U.S. POLICY ON IRAQI REFUGEES AND DISPLACED

S E C R E T STATE 051405 E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2029 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SY JO IZ SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY ON IRAQI REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS REFS: A: STATE 48144 B: STATE 34650 Classified By: (U) NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. This cable describes the new U.S. policy on assisting Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It expands upon the objectives described by the President in his February 27 speech in which he committed to helping the millions of displaced Iraqis inside Iraq and in neighboring countries. It is provided as policy guidance for Embassy Baghdad for implementation beginning immediately and for the information of other addressees. This guidance is not intended to limit or constrain the Mission from designing specific tactics, or pursuing specific opportunities, in support of policy goals. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY Cont'd. Paragraphs 3-9 detail the policy to assist Iraqi refugees and IDPs adopted by the Deputies Committee on April 17. The policy focuses on three areas: --improving the conditions of returning Iraqi refugees and IDPs by urging increased GOI attention to displacement issues and enhancing GOI Iraqi capacity to ensure security and services for returnees; --enhancing the efficiency of processing requests for Iraqis who seek to immigrate to third countries; and --improving conditions for Iraqis who remain displaced. This policy complements the Iraq regional engagement policy, also approved by Deputies on April 17 (Ref A) and the policy on political engagement in Iraq, approved by Deputies on March 13 (Ref B). An Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) on Iraqi refugees and IDPs is coordinating next steps, particularly on an integrated strategy for approaching donors for funding, and designing a longer-term USG assistance program for community-based development projects aimed at creating conditions that will encourage and sustain the voluntary return and integration of displaced Iraqis. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE U.S. COMMITMENT... -------------- ¶3. (C) President Obama emphasized America's commitment to help Iraqi refugees and IDPs in his February 27 speech on Iraq policy, stating that "America has a strategic interest -- and a moral responsibility -- to act." The President said dealing with this problem addresses critical U.S. goals: improving stability in the region; meeting our moral responsibility to heal the wounds of the Iraq conflict; and promoting peace and development in Iraq. -------------- ...TO ADDRESS THE SITUATION... -------------- ¶4. (C) There are an estimated 2.8 million IDPs in Iraq, according to UN data, with 1.6 million of them displaced during the spike in sectarian violence in 2006-2007. Most IDPs are living with relatives or in private accommodations, often in substandard conditions. Refugee figures are more difficult to estimate. Recent analysis suggests that there are approximately one million total refugees in neighboring countries, with 100-200,000 in Jordan, and 500-700,000 in Syria. These numbers are substantial and pose a serious humanitarian and security challenge, though they are considerably smaller than the commonly reported estimate of two million refugees, a figure derived from host government claims, including 450,000-500,000 in Jordan and 1-1.5 million in Syria. There are also substantial numbers of Iraqi refugees in Europe and elsewhere. ¶5. (C) Prime Minister Maliki has opposed measures to support refugees, in some cases based on his view that the majority Sunni refugee population, many with perceived ties to Saddam's Ba'ath Party, does not support post-Saddam Iraq and could coalesce into a permanent threat and in other cases based on the view that assisting these refugees only encourages them to remain abroad. The GOI consistently downplays the numbers of refugees and has only given a total of $25 million to support refugees in the region. It has occasionally paid for transport of small numbers of refugees back to Baghdad and engaged in modest outreach efforts to some educated professionals. The GOI provided substantial assistance inside Iraq in 2008 - $211.9 million for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) for social benefits for IDPs and returnees - but cut funding in 2009, budgeting only $42 million. The shrinking budget reflects the drop in Iraq's oil income, but also the GOI's lack of urgency for the program. MODM lacks the capacity, authority and resources to coordinate an effective government-wide program. -------------- ...FOCUSES ON RETURNS... -------------- ¶6. (C) The policy recognizes that of the three areas identified for U.S. support -- voluntary and safe returns and integration, resettlement, and improving conditions for refugees and IDPs -- returns and integration demands the most attention because the pace of returns is accelerating and could pose significant risks to Iraqi stability. Large-scale voluntary refugee and IDP returns could alleviate strains in neighboring countries and host communities, bring back to Iraq a large number of skilled professionals and, if responsibly integrated, help heal sectarian wounds. A badly planned or too hasty returns process, however, could reopen old wounds, jeopardize returnees' protection, and promote instability. From a security standpoint, we must ensure that large-scale