KFOR: GUIDANCE ON MOVEMENT TO A DETERRENT PRESENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 053069

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019
TAGS: KV MARR NATO PGOV PREL KPKO
SUBJECT: KFOR: GUIDANCE ON MOVEMENT TO A DETERRENT PRESENCE

Classified By: EUR/RPM Office Director Bruce Turner for reasons
1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (U) This is an action request, please see
paragraph 7.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (C) SHAPE assesses that security conditions warrant a
draw down of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) to Deterrent
Presence (DP) over the next 12-24 months. Several Allies
support the development of a political assessment that
would complement SHAPE's security assessment, with both
to be approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
Washington supports such an approach. The Policy
Coordination Group (PCG) should be responsible
for establishing political criteria, conducting the
assessment, and forwarding recommendations based on that
assessment to the NAC.


3. (C) Although Foreign and Defense Ministers have
pledged to keep KFOR at current force levels, some Allied
capitals are already planning to draw down their forces,
citing budget constraints and projected pledges to
increase their ISAF presence. As an Alliance, we have
agreed that we are in Kosovo together, and upon completing
the mission, we will leave together. Yet Latvia, the UK,
Lithuania and Spain have already announced their intent to
withdraw from KFOR.


4. (C) The U.S. should take a leadership role in
securing agreement on the development of a political
assessment that includes a set of political criteria and
benchmarks for next steps, thus preventing further
unilateralpullouts. Any change in KFOR force posture
should be dictated by both political and security conditions
in Kosovo and the region. The Periodic Mission Review (PMR)
is the appropriate mechanism to assess those conditions.


5. (C) Relevant political criteria should be calibrated
to different DP force levels, ensuring that the process is
conditions-based. Political criteria should be incorporated
into each PMR or DP-related document. To provide for
appropriate political-military oversight of the transition
process, NATO's Military Authorities and the PCG will
propose to the North Atlantic Council subsequent DP moves
as appropriate security and political conditions are met.


6. (SBU) Paralleling the PMR process, NATO must also
develop a well-defined KFOR Public Diplomacy strategy that
explains each stage of draw down Such a strategy should
not only emphasize that moving to a Deterrent Presence
posture reflects a more stable and secure Kosovo, but also
underscores that NATO will continue to contribute to a
safe and secure environment (SASE) and freedom of movement
(FOM) throughout all of Kosovo. The Alliance will also
continue to supervise, train, and mentor the Kosovo
Security Force and its ministry.

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ACTION REQUEST
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7. (C) In response to a) SHAPE's security assessment,
b) SACEUR's May 19 letter to NATO's Secretary General de
Hoop Scheffer requesting KFOR movement to DP and a decision
to be taken at the June 11-12 Defense Ministerial, and
c) the NATO Military Committee (IMSWM 0211) document
agreeing to SACEUR's assessment and recommendation for KFOR
movement to DP, USNATO is requested to deploy the following
guidance:

-- Highlight that reducing force levels in Kosovo has
broad political implications and should therefore be
accompanied by a political assessment. Such assessments
are properly the role of the NAC, advised by the Policy
Coordination Group (PCG).

-- Ensure that political criteria are included in the
Balkans Periodic Mission Review and in NATO documents
relating to deterrent presence.

-- Allow the PCG to review the political criteria and present
a recommendation to the NAC that accompanies SHAPE's security
assessment and the Military Committee's recommendation.

-- Ensure the NAC will exercise its authority at
each transition stage. Military Committee document
IMSWM 0211 states that "the NMAs will propose to Council
to continue movement through the next transition gate when
the appropriate conditions are met. The purpose is to
allow an appropriate Pol-Mil oversight of the process."

-- Stress that NAC decisions to move KFOR through
subsequent deterrent presence gates should consider providing
sufficient time for the PCG to review established political
criteria and for NATO's public affairs office to develop a
well-defined KFOR Public Diplomacy strategy.

-- The U.S. will not block movement to stage one of
deterrent presence, which would reduce current KFOR
strength of 14,200 to 10,000 troops by January 2010 in
accordance with SACEUR's timetable.

-- We recommend that NAC take a decision by the end of
June/early July to allow appropriate time to prepare to
execute stage one of deterrent presence.
CLINTON