KFOR: GUIDANCE ON MOVEMENT TO A DETERRENT PRESENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 053069 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019 TAGS: KV MARR NATO PGOV PREL KPKO SUBJECT: KFOR: GUIDANCE ON MOVEMENT TO A DETERRENT PRESENCE Classified By: EUR/RPM Office Director Bruce Turner for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request, please see paragraph 7. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) SHAPE assesses that security conditions warrant a draw down of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) to Deterrent Presence (DP) over the next 12-24 months. Several Allies support the development of a political assessment that would complement SHAPE's security assessment, with both to be approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Washington supports such an approach. The Policy Coordination Group (PCG) should be responsible for establishing political criteria, conducting the assessment, and forwarding recommendations based on that assessment to the NAC. ¶3. (C) Although Foreign and Defense Ministers have pledged to keep KFOR at current force levels, some Allied capitals are already planning to draw down their forces, citing budget constraints and projected pledges to increase their ISAF presence. As an Alliance, we have agreed that we are in Kosovo together, and upon completing the mission, we will leave together. Yet Latvia, the UK, Lithuania and Spain have already announced their intent to withdraw from KFOR. ¶4. (C) The U.S. should take a leadership role in securing agreement on the development of a political assessment that includes a set of political criteria and benchmarks for next steps, thus preventing further unilateralpullouts. Any change in KFOR force posture should be dictated by both political and security conditions in Kosovo and the region. The Periodic Mission Review (PMR) is the appropriate mechanism to assess those conditions. ¶5. (C) Relevant political criteria should be calibrated to different DP force levels, ensuring that the process is conditions-based. Political criteria should be incorporated into each PMR or DP-related document. To provide for appropriate political-military oversight of the transition process, NATO's Military Authorities and the PCG will propose to the North Atlantic Council subsequent DP moves as appropriate security and political conditions are met. ¶6. (SBU) Paralleling the PMR process, NATO must also develop a well-defined KFOR Public Diplomacy strategy that explains each stage of draw down Such a strategy should not only emphasize that moving to a Deterrent Presence posture reflects a more stable and secure Kosovo, but also underscores that NATO will continue to contribute to a safe and secure environment (SASE) and freedom of movement (FOM) throughout all of Kosovo. The Alliance will also continue to supervise, train, and mentor the Kosovo Security Force and its ministry. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to a) SHAPE's security assessment, b) SACEUR's May 19 letter to NATO's Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer requesting KFOR movement to DP and a decision to be taken at the June 11-12 Defense Ministerial, and c) the NATO Military Committee (IMSWM 0211) document agreeing to SACEUR's assessment and recommendation for KFOR movement to DP, USNATO is requested to deploy the following guidance: -- Highlight that reducing force levels in Kosovo has broad political implications and should therefore be accompanied by a political assessment. Such assessments are properly the role of the NAC, advised by the Policy Coordination Group (PCG). -- Ensure that political criteria are included in the Balkans Periodic Mission Review and in NATO documents relating to deterrent presence. -- Allow the PCG to review the political criteria and present a recommendation to the NAC that accompanies SHAPE's security assessment and the Military Committee's recommendation. -- Ensure the NAC will exercise its authority at each transition stage. Military Committee document IMSWM 0211 states that "the NMAs will propose to Council to continue movement through the next transition gate when the appropriate conditions are met. The purpose is to allow an appropriate Pol-Mil oversight of the process." -- Stress that NAC decisions to move KFOR through subsequent deterrent presence gates should consider providing sufficient time for the PCG to review established political criteria and for NATO's public affairs office to develop a well-defined KFOR Public Diplomacy strategy. -- The U.S. will not block movement to stage one of deterrent presence, which would reduce current KFOR strength of 14,200 to 10,000 troops by January 2010 in accordance with SACEUR's timetable. -- We recommend that NAC take a decision by the end of June/early July to allow appropriate time to prepare to execute stage one of deterrent presence. CLINTON