returns do not overwhelm the capacity of the GOI to absorb them into society. If security continues to improve, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) projects 500,000 IDP and refugee returns in 2009, anticipating that the bulk of returns will start in the summer after the school terms end. The rate of returns will be sensitive to present security conditions and perceptions of future security trends. Other important factors include GOI support, international assistance, and worsening economic conditions in host countries and Iraq. Some Iraqi refugees and IDPs, especially Christians and other minorities, may choose not to return to their original communities but instead either integrate locally in their current place of displacement or seek third country resettlement. ¶7. (C) The policy outlines a comprehensive strategy for returns, which addresses five factors with recommended actions for each factor: A) Making the management of displacement and returns a GOI priority by: --Continuing high-level engagement with Prime Minister Maliki and senior GOI officials to emphasize President Obama's interest in this issue and stressing the need for increased GOI ownership of and attention to this issue. --Placing indirect pressure on the GOI by promoting or directly sponsoring media coverage that highlights poor conditions for refugees and IDPs, aimed at building local awareness and pressure for the GOI to engage proactively with them and create the necessary conditions to facilitate their return and integration. Any media campaign should take care to highlight the difficulties faced by Iraqi refugees and IDPs while not negatively branding them (for example, as prostitutes, criminals, or a group that engages in other culturally unacceptable behaviors),nor undermining concurrent informational outreach designed to convey the improved on-the-ground situation inside Iraq. --Urging Sunni Arab political leaders in Iraq (whose support Maliki is seeking for elections) to raise refugee and IDP integration as a priority in their talks with Maliki. --Balancing with messages from Shi'a leaders stressing the need to support Shi'a IDPs, the importance of returns for reconciliation, and the special dangers to Christians and other minorities. This is a message senior clerics, such as Sistani, are likely to support. --Linking returns to the GOI priority to return skilled professionals by offering technical assistance to identify professionals and technocrats among the refugee population and establish programs to encourage their job placement and return. [Note: The Strategic Framework Agreement Services and Technology Joint Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Issawi, agreed to promote programs to reintegrate highly skilled returnees into government service ministries.] --Urging Jordan, Syria and other Sunni Arab neighbors, directly or through the UN, to make refugees a top agenda item during upcoming visits with GOI officials, focusing on the Iraqi government's need to create conditions that will ensure Iraq can better absorb returns. B) Increasing GOI capacity to absorb returns by: --Encouraging the GOI to establish a GOI-UN-U.S. working group on refugees that meets regularly at the ministerial level or higher and is chaired by an individual with authority and credibility among all Iraqi groups. Stressing that such a chair is needed to reassure potential returnees and gain United States and international support for expanded initiatives. --Offering specialized training to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units responsible for areas with heavy concentrations of returnees, focusing on conflict management and coordination with government, U.N., and U.S. assistance programs. --Working with provincial councils in key displacement areas - Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa - to increase their capacity to manage returns. C) Enhancing UNHCR and other international organization and non-governmental organization programs by: --Shifting existing budgeted funds to support expanded UNHCR returns activities, which are expected to include opening new community and return assistance centers and rehabilitating shelters. --Supporting the efforts of UNHCR, as well as other UN agencies, to overcome security and logistic constraints in order to maximize their presence and operations in Iraq, while adequately addressing security concerns. D) Increasing Iraqi and international contributions to refugee and IDP initiatives and building on the preference by European donors to facilitate returns rather than support Iraqis in neighboring countries by: --Leveraging the appeal of a new Administration and using a coordinated approach to major donors by senior U.S. officials. --Encouraging the U.N. to issue a revised 2009 Consolidated Appeal that includes expanded returns-related activities inside Iraq. --Appealing to Arab neighbors to contribute to the return of Sunnis to Iraq, and encourage private investment as a means to improve economic prospects for returnees. [Note: An interagency group is developing an approach to major donors on Iraq that is coordinated with other USG priorities and requests, particularly on Afghanistan and Pakistan. End note.] E) Finding the right balance of near-term humanitarian assistance and targeted community development programs: State/PRM, USAID/Iraq and USAID/OFDA have identified sectors where each organization is responsible for programs that could be targeted to facilitate the reintegration of refugees and IDPs, and the integration of