A/S CARSON AND NSC SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAVIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 052639 C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 052639 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SUBJ TAGS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PINS KE SO UK XA ZI SUBJECT: A/S CARSON AND NSC SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAVIN DISCUSS AFRICA ISSUES WITH SENIOR UK REPRESENTATIVES Classified By: AF A/S Johnnie Carson, Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (SBU) On May 19, senior U.S. and UK Africa representatives participated in a secure video teleconference (SVTC) focused on Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Somalia. All expressed mutual interest in holding a regular dialogue via SVTC, and agreed to meet during Wood's June 9-10 trip to Washington. U.S. participants included Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Phillip Carter, and NSC-Africa Senior Director Michelle Gavin. UK participants included Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Africa Director Adam Wood, Cabinet Office Senior Policy Advisor for Africa Anna French, the Prime Minister's Special Advisor for Africa and Development Brendan Cox, and Department for International Development (DFID) Deputy Director for East and Central Africa John Gordon. -------------- KENYA -------------- ¶2. (C) Carson warned that Kenya's democracy is fragile and political tensions have seriously fragmented the coalition. He summarized the AF/NSC visit to Kenya last week, where Carson and Gavin met with, among others, President Kibaki, Prime Minister Odinga, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Uhura Kenyatta, and the current and former Ministers of Justice. Carson indicated he would return to Nairobi in early June to reinforce messages made during the trip and to continue pressing Kenya for progress on reform. (Note: the trip is now postponed until July.) - Carson noted his deep disappointment with the slow pace of implementation of the Kofi Annan accord. He described the striking weakness of the coalition and the apparent alienation of Odinga from his closest supporters. Some in the administration seemed to be taking a hard line on the amount of power held by the Prime Minister. He expressed concern with the sharp rise in human rights violations, particularly the killing of young Kenyans by gangs in the police service. He also noted a significant uptick in the level of corruption, both in Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement coalition and Kibaki's Party of National Unity. - Carson noted that Secretary Clinton is expected to visit Kenya in early August for the African Growth and Opportunity Act Forum; the U.S. will want to use the visit to ratchet up pressure on the Kenyans. He said the Secretary also planned to raise Kenya and Zimbabwe in her May 19 meeting with former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. ¶3. (C) Gavin noted that she was also struck by the divide between political elites and civil society-- political elites did not seem to be seized with the seriousness of the situation. ¶4. (C) Wood, who visited Kenya just after Easter, echoed U.S. concerns and warned that the visible anger of civil society and ongoing human rights violations by police presented a recipe for police violence. He noted the need to press for progress on constitutional and other reforms over the next few months and to break the culture of impunity. Wood inquired into progress on the local tribunal; Carson noted it was likely a hybrid was in the works. The UK's next steps include a potential invitation to Kibaki to visit the UK. Wood acknowledged that stronger U.S. connections to Kibaki and other Kenyan officials make the U.S. better placed to push messages. Carson and Wood agreed they may want to visit Kenya in tandem to signal stronger concerns. -------------- ZIMBABWE -------------- ¶5. (C) Wood left for Zimbabwe May 19 for a 48-hour visit; he indicated he would not make any commitments to Tendai Biti and Morgan Tsvangirai during the trip. Wood noted that he would be in an "interrogative" mode, asking for proof of progress. The UK is interested in benchmarks based on the Global Political Agreement (GPA),which they agree is a means not an end. Cox said the PM will not change policy substantially unless a quid pro quo is part of the strategy-possible elements include removal of Gideon Gono from the Reserve Bank, commitment to fully empower and swear in Roy Bennett, allowing the return of journalists into the country, and commitments to allow international monitoring of elections. Wood acknowledged that the UK may be more forward-leaning than the U.S. on Zimbabwe, and warned that excessive caution from the international community in providing assistance could doom the Zimbabweans to failure. He noted the UK is considering additional support for education. ¶6. (C) Carson noted the U.S. is looking for possible ways to be helpful to Tsvangirai and reiterated the importance of maintaining targeted sanctions on individuals in the regime. Post is inclined to support limited assistance in health and education. Carson noted he has long regarded Mugabe's stay in power as infinite, as long as the security forces are behind him. ¶7. (C) Gavin noted that that President Obama will see Tsvangirai in Washington next month and will privately underscore with him that the GPA is not an end in itself. Gavin also noted the Movement for Democratic Change's recent call to the Southern African Development Community to press for more engagement by the regional organization. -------------- SUDAN -------------- ¶8. (C) Wood and Cox expressed interest in meeting in Washington "to get a better sense of where the administration is across the board" on Sudan. Wood inquired into the status of the policy review; Gavin expressed optimism that it was near completion. Gavin welcomed the proposal for a meeting in Washington, also noting the need to incorporate U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Gration's views on next steps. -------------- SOMALIA -------------- ¶9. (C) Wood asked for the U.S. read on the situation on the ground and its implications for President Sharif's position. He expressed disappointment that Sharif has not done more on reconciliation or formation of the unity government. He noted that if weakened, Sharif may need to broaden his alliances, which may include reaching out to Aweys. ¶10. (C) Carson characterized the situation as extraordinarily fragile and confusing-- depending on how the situation is read, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has either overcome its toughest test and survived, or is about to be defeated by al-Shabaab. He noted that Ugandan President Museveni believes the TFG will not collapse and that al-Shabaab has been thwarted in Mogadishu. Reports from Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and the media indicate that the situation is fragile, fluid, and uncertain, and that the battle for Mogadishu has not been resolved. He noted reports that al-Shabaab has captured several towns, as well as of Ethiopians inside the border, which would represent a show of support for the TFG. ¶11. (C) Carson noted that if Sharif survives the most concerted effort that al-Shabaab can launch, with international support he may emerge stronger. He stressed that the international community must find a way to strengthen Sharif, his forces, and his government; to gain public support, the TFG must be able to demonstrate its effectiveness in delivering basic government services. He noted that at the Secretary's request, we have done as much as possible to shore up the TFG, including urging InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) support for the TFG on the margins of the May 20 IGAD Ministerial and delivering $500,000 to Somalia last Friday. Cox inquired about the $2 M notified to the UN sanctions committee. Carter explained that the $2 M (which includes the $500,000 already released) will go toward salaries, weapons, equipment, and material support. He noted the U.S. is working with the TFG to ensure our support is deconflicted with the TFG's requests for assistance to other donor nations. Gavin highlighted the importance of seizing the opportunities related to potential al-Shabaab expulsion from Mogadishu. CLINTON