U.S. NON-PAPER ON ELEMENTS OF A START FOLLOW-ON

S E C R E T STATE 050910


GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2029
TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPER ON ELEMENTS OF A START FOLLOW-ON
TREATY

REF: STATE 41125


Classified By: Jerry Taylor, Director VCI/SI. Reason
1.4B and D.


1. (SBU) Background: A U.S. delegation led by Assistant
Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation,
Rose Gottemoeller, is scheduled to begin negotiations
regarding a START follow-on agreement with a Russian
delegation led by Russian MFA Director of Security and
Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, in Moscow on May
19-21, 2009. During a May 6 meeting with Amb. Antonov in
Washington, A/S Gottemoeller agreed to provide a U.S.
paper that would lay out U.S. proposals on the key
elements of a START follow-on treaty. Amb. Antonov
undertook to provide a similar paper regarding the views
of the Russian Federation.


2. (U) Guidance: As part of its discussion of the
United States' position on the elements of a START
follow-on treaty, Delegation should provide the text
contained in paragraph 3 below to the Russian Delegation
in the form of a non-paper and may provide a courtesy
Russian-language translation of the paper (to be sent via
e-mail).


3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) U.S. non-
paper on the elements of a START follow-on treaty.

Begin text of U.S. non-paper.

Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty


I. General Obligations and Objectives

The United States desires to reach agreement with the
Russian Federation promptly on a treaty to be completed
by the time START expires in December, 2009. The United
States agrees that the follow-on agreement should be a
legally binding treaty and would incorporate incremental
reductions below the levels contained in START and the
Moscow Treaty.

The United States seeks to work cooperatively with the
Russian Federation to reduce the size of our strategic
nuclear arsenals as a part of our efforts to:

a. Reduce the role and importance of nuclear weapons in
maintaining international security;

b. Fulfill U.S. and Russian obligations under Article VI
of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons;

c. Support worldwide nonproliferation efforts;

d. Move demonstrably toward the ultimate goal of the
elimination of nuclear weapons;

e. Strengthen deterrence for both sides while mutually
reducing operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads below Moscow Treaty levels;

f. Maintain the safety and security of nuclear arsenals
as both sides carry out reductions; and

g. Bring the nuclear postures of the United States and
the Russian Federation into alignment with our post-Cold War
relationship - no longer enemies, no prospect of war
between us, and cooperating where mutually advantageous.

II. Central Limits and Counting Rules


A. Warhead limit: The central limit would be on
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

- The term "operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warhead" means a nuclear warhead operationally deployed
on an ICBM in its launcher, a nuclear warhead operationally
deployed on an SLBM in its launcher onboard a submarine,
and a nuclear warhead loaded on a heavy bomber or a
nuclear warhead for a heavy bomber located in a specified
weapon storage area associated with or directly
supporting a heavy bomber air base.

- In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear
warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are located at
specified heavy bomber weapons storage areas and would
not be considered to be operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads.

- The treaty should contain agreed definitions to
identify, and verification measures to confirm, the
number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
for each side.


B. Limits on deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed
launchers of SLBMs, and on deployed heavy bombers:

- All deployed launchers of ICBMs and all deployed
launchers of SLBMs, for ICBMs and SLBMs tested for
nuclear weapon delivery, would count against the limit
on deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of
SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers.

- Deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
would count against the limit on deployed launchers of
ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers.

- Some launchers that are now counted in START but that
are no longer part of the operational strategic forces of
a side, i.e., launchers that are no longer capable of
supporting operational ICBMs or SLBMs, and heavy bombers
that have been converted to non-nuclear only roles or
could not be returned to operational status without
considerable time and expense, would not be subject to
the
treaty.


C. Counting rules: Since the warhead limits would be on
the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads, no attribution rules are needed regarding the
number of warheads associated with specific types of
deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers (both existing
and new types).


D. Deployment of non-nuclear warheads: Non-nuclear
warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs would not count
toward the operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warhead limits of the treaty.

- Verification measures would be developed for deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that nuclear warheads are not
deployed on these systems.


