SOUTH KOREA WANTS TO STRENGTHEN NONPROLIFERATION

S E C R E T STATE 046713 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 TAGS: KNNP PREL KN KS SUBJECT: SOUTH KOREA WANTS TO STRENGTHEN NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES AND FACILITATE NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION Classified By: EAP A/S Glyn T. Davies, Acting, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During a May 1 working lunch, Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (VCI) Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller and Republic of Korea (ROK) Deputy Foreign Minister (DFM) Joon Oh discussed further strengthening the international nonproliferation regime, coping with the North Korean nuclear threat, and working to solve front-end and back-end fuel cycle challenges facing the nuclear power generation industry in South Korea. A/S Gottemoeller stressed the United States would work hard at the upcoming NPT Prepcom to ensure a successful Review Conference next year. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- United States Wants to Strengthen Nonproliferation Regime -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) A/S Gottemoeller said President Obama noted during his election campaign his interest in strengthening our approaches to nonproliferation, citing as examples his call to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC). DFM Oh suggested the recent North Korean actions provided a good motivator to strengthen the HCOC. The MTCR is voluntary, but the ROKG would like it to be strengthened to become legally binding. A/S Gottemoeller responded that the United States did not yet have an official position on this idea, but she agreed this could help, noting also the Russian proposal to "internationalize" the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The Obama Administration continues to support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). President Obama is committed to the global goal of no nuclear weapons and has noted the limits of the current nonproliferation regimes, magnified by recent North Korean and Iranian behavior. He believes treaty signatories have certain rights, but also bear a responsibility to comply with their obligations, she said. She noted in this regard the President,s strong statement on compliance in his Prague speech. ¶3. (S) DFM Oh said he agreed with this general approach to handling challenges to the NPT. Oh remarked that the NPT adherents should discuss more about North Korea-related issues at the upcoming Prepcom. Unlike last year, when there was greater hope for progress in the Six-Party Talks, he said, now "there is no reason to hold back. If we let North Korea get away with its threat, this could constitute the first-ever case of a country going nuclear within the NPT." Oh noted North Korea had received the benefits of the "peaceful use" clauses of the NPT, such as its acquisition of a small research reactor from Russia. He said the text of Article 10, which governs withdrawal from the NPT, is too vague and does not specify a response from other member states. The ROK presented a working paper at last year,s Prepcom to specify the conditions for withdrawal, he noted. ¶4. (S) VCI Nuclear Affairs Office Director Jeff Eberhardt agreed the NPT parties need to strengthen the regime to deal with the possibility of withdrawal. The discussion between NPT member states so far had not delved into much detail but it has, for example, been suggested at previous Prepcoms that any declaration by a state of its intention to withdraw from the NPT should logically be an issue for discussion by the UN Security Council. The United States was interested in hearing the views of others regarding specific actions State Parties might take. Since North Korean actions had focused international attention on the issue, this may be the right time to develop specific proposals, Eberhardt observed. ¶5. (S) At the last Prepcom, the confrontation between the Non-Aligned Movement and the West meant we could not focus on this kind of issue, DFM Oh noted. A/S Gottemoeller agreed this is an important issue, which we hope to make progress on at the Prepcom in New York. North Korea and Iran closely monitor how the international community reacts to the actions of the other, she noted. -------------- Coping with the North Korean Nuclear Threat -------------- ¶6. (S) DFM Oh said the ROKG tries to keep North Korean nuclear threats in perspective. In 1993, North Korea underestimated the IAEA inspectors, who raised questions about North Korea,s honesty in declaring its nuclear programs, so North Korea had to expel the IAEA monitors to avoid providing more information. This crisis was resolved through the Agreed Framework, which gave North Korea something in exchange for giving up its nuclear program. ¶7. (S) The United States believes that verification has to be clearly specified (i.e. written down) to achieve a permanent resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue, A/S Gottemoeller said. Describing his view of the U.S. approaches over time, DFM Oh opined that the USG has used different tactics to achieve this end: (1) putting everything on the table to be agreed and implemented in sequence; and (2) taking what we can get piecemeal, while continuing to work to achieve agreement on everything. The problem with the second approach was that the real hard issues linger. A/S Gottemoeller said the United States would keep working to get North Korea back to the table, noting we need to build on the agreements made in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. Gottemoeller remarked that it was hard to understand the