A/S Gottemoeller on April 24 and distributed to all CFE States Parties at the JCG in Vienna on May 5.) U.S. rep should seek Allied views on the range of issues in both papers with a view to reaching a common understanding of core challenges: Russia's insistence on abolishing the flank for itself; Russia's continuing failure to implement CFE; and Russia's continued disregard for the principle of host-nation consent in both Georgia and Moldova. In addition to a point-by-point discussion of Russia's Aide Memoire, we would also welcome new ideas for a way forward on these individual issues. U.S. del may draw from the following and from ref A, as appropriate, in discussion of Russia's position generally and point-by- point while also eliciting input from Allies on each element: STATE 00053816 003 OF 007 -- General Comments: Russia's Aide Memoire states that the Parallel Actions Package could serve as a basis for restoring the viability of CFE. Substantively the Aide Memoire does not reflect significant new ideas or flexibility; rather, it largely repeats familiar positions. It is fair, however, to say that the Aide Memoire is not a step backward regarding Russian positions articulated since 2007. In at least one case - regarding transparency for Moldova and the Transcaucasus - it will be useful to probe details of Russian thinking, since Russia has invited the possibility of such measures, which will be essential in finding a way forward. In another case - the question of a collective ceiling - it is not clear whether the Russians have moved toward NATO's proposal to consider reductions in national ceilings in lieu of a collective ceiling, or continues to seek the latter. We hope we can build on Russia's apparent interest in re-engaging to try to redirect CFE negotiations to a positive trajectory. In responding to the Russian Aide Memoire, we must ensure the continuation of a unified NATO message to Russia on CFE and other security issues. -- Point 1 ? Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation: Russia remains focused on eliciting as much certainty as possible regarding Allies' plans for ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty -- with particular interest in ratification by the U.S., the UK, Germany, and France, as well as Georgia and Moldova. In the fall of 2007, Allies developed a three-phase matrix of ratification plans and processes. Russia does not mention this approach in its Aide Memoire. We should think creatively about what assurances we can provide regarding ratification plans. It is also worth highlighting that Russia has sought to insist that "ratification" means deposit of instruments, as well as parliamentary/executive approval. Allies had, in the matrix process, envisioned a staggered series of NATO ratifications, culminating in a moment when all Allies would deposit instruments together. This is because Allies wanted to maintain a unified position on this key matter. We would be interested in any further Allied thinking on this point. -- Point 2 - Provisional Application: The first phase of Russia's two-phased approach seems to be in keeping with the generalized political commitment proposed by NATO, that all parties would act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of the Adapted Treaty (A/CFE) until it enters into force. Russia's idea of provisional application within 6 months of agreement on the package raises serious concerns for the U.S.: it would be politically impossible for the U.S. to provisionally apply a Treaty prior to the Senate providing advice and consent for its ratification. The notion that Allies would provisionally apply A/CFE while Russia fails to implement CFE is unreasonable, especially in light of Russia's actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since August 2008. It would be useful to know in what circumstances other Allies could provisionally apply A/CFE. -- Point 3 - Abolish the Flank regime for Russia: Along with Russia's suspension of its implementation of CFE, the flank is the core issue now in play. The Russian proposal would change a fundamental element of the Adapted Treaty prior to its ratification, which could imperil prospects for entry into force of A/CFE. Russia remains firm making clear the flank is a high-level political issue and a sine qua non for achieving agreement on the package. The Aide Memoire is the first time Russia has indicated in writing the possibility of confidence-building measures to address concerns about abolition of the flank for Russia. We would be very interested in Allies' thinking on this Russian idea, which appears to us to imply the possibility that Russia would consider substitution of political commitments for the legal limits and related provisions concerning the flank in the Adapted CFE Treaty, on the basis of reciprocity, a reference presumably to political commitments NATO States have made. However, there is no indication that Russia is prepared to forego legally binding flank limits on NATO states. - U.S. team should also elicit discussion of other STATE 00053816 004 OF 007 implications of the Russian proposal: the implications for Ukraine, for stability in the Caucasus, for accession by the Baltic states. -- Point 4 - Equipment Reductions for NATO States Parties: It is not clear whether Russia has moved toward the U.S./NATO idea of considering lowering national equipment ceilings rather than establishing a collective ceiling for NATO. It would be useful to clarify this point in further discussions with Russia. - We would be interested in knowing whether individual Allies envision possible reductions in ceilings in any equipment category. -- Point 5 - Conditions for Accession: Russia continues to insist on establishing the conditions of accession to CFE in the near term for the Baltic states and Slovenia, and now Croatia and Albania as well. This remains an issue of timing. U.S. team should elicit thinking from the Baltics and others directly concerned, and engage Croatia and Albania on their thinking as well. -- Point 6 - Definition of "Substantial Combat Forces": Insistence on defining this term as part of the package is yet another unwavering Russian position. Definition of "substantial combat forces," as the phrase is used in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, should only be developed in the context of a deal on CFE. Such a discussion is not appropriate for the OSCE in Vienna - this is a NATO- Russia, not a CFE or OSCE issue. -- Point 7 - Future Review: Russia's position goes beyond the NATO position to review the operation of the Adapted Treaty once it is in force by calling for a guarantee to update the Treaty after it is in force and the possibility of including a sample list of (yet to be specified) issues as part of the package. The NATO position calls for a political commitment to review the Treaty after its entry into force and specifies the consideration of changes to equipment ceilings and sub- ceilings (e.g., flank limits). Including in the package a specific commitment to change, following Allied ratification, key provisions of the Adapted Treaty would make ratification highly problematic. -- Point 8 - Moldova: NATO Allies should continue to give primacy to Moldova's position on the status of the 1992 ceasefire agreement. The Istanbul commitments required withdrawal of Russian military forces from Moldova by the end of 2002; that deadline was extended to 2003. The withdrawal was not completed. The language of the Parallel Actions Package was a significant change in the U.S./NATO position, which previously had simply insisted on fulfillment of that withdrawal commitment as a prerequisite for ratification of the Adapted Treaty by NATO Allies. - In general, it seems that progress is possible on the Moldova portion of the Parallel Actions Package. The package does not require that Russia withdraw its PKF from Moldova as the basis for agreement, but instead focuses on establishing a structure to promote demilitarization of the conflict, eventual replacement of the existing PKF with multinational observers, and enhanced transparency. - The U.S. will continue to engage with both Moldova and Russia to see if more common ground is possible. We are mindful of Romanian concerns regarding status of the PKF. Obviously, appropriate assurances are necessary for Moldova's neighbors as well as for Chisinau. -- Point 9 - Regional Transparency-related Issues: We welcome Russia's readiness to consider possible transparency measures for Moldova and the Transcaucasus. The U.S. plans to probe Russian thinking on this point when we meet in the bilateral format, and seek clarification on how this element of the Aide Memoire applies to specific ideas advanced by the U.S. in the Georgia and Moldova contexts. We note that Russia used the word "Transcaucasus" rather than mentioning Georgia; this may be a step that can be built upon, if it provides a way to avoid problem issues relating to the status of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions of Georgia. STATE 00053816 005 OF 007 - The U.S.-Georgia proposals developed in December 2008 to update the Georgia portion of the package did not propose a full Russian military withdrawal from the regions of South Osetia and Abkhazia, nor did they require resolution of their political status. Rather, the U.S.-Georgia points offered a way forward that would eliminate the heavy equipment associated with the Russian presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, provide transparency regarding Russian and other military forces throughout the region, and offer international observation where there are significant new concentrations of forces. In addition to disbanding and withdrawing the Russian military base at Gudauta by 1 July 2001, Istanbul required Russia and Georgia to agree on the utilization of remaining military facilities and infrastructure at Gudauta, which is located in Abkhazia. That deal will not happen; Georgia will not recognize Russian ownership of the base as legitimate. The three elements developed by Georgia and the U.S. in effect leapt over this problem, and thus provide a conceptual basis for seeking ratification of the Adapted Treaty. -- Point 10 ? Mechanism for Approving Package: Russia suggests using the Final Document of a new Extraordinary Conference of CFE States Parties as the mechanism. This seems like a viable option assuming core issues are resolved in advance. It is also an idea previously advanced by Russian authorities. We will want to consider how some of the elements of the package would be handled in the context of a Final Document of CFE States Parties, considering some, such as defining "substantial combat forces," do not fall strictly within the purview of CFE. -- Point 11 - Russian Implementation of CFE: Russia's failure to implement is, along with the flank, a core issue that hinders prospects for ratification of A/CFE, and agreement on a way forward. In the Aide Memoire, Russia indicates openness to some level of implementation of reciprocal transparency measures on a bilateral basis after agreement on the package (likely based on our suggestion that fulfillment of data exchange/information and inspection provisions would be a useful step.) This is another element that will be explored with Russia to probe for maximum flexibility. - We would be interested in Allied views on whether Russian implementation of elements of the Adapted Treaty on a bilateral basis would facilitate agreement on a package or ratification by Parliaments. -- Point 12 - Intensified Efforts to Resolve the Impasse: The Aide Memoire stresses the importance of the bilateral channel to make progress. While we welcome Russia's reaffirmation of its willingness to step up efforts, we do not concur that disaggregating the package for discussion in Vienna would be beneficial to achieving resolution. It would risk Russia pocketing further gains or even derailing the process entirely. In terms of variable geometry, if Russia seriously engages, we agree with the idea - that Allies have proposed in recent HLTF discussions - of augmenting the bilateral track by engaging with the Russians together with a small group of Allies in discussing the full range of issues. - - - - - - - - - - - - - COMMON APPROACH FOR BERLIN - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) Allies agreed that the Away Day would serve as a key event