Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE47359
2009-05-08 21:40:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:
GUIDANCE ON RESPONDING TO RADIATION ALARM AT
VZCZCXYZ0002 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #7359 1282153 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 082140Z MAY 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 2091 INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 4904 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0747 RHMFIUU/NRC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 4043 RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD IMMEDIATE 2172 RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 6967
UNCLAS STATE 047359
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC KCRM KNNP MNUC PARM PINR PREL PTER LH
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON RESPONDING TO RADIATION ALARM AT
LITHUANIAN BORDER WITH KALININGRAD
REF: A. A) VILNIUS 000247
B. B) STATE 030541
UNCLAS STATE 047359
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC KCRM KNNP MNUC PARM PINR PREL PTER LH
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON RESPONDING TO RADIATION ALARM AT
LITHUANIAN BORDER WITH KALININGRAD
REF: A. A) VILNIUS 000247
B. B) STATE 030541
1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Vilnius.
Please see paragraph 4.
2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: Per REF A, on May 5, 2009, Post
alerted Washington that a radiation alarm was set off by a
cargo train at the border of Lithuania and the Russian
enclave of Kaliningrad on May 1, 2009. Post received the
information via media reports and the Lithuanian State Border
Guard Service website. The reporting detailed in REF A stated
that Border Guards in Lithuania's southern Lazdijai Frontier
District found zirconium ore and sodium triphosphate in a
freight train heading to a ceramics factory in Volgograd in
southern Russia. Radiation monitoring equipment "revealed a
field of 100 micro-roentgen per hour" and the train car with
the increased radiation field was denied entry to Lithuania
and sent back to Kaliningrad. Albinas Mastauskas, Director of
the Lithuanian Radiation Protection Center, informed Post
that the cargo contained zirconium ore and sodium
triphosphate and was not properly documented by Russian
regulatory agencies.
3. (SBU) Since the Second Line of Defense agreement with
Lithuania is not yet in place, there is no formal requirement
at this time for GOL officials to notify the Department of
Energy's Second Line of Defense Country Manager for
Lithuania. .
4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to inform the
GOL that Washington does not believe the cargo poses a
national security threat but deeply appreciates their
vigilance in recognizing and responding to radiation alarms.
Washington is grateful for Post's adherence to State's
updated guidance on reporting radiation alarms (REF B) and
encourages Post to continue following-up with local
authorities and to inform Washington if additional
information becomes available.
5. Washington appreciates Post's assistance.
CLINTON
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC KCRM KNNP MNUC PARM PINR PREL PTER LH
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON RESPONDING TO RADIATION ALARM AT
LITHUANIAN BORDER WITH KALININGRAD
REF: A. A) VILNIUS 000247
B. B) STATE 030541
1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Vilnius.
Please see paragraph 4.
2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: Per REF A, on May 5, 2009, Post
alerted Washington that a radiation alarm was set off by a
cargo train at the border of Lithuania and the Russian
enclave of Kaliningrad on May 1, 2009. Post received the
information via media reports and the Lithuanian State Border
Guard Service website. The reporting detailed in REF A stated
that Border Guards in Lithuania's southern Lazdijai Frontier
District found zirconium ore and sodium triphosphate in a
freight train heading to a ceramics factory in Volgograd in
southern Russia. Radiation monitoring equipment "revealed a
field of 100 micro-roentgen per hour" and the train car with
the increased radiation field was denied entry to Lithuania
and sent back to Kaliningrad. Albinas Mastauskas, Director of
the Lithuanian Radiation Protection Center, informed Post
that the cargo contained zirconium ore and sodium
triphosphate and was not properly documented by Russian
regulatory agencies.
3. (SBU) Since the Second Line of Defense agreement with
Lithuania is not yet in place, there is no formal requirement
at this time for GOL officials to notify the Department of
Energy's Second Line of Defense Country Manager for
Lithuania. .
4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to inform the
GOL that Washington does not believe the cargo poses a
national security threat but deeply appreciates their
vigilance in recognizing and responding to radiation alarms.
Washington is grateful for Post's adherence to State's
updated guidance on reporting radiation alarms (REF B) and
encourages Post to continue following-up with local
authorities and to inform Washington if additional
information becomes available.
5. Washington appreciates Post's assistance.
CLINTON