thinking of North Korean leaders. They should work to take advantage of the possibilities of working with the new U.S. Administration, but instead they do the opposite. DFM Oh said North Korea specializes in brinkmanship but would eventually come back to the table. If there were new threats, such as a nuclear test or more ICBM launches, that would be "too much," he said. ¶8. (S) A/S Gottemoeller said she understood China had some helpful ideas about verification during the last round of Six-Party Talks discussions. DFM Oh said if we were making progress, the ROKG could work with the Chinese to pursue these ideas with North Korea. But, if we have "reached the moment of truth, it may not be enough." A/S Gottemoeller noted the past success of outreach efforts with Russia as a means of building bridges to span distrust and asked whether the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program could usefully be applied to North Korea, such as through the creation of "scientist-to- scientist" redirection programs. This would be tough, but it worked in Russia after a lot of confidence-building measures, she said. DFM Oh responded that he thinks a scientist-to-scientist dialogue could only come after we have agreement on what to do with North Korean nuclear facilities. Oh said the ROKG believed North Korea would need to construct a new cooling tower to replace the one that was destroyed at Yongbyon last year. "Now we are at square one," he said. ¶9. (S) A/S Gottemoeller said she understood North Korea is preparing to start separating plutonium again. Having paid to destroy the Yongbyon cooling tower once, she said, the United States will not want to pay to destroy it again. The North Koreans are tough negotiators -- they drive a very hard bargain. We need to ensure that we secure access to suspect sites in any new agreement, she said, adding that she understood that the latest Chinese proposal moved in that direction. DFM Oh said it is difficult to predict what North Korean leaders will do but ROK Chief Negotiator Wi Sung-lac is in close consultation with Ambassadors Bosworth and Sung Kim to try to find a way forward. ¶10. (S) ROK Embassy Political Minister-Counselor Kim Hyong-zhin said North Korea had been working towards finalizing the succession issue by 2012 -- the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung,s birthday. After Kim Jong-il,s apparent stroke last August, he has had to accelerate the process. Minister-Counselor Kim said it appeared the North Korean regime was preparing the people for public discussion of the succession issue by releasing photos of the national commission "for the first time" and releasing pictures of Kim Jong-il looking very old and frail. DFM Oh said some speculated that North Korea wanted to build up its missile and nuclear capability so that it could be recognized as a nuclear power before Kim Jong-il dies. ¶11. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted Iran was providing similar challenges for the United States. DFM Oh noted the EU 3 was using the same "carrot" strategy with Iran that has "failed" with North Korea. The EU 3 was proposing to give something to Iran for giving up its nuclear program. Because Iran was not as economically poor or politically isolated as North Korea, Iran was not as desperate and was more difficult to influence. -------------- -------------- ROK Wants U.S. Engagement to Resolve Nuclear Energy Issues -------------- -------------- ¶12. (S) DFM Oh said the ROKG would like to initiate talks to renew the 40-year-old U.S.-ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. In 1993, the ROK voluntarily agreed not to construct any enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) facilities. The ROK has the sixth largest nuclear energy sector in the world, generating 40% of the ROK,s electricity, he said. The ROK needs a stable supply of nuclear fuel, and at the back end, the ROK stores the largest quantity of spent nuclear fuel of any country in the world. We need to come up with ways to handle these two issues and would like to do it in cooperation with the United States, he stressed. ¶13. (S) DFM Oh noted the initial thought that pyroprocessing provided a good proliferation-resistant solution to the nuclear waste issue has gone astray. The ROK needed to find a way to deal with spent fuel without creating a proliferation risk by separating plutonium from spent fuel. The new U.S. Administration needed to carefully review the nuclear issue, he urged. We are good allies and need to work together to find a way forward. A/S Gottemoeller said the new Administration would want to pursue cooperation with the ROK to find solutions in this area. ¶14. (S) DFM Oh opined that, for the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the national fuel bank idea deserved attention. For the back end, the ROK needed something to deal with mounting stocks of spent fuel, if not pyroprocessing. A/S Gottemoeller said concerns about climate change have altered the public acceptability of nuclear power, adding that the President,s Science Advisor was working on these issues. The Obama Administration was committed to internationalism, but we do not yet know exactly what the preferred solutions would be, she said. DFM Oh said Russia suggested last year that the ROK join a Russian-based nuclear fuel bank, noting that the United States endorsed this idea. The ROKG was willing to consider all proposals, noting that stability and cost would be key factors for the ROKG. So far, the ROKG has not seen any good suggestions for coping with the back end of the fuel cycle, a vital question for the international community to focus on, he opined. CLINTON