to prepare for the June seminar. U.S. rep should encourage Allies to agree on an approach for Berlin that strives to achieve maximum benefit for efforts to resolve the impasse ? rather than an extended meeting in which familiar maximalist positions are repeated and a negative tone is perpetuated. We might seek to emphasize the value of transparency and mutual confidence, and the contribution that conventional arms control has made to security and stability in Europe. The June 10 meeting should not be allowed to turn into a negotiating session and there should not be any effort to conduct an element-by-element examination of either the Package or the Aide Memoire. STATE 00053816 006 OF 007 ¶6. (SBU) Themes. U.S. team should suggest that Allies agree on a set of themes for discussion on June 10, on the following lines: -- The importance of military transparency as a contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, and the key role that arms control, including CFE, has played in providing it. -- Readiness of Allies to work to resolve CFE issues in a way that is acceptable to all CFE states and results in implementation of the regime by all signatories. -- Desirability of achieving entry into force of Adapted CFE and to extend participation beyond the current 30 CFE states, recognizing that the CFE regime is important to all of Europe, not only to the current States Parties. -- Importance of implementing all legal and political commitments. -- Utility of arms control in providing verifiable information regarding the defense arrangements of neighbors, so as to facilitate rational defense planning in a time of limited economic resources. ¶7. (SBU) Meetings on the Margins. U.S. team should, as appropriate, outline for Allies U.S. hopes for meetings on the margins of the June seminar (including a meeting of all Allies, and possibly an initial meeting of a small, self-selected group of Allies, with Russia, as an expansion of the U.S.-Russia bilateral dialogue, if Russia agrees). ¶8. (SBU) Annotated Agenda. The Germans have circulated an annotated agenda for the Berlin seminar that includes two broad topics: "Stocktaking and Perspectives for Conventional Arms Control in Europe" and "Challenges and Options for the Future." The latter includes the expected sub-categories of "Regional Crises" and "Progress of Technology" as areas that could benefit from additional new arms control measures without any details as to which advances in technology and military capabilities are up for discussion. U.S. rep should seek further clarification from the German delegation on this agenda item and in particular what it implies for current NATO positions. We feel strongly that the first step in exploring new ideas is an internal and Alliance discussion, before brainstorming with an audience that includes not only Russia but also non-CFE states. We also have concerns with broaching any topics (such as UAVs) for which there is not yet an Alliance position. ¶9. (SBU) Draft Chairman's Statement. U.S. team should seek an opportunity with UK, French, and German delegations, to provide comments on Germany's draft "chairman's statement," circulated for comment to the quad only. -- In general we believe the German chairman's statement makes sense in the context of a seminar that will include a very wide net of participants, not all of which are CFE states. It does not go into detail, which is probably appropriate for an event which is not intended to produce specific conclusions. It does not set up an extension of the German meeting process, which would be unhelpful. Future work needs to concentrate on a CFE solution, not on generalized events lauding arms control. -- We note that the German paper does not mention the importance of meeting Treaty and political obligations. This seems to us an essential, basic point which a number of delegations are certain to raise, and Germany would do well to consider how to incorporate this theme into its statement. -- Point (3): the idea of comparable levels of security for all nations, does not seem to us necessarily problematic, but it also is not clear. What is required for a small country to enjoy a comparable level of security when its neighbor has a large military organization which can easily menace its political independence? Should the small country join a military alliance with friends, and thus gain "comparable STATE 00053816 007 OF 007 security?" This idea may raise more difficulties in discussion than common ground. -- Point (5): the call for further work to find a CFE solution based on the Parallel Actions Package, especially if Russia engages seriously on June 3, seems likely to find favor with both Russia and NATO. -- Point (6): the linkage between arms control and the Georgia conflict raises conceptual problems. No arms control regime will prevent a war. Arms control-like steps may help to build confidence in Georgia now, but only if all sides are prepared to implement them in good faith. -- Point (7): it is a fair point, in principle, that arms control should take account of new technologies where appropriate. We question, however, Germany's goal in including this point. We doubt that Russian authorities would welcome a call to set limits on a number of new military technologies, such as armed drones, and we consider it even more unlikely that Russia would be prepared to endorse restrictions on military-technical advances that cut equally against Russia and NATO Allies. -- Point (10): We are not fully comfortable with the language of point 10: at this stage we should not suggest that it is sufficient to preserve "the substance" of the CFE regime. It may come to that. But NATO's stated goal is to achieve entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, and then further modernize and enhance it. - - - - - - - - - - - - - DATE OF NEXT HLTF MEETING - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) The IS has indicated that July 9 is not workable for all for the next HLTF and will propose July 16 as an alternate. This date is fine from the U.S. perspective and will allow for drawing conclusions from the preceding events and considering next steps in light of any developments. CLINTON