those individuals who have decided to remain permanently in new locations inside Iraq. The goal will be to concentrate on a range of USG-funded humanitarian, protection, and community development activities on the areas that show the most potential for reintegration and ensure that funded activities are complementary and not redundant. The IPC has asked State/PRM and USAID to develop a coordinated, multi-year strategy for returns and community-based development programs, using currently available and budgeted resources as much as possible, in coordination with U.N. agencies, NGOs, and the GOI. We plan to share this strategy with donors in the context of our overall approach on Iraq, to encourage stronger support and financial contributions. -------------- ...RESETTLEMENT,... -------------- ¶8. (C) UNHCR has reduced its estimate of the number of Iraqis seeking resettlement from 80,000 to 60,000. The USG expects to admit over 20,000 Iraqi refugees in FY2009 and substantial numbers in FY2010, in addition to the total of over 15,000 who were admitted in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Interagency discussions on anticipated Iraqi refugee admissions numbers for FY 2010 will take place during the summer of 2009. The policy identifies the following potential obstacles to expediting the processing of resettlement claims and recommends actions to address those challenges: --Delays in approval of Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs), which are required for refugee processing: Resource shortages have caused delays in SAO processing, and Deputies have expressed concern that all relevant agencies should dedicate sufficient, permanent resources to keep pace with processing demands. Progress to reduce delays has been made through the Homeland Security Council Border and Transportation Security IPC, which continues to address issues related to SAO processing. -- Limitations placed on U.S. resettlement processing in Syria: While the Syrians have issued visas for all Department of Homeland Security circuit ride teams this fiscal year, they still require interviews be conducted at UNHCR facilities and have refused to provide visas for non-Syrian staff of our overseas processing entity. In addition, the Syrians continue to place restrictions on cases referred by UNHCR for third-country resettlement, thereby limiting our ability to process cases of U.S.-affiliated Iraqis. As U.S.-Syrian contacts increase, these issues could be raised as examples of how Syria can show goodwill in the relationship. -- The perception of Iraqi refugees in the U.S., that the USG is unable and/or unwilling to adequately support them, becoming a disappointment channeled back to refugees in the region: Refugees should receive more accurate information about what benefits will be provided to them during the refugee admissions process, so that Iraqi refugees do not arrive in the United States with inflated and unrealistic expectations. -- The Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program is poorly understood by Iraqis and difficult to access: The State Department is reviewing its guidance on SIV eligibility to determine whether to include some of those who worked for implementers of grants and cooperative agreements. The policy also directs streamlining technical procedures of the SIV application process. --Refugee resettlement for Palestinian refugees stranded in isolated camps along Iraq's borders: The Department of Homeland Security may concur with the State Department's request to streamline the resettlement process by eliminating its pre-clearance requirement to permit processing of the Palestinian caseload like other nationalities. [Note: The pre-clearance policy is now under review by DHS. End note.] -------------- - ...AND IMPROVING CONDITIONS FOR THE DISPLACED. -------------- - ¶9. (C) Syria and Jordan have an interest in inflating the numbers of refugees to gain additional assistance and credit for the burdens they are bearing. Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are becoming increasingly vulnerable - and more reliant on humanitarian aid - as they deplete available resources and are unable to work legally. The policy recommends, when appropriate, that the U.S. advocate for improved conditions for Iraqi refugees by: --Encouraging Syria and Jordan to allow UNHCR and NGOs to do large-scale outreach and public registration campaigns. --Asking Jordan and Syria to allow independent assessments of the refugee populations to determine numbers and needs, and share information that would allow for better estimates. --Lobbying Jordan and Syria to allow more refugees to obtain temporary legal status and temporary work permits in an effort to prevent exploitation, while generating goodwill and linkages between the refugee and local populations. [Note: There has been some progress in discussions with the Jordanian government, and improving United States-Syrian relations may make it easier to raise this issue with Damascus. End note.] --Urging Jordan to further relax its visa regulations for non-business Iraqi travelers to make it easier for refugees to visit Iraq and return to Jordan. Such visits would allow Iraqis to see relatives, collect income, explore employment opportunities, and assess whether it is possible to return. At the same time, urge Jordan to offer a permanent amnesty from overstay fines for Iraqi refugees seeking return to Iraq. --Working with the GOI and UNAMI to ensure that refugees and IDPs are able to vote in the upcoming national elections. CLINTON