E. Treaty Terminology: The Parties should agree on
terminology and definitions to ensure clarity regarding
the intended scope of the treaty and verification regime
(e.g., "operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads," "tested for nuclear delivery," "new type,"
etc.) The new treaty should use START definitions except
when there is a specific reason to change them or to
incorporate a new term into the treaty.

III. Limitations, Restrictions, and Prohibitions: Many
of the limitations, restrictions, and prohibitions currently
included in the START Treaty could be adapted forinclusion
in the START Follow-on agreement.

- Examples of limitations, restrictions, and prohibitions
in this treaty may include:


1. a ban on the production, testing or deployment of
systems for rapid reload of ICBMs,


2. a ban on the basing of strategic offensive arms subject
to the limitations of the Treaty outside of each side's
national territory.

This list is not exhaustive; other important limitations,
restrictions, and prohibitions should be considered as
well.

IV. Elimination: Simpler and less expensive elimination
and monitoring procedures should be explored. Examples
of
elimination procedures that could be made simpler and
less
expensive may include modifying elimination procedures
for
silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers.


V. Notifications, Monitoring, and Verification: The basic
START data exchanges, notifications, and inspection
provisions, would be retained and adapted, as
appropriate. For example, notifications concerning the
movement of mobile ICBMs or heavy bombers, and
notifications concerning the elimination of items subject
to limitation should be included. Once again, this list
is not exhaustive.


A. Data base: The START data base should be modified to
reflect limits on operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads as well as limits on deployed launchers
of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs and deployed heavy
bombers. The database would be maintained and periodically
updated through the use of current START notifications, as
adapted. New categories of data could be added reflecting
the provisions of the new treaty.


B. Notifications: Many of the current START notifications
should be included in the START Follow-on agreement.
However, the sides should develop less stringent
notification requirements in selected cases, e.g., for
the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside national
territory for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty.


C. Verification: In general, the types of verification
provisions and the procedures for their implementation
would be similar to those contained in START, but they
would be adapted for the new treaty's verification
requirements.

- Verification procedures will need to be designed to
confirm the number of operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and
associated with heavy bombers, and the number of deployed
launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and
deployed heavy bombers.

- The basic START inspection provisions, including reentry
vehicle inspections (appropriately modified),data update
inspections, conversion or elimination inspections,
suspect-site inspections, new facility inspections,
close-out inspections, formerly declared facility
inspections, technical characteristics exhibitions, and
perimeter and portal continuous monitoring, as well as
telemetry provisions, would be retained and adapted, as
appropriate. Where possible, the United States and Russia
should look for ways to make verification simpler, less
costly, and less burdensome based on 15 years of START
implementation experience.

- ICBMs and SLBMs removed from their launchers would be
stored, destroyed, or used (e.g., for space launch or as
target vehicles for ballistic missile defense tests),and
would be periodically monitored while in storage.

VI. Implementation Oversight: An oversight body similar to
START's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission should
be established to resolve questions related to treaty
implementation.

VII. Conflicting International Obligations/Patterns of
Cooperation: As in START, the provisions of the new
treaty should not apply to existing patterns of
cooperation in the area of strategic offensive arms
between a Party and a third state.

VIII. Entry Into Force and Duration: The new treaty's
duration should be 5-10 years. The reduction period to
reach the agreed levels will depend on the types of
actions required in the treaty. A goal would be to reach
new levels of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads, and deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed
launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers somewhere
between 3-5 years after entry into force of the new
treaty. A withdrawal provision should be included as
well.

Further reductions beyond the START Follow-on Treaty: At
the conclusion of the negotiations, the new START
follow-on agreement should be accompanied by an agreed
commitment to initiate promptly further negotiations
directed toward concluding a second agreement that
achieves additional, deeper reductions in overall nuclear
warheads, including non-strategic nuclear warheads and
non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Also, at some
point, multilateral discussions will be necessary as we
move toward achieving a goal of the elimination of
nuclear
weapons.

End text.


CLINTON