READ OUT OF APRIL 23 MEETING OF G-8

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 045019 GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019 TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL KNNP IT SUBJECT: READ OUT OF APRIL 23 MEETING OF G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP (NPDG) Classified By: ISN Acting DAS Matthias Mitman; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The G-8 Nonproliferation Directors devoted most of the April 23 NPDG meeting in Rome to revising draft nonproliferation language, which the Italian G-8 Presidency plans to release as a separate Leaders' statement at the July G-8 Summit. Lengthy debate occurred on the paragraph related to a "vision of a world free of nuclear weapons," with only France not concurring to include such language. On UNSCR 1540 U.S. representative Matthias Mitman urged the NPDG to take substantive action beyond a demarche encouraging states which had not submitted reports to do so and tabled language for a more robust demarche. The NPDG agreed to consider the text, as well as the U.S. proposal for G-8 1540 experts to meet in September. Italy and Germany indicated interest in hosting such a meeting. End Summary Iran ¶2. (SBU) After noting that Political Directors had discussed the Iran issue in depth, the Chair (Filippo Formica) asked whether there were any new developments. The Japanese rep (Toshio Sano) informed the group that during a recent visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister to Tokyo for a meeting on Afghanistan, the Japanese had told him that it was up to Iran to take the first step to restore confidence and that Iran should comply with UN Security Council resolutions. In response to a request from the Russian rep (Anatoly Antonov), Mitman said the U.S. policy review was still under way, but the U.S. position remained that it expected Iran to comply fully with its obligations. Mitman stressed that the U.S. would consult with allies once the review was complete and encouraged them to share their positions with the United States. North Korea ¶3. (SBU) Sano led off by stressing the necessity for the DPRK to meet commitments, especially with UNSCR 1718. Noting the North Korean statement that they would not return to the 6-Party talks, the ouster of IAEA inspectors, and DPRK moves to reactivate its nuclear facilities, he concluded there was no prospect of a resumption of the talks and thus we should now concentrate on implementation of Resolution 1718. Sano also sought help on the abduction issue. ¶4. (SBU) Antonov said Russia had tried to persuade the DPRK not to go ahead with its launch but was unsuccessful. Russia regretted the DPRK announcement on withdrawal from the 6-Party talks. Russia had reacted cautiously, however, hoping to wait till emotions had calmed down. Antonov commented further that Russia was satisfied with the Presidential statement, rather than a resolution, because Russia feared that a strong signal would only have a negative reaction. At this stage, what we needed was time. ¶5. (SBU) Mitman said the United States shared the Japanese views and expected that the Sanctions Committee would now do its work. The United States remained committed to the 6-Party talks and would stay in close consultation with other parties on how to restart them. NPT Review Process ¶6. (SBU) The UK (Liane Saunders) and Russian reps both considered the upcoming NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting, May 4-15, an important event. Saunders said that procedural tasks -- agreeing on an agenda and rules of procedure -- were most important and a positive outcome could put the review process on the right path, leading to the 2010 Review Conference. Antonov thought that in addition to procedural tasks, it was important for the PrepCom to make recommendations to the RevCon and suggested that the 2008 P-5 statement might provide the basis for such recommendations. Canada (Andre-Francois Giroux) requested G-8 comments on a Canadian paper on strengthening the NPT review process, which he circulated and which the U.S. had previously received. ¶7. (SBU) Otherwise the NPT discussion focused on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 1995 Middle East Resolution. Antonov noted the positive signals coming from Washington on the CTBT and commented that U.S. ratification would change the situation with regard to the Treaty. China clearly was looking toward the U.S. although when questioned about what they would do if the U.S. ratified, they provided only a vague answer. The Egyptians, on the other hand, said they would ratify after Israel adhered to the NPT. Mitman reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to CTBT ratification and said the Administration was working closely with the Senate to win its advice and consent to ratification. ¶8. (SBU) Several representatives said that the Middle East would prove the most contentious issue at the RevCon. Both the UK and Russian reps noted