U.S. NON-PAPER ON ELEMENTS OF A START FOLLOW-ON

S E C R E T STATE 050910 GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2029 TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPER ON ELEMENTS OF A START FOLLOW-ON TREATY REF: STATE 41125 Classified By: Jerry Taylor, Director VCI/SI. Reason 1.4B and D. ¶1. (SBU) Background: A U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, is scheduled to begin negotiations regarding a START follow-on agreement with a Russian delegation led by Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, in Moscow on May 19-21, 2009. During a May 6 meeting with Amb. Antonov in Washington, A/S Gottemoeller agreed to provide a U.S. paper that would lay out U.S. proposals on the key elements of a START follow-on treaty. Amb. Antonov undertook to provide a similar paper regarding the views of the Russian Federation. ¶2. (U) Guidance: As part of its discussion of the United States' position on the elements of a START follow-on treaty, Delegation should provide the text contained in paragraph 3 below to the Russian Delegation in the form of a non-paper and may provide a courtesy Russian-language translation of the paper (to be sent via e-mail). ¶3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) U.S. non- paper on the elements of a START follow-on treaty. Begin text of U.S. non-paper. Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty ¶I. General Obligations and Objectives The United States desires to reach agreement with the Russian Federation promptly on a treaty to be completed by the time START expires in December, 2009. The United States agrees that the follow-on agreement should be a legally binding treaty and would incorporate incremental reductions below the levels contained in START and the Moscow Treaty. The United States seeks to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation to reduce the size of our strategic nuclear arsenals as a part of our efforts to: a. Reduce the role and importance of nuclear weapons in maintaining international security; b. Fulfill U.S. and Russian obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; c. Support worldwide nonproliferation efforts; d. Move demonstrably toward the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons; e. Strengthen deterrence for both sides while mutually reducing operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads below Moscow Treaty levels; f. Maintain the safety and security of nuclear arsenals as both sides carry out reductions; and g. Bring the nuclear postures of the United States and the Russian Federation into alignment with our post-Cold War relationship - no longer enemies, no prospect of war between us, and cooperating where mutually advantageous. II. Central Limits and Counting Rules ¶A. Warhead limit: The central limit would be on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. - The term "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warhead" means a nuclear warhead operationally deployed on an ICBM in its launcher, a nuclear warhead operationally deployed on an SLBM in its launcher onboard a submarine, and a nuclear warhead loaded on a heavy bomber or a nuclear warhead for a heavy bomber located in a specified weapon storage area associated with or directly supporting a heavy bomber air base. - In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are located at specified heavy bomber weapons storage areas and would not be considered to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. - The treaty should contain agreed definitions to identify, and verification measures to confirm, the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each side. ¶B. Limits on deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and on deployed heavy bombers: - All deployed launchers of ICBMs and all deployed launchers of SLBMs, for ICBMs and SLBMs tested for nuclear weapon delivery, would count against the limit on deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. - Deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments would count against the limit on deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. - Some launchers that are now counted in START but that are no longer part of the operational strategic forces of a side, i.e., launchers that are no longer capable of supporting operational ICBMs or SLBMs, and heavy bombers that have been converted to non-nuclear only roles or could not be returned to operational status without considerable time and expense, would not be subject to the treaty. ¶C. Counting rules: Since the warhead limits would be on the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, no attribution rules are needed regarding the number of warheads associated with specific types of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers (both existing and new types). ¶D. Deployment of non-nuclear warheads: Non-nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs would not count toward the operationally deployed strategic nuclear warhead limits of the treaty. - Verification measures would be developed for deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that nuclear warheads are not deployed on these systems. ¶E. Treaty Terminology: The Parties should agree on terminology and definitions to ensure clarity regarding the intended scope of the treaty and verification regime (e.g., "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads," "tested for nuclear delivery," "new type," etc.) The new treaty should use START definitions except when there is a specific reason to change them or to incorporate a new term into the treaty. III. Limitations, Restrictions, and Prohibitions: Many of the limitations, restrictions, and prohibitions currently included in the START Treaty could be adapted forinclusion in the START Follow-on agreement. - Examples of limitations, restrictions, and prohibitions in this treaty may include: ¶1. a ban on the production, testing or deployment of systems for rapid reload of ICBMs, ¶2. a ban on the basing of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty outside of each side's national territory. This list is not exhaustive; other important limitations, restrictions, and prohibitions should be considered as well. IV. Elimination: Simpler and less expensive elimination and monitoring procedures should be explored. Examples of elimination procedures that could be made simpler and less expensive may include modifying elimination procedures for silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers. ¶V. Notifications, Monitoring, and Verification: The basic START data exchanges, notifications, and inspection provisions, would be retained and adapted, as appropriate. For example, notifications concerning the movement of mobile ICBMs or heavy bombers, and notifications concerning the elimination of items subject to limitation should be included. Once again, this list is not exhaustive. ¶A. Data base: The START data base should be modified to reflect limits on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads as well as limits on deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. The database would be maintained and periodically updated through the use of current START notifications, as adapted. New categories of data could be added reflecting the provisions of the new treaty. ¶B. Notifications: Many of the current START notifications should be included in the START Follow-on agreement. However, the sides should develop less stringent notification requirements in selected cases, e.g., for the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. ¶C. Verification: In general, the types of verification provisions and the procedures for their implementation would be similar to those contained in START, but they would be adapted for the new treaty's verification requirements. - Verification procedures will need to be designed to confirm the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and associated with heavy bombers, and the number of deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. - The basic START inspection provisions, including reentry vehicle inspections (appropriately modified),data update inspections, conversion or elimination inspections, suspect-site inspections, new facility inspections, close-out inspections, formerly declared facility inspections, technical characteristics exhibitions, and perimeter and portal continuous monitoring, as well as telemetry provisions, would be retained and adapted, as appropriate. Where possible, the United States and Russia should look for ways to make verification simpler, less costly, and less burdensome based on 15 years of START implementation experience. - ICBMs and SLBMs removed from their launchers would be stored, destroyed, or used (e.g., for space launch or as target vehicles for ballistic missile defense tests),and would be periodically monitored while in storage. VI. Implementation Oversight: An oversight body similar to START's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission should be established to resolve questions related to treaty implementation. VII. Conflicting International Obligations/Patterns of Cooperation: As in START, the provisions of the new treaty should not apply to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic offensive arms between a Party and a third state. VIII. Entry Into Force and Duration: The new treaty's duration should be 5-10 years. The reduction period to reach the agreed levels will depend on the types of actions required in the treaty. A goal would be to reach new levels of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers somewhere between 3-5 years after entry into force of the new treaty. A withdrawal provision should be included as well. Further reductions beyond the START Follow-on Treaty: At the conclusion of the negotiations, the new START follow-on agreement should be accompanied by an agreed commitment to initiate promptly further negotiations directed toward concluding a second agreement that achieves additional, deeper reductions in overall nuclear warheads, including non-strategic nuclear warheads and non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Also, at some point, multilateral discussions will be necessary as we move toward achieving a goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. End text. CLINTON