that their governments were already engaging with Egypt on the question. Antonov reported that Russia had conducted bilateral NPT consultations with Egypt and wanted to make clear (and in particular stressed that this should be reported to Washington) the Egyptian view that the 1995 decision to extend the NPT indefinitely was part of a package in which the agreement to seek a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (MENWFZ) was the other part. Egypt's view was that if others did not work towards a MENWFZ, Egypt did not have to uphold its part of the bargain. Russia agreed that nothing had been done on a MENWFZ since 1995 and that without a step from others, it would be difficult to get Egypt and Iran to agree to a consensus outcome at the RevCon. Mitman said he would convey Russia's points to Washington. Additional Protocol ¶9. (SBU) The chair noted that a revised list of countries to which a demarche would be directed urging signature or ratification of the Additional Protocol (AP) now included all those suggested by Russia, except Colombia, which had in the meantime ratified. After some discussion of whether to address a demarche to Belarus, Antonov volunteered that Russia would undertake that responsibility, taking account of what he characterized as the "complexity" of other G-8 members' relationship with that country. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 ¶10. (SBU) The chair began by noting that the U.S. had proposed a more thorough involvement of the G-8 in UNSCR 1540 implementation, instead of the usual demarche by the G-8 presidency urging states that had not done so to submit reports on their compliance with UNSCR 1540. Antonov countered that we have to start by urging those states that had not submitted initial reports to do so. Making such demarches could also provide a sense of why they had not done so and could enable us to take the next step. He also asserted that it was a delicate situation in light of the process under way to review 1540 and urged that the NPDG continue discussions on next steps. ¶11. (SBU) Mitman shared the view that it was important for all states to meet their obligations, but the U.S. did not think that pressing for initial reports was all the G-8 could do. It should reply to the 1540 Committee's letter of August 2008, which laid out a series of activities. Mitman also stressed the importance of holding a meeting of 1540 experts to consider how G-8 states could help others in implementing their 1540 responsibilities. In reply Sano said he thought the U.S. proposal for an experts' meeting was a good one, and Germany (Wunderlich) said Berlin was considering the U.S. request to host such a meeting in September but had not reached a final decision. ¶12. (SBU) After Antonov raised some further questions, Annalisa Giannella of the EU thought that a compromise could be found. Making the demarche proposed by the chair did not preclude an experts' meeting, she said. She also pointed out that the EU had organized regional seminars on 1540 implementation last year and was planning to hold six operational workshops on 1540 in 2009. These activities had given the EU a good understanding of states' problems in 1540 implementations, and the EU was prepared to provide a paper to the NPDG on what it had learned from those seminars. ¶13. (SBU) At the conclusion of the discussion, Formica said the Italians would go ahead, as G-8 Presidency, with the demarche urging submission of initial reports, but the U.S. proposal for a more extensive demarche would be considered by the Group later, perhaps at its June meeting. Secondly, Italy and Germany would consider hosting a meeting of G-8 1540 experts in September and would get back to the group with their conclusions. G-8 Leaders' Statement on Nonproliferation ¶14. (U) The Chair noted that Italy had decided that the nonproliferation statement would be a stand-alone statement issued by the leaders at the July Summit. This had been the practice before 2008, which was the only time that nonproliferation had been incorporated in the overall leaders' statement. ¶15. (C) As expected, virtually every paragraph elicited comments and revealed differences of opinion, but on only a few did the differences seem to reflect fundamentally different approaches. In particular France refused to accept a reference to a "vision of a world free of nuclear weapons," which all other G-8 members hailed in President Obama's and other leaders' recent statements. Russia's insistance that any reference to Syria's alleged nuclear activities contain a comment that the unilateral use of force was unacceptable was rejected by many, including the U.S. (Comment: If Russia does not yield on this point, the Leaders' nonproliferation statement may have no reference to Syria, as was the case in 2008) At the end of the discussion, the chair promised to circulate a revised version of this statement with bracketed language, which he did on April 30. CLINTON NNNN End Cable Text