EXPLOSIVE DETONATORS SOLD TO SYRIA

S E C R E T STATE 004489 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2034 TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER IN SY SUBJECT: EXPLOSIVE DETONATORS SOLD TO SYRIA Classified By: SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request; please see paragraph four. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) In October 2008, the Department delivered to the Congress the classified semi-annual report required by the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). This report, which covered the July-December 2006 period, identified foreign persons for whom there is credible evidence that such persons transferred to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria goods, services, or technologies controlled under multilateral export controls lists (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement). The report also detailed decisions regarding the imposition, non-imposition, or deferral of sanctions against these foreign persons. The Department deferred a decision on sanctions regarding two Indian firms pending a diplomatic query to Indian authorities. (Note: these cases were not raised with the Indian government prior to their inclusion in the INKSNA report). The two Indian firms sold or were involved in negotiating the sale of explosive detonators to Syria in the July-December 2006 period. Detonators are controlled under Section ML4 of the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and the transfer of this hardware must be reported under the Iran, Syria, and North Korea Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). While the cases involving these Indian entities were included in the classified report and briefed to Congressional staff, a decision on the sanctions deferrals against these two firms will form part of the next INKSNA report, which is in preparation. Indian government action with respect to investigating and, if appropriate as a result of this investigation, penalizing these firms will inform the decision-maker's determination to impose or waive penalties. Potential sanctions penalties described in talking points below include a licensing ban on the two Indian entities. Department's Office of Defense Trade Control Compliance found no license records for Rajasthan Explosives. For Premier Explosives, five license records for boron metal powder were found, most recently from May 2006. ¶3. (SBU) For post's background, during August 2008 experts talks on Indian export controls held in Washington, Indian MEA Director of Disarmament Amandeep Singh Gill, briefed on India's current efforts to expand its munitions list. Gill also expressed interest in receiving outreach from the Wassenaar Arrangement Chair. The USG repeatedly has urged India to harmonize its SCOMET control list with the Wassenaar annex. During October 2007 expert talks, the United States undertook to provide India with a paper outlining the U.S. understanding of the specific remaining differences between India's SCOMET list and the Wassenaar control list. That paper has not yet been produced. Post should use the opportunity of sharing information on activities by these firms to seek an update on India's projected timeline for finalizing its munitions list update and the breadth of the items (e.g. full adoption of the Wassenaar list; some subsets) under consideration. Additional information on the timing and scope of Indian updates to its munitions controls would be useful information that could inform interagency recommendations on this sanctions case. -------------- Objectives/Action Request -------------- ¶4. (S) Post is requested to pursue the following objectives and approach the appropriate Indian government officials to deliver the talking points in paragraph 5: -- Inform India of information regarding the Indian firms and their involvement in selling Wassenaar Arrangement controlled detonators to Syria, a state sponsor of terrorism. -- Emphasize that this activity must be reported to Congress under INKSNA and also may trigger INKSNA sanctions against the Indian firms. -- Ascertain whether the detonators are subject to Indian export control laws and if the firms sought Indian Government authorization to export these goods. -- Urge India to investigate the information we are providing and ask that it cease all cooperation with Syria, Iran, and North Korea on goods and technologies controlled under the cited multilateral control lists. -- Seek an update on India's projected timeline for finalizing its munitions list update and the breadth of the items (e.g. full adoption of the Wassenaar list; some subsets) under consideration for inclusion. -------------- TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶5. (S/REL INDIA) -- In the interests of transparency and enhanced cooperation on nonproliferation matters, we would like to share the following information. -- We have information that the Indian firm Premier Explosives Ltd. sold two million explosive detonators to Syria's Industrial Establishment of Defense (IED) in late November 2006, and shipped them from Mumbai to Tartus, Syria aboard the cargo ship "Lynx" in December 2006. -- We also have information that the Indian company Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals Ltd. in New Delhi was negotiating the sale of electric instant and delay detonators with IED in November 2006. We note that the "Lynx" was reportedly destined to make a port call in Latakia, Syria. -- Under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act ("INKSNA"),the United States is required to report to Congress persons and companies who have transferred to or acquired from Syria, Iran, or North Korea goods, services or technology controlled by multilateral nonproliferation export control regimes, specifically the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. -- Explosive detonators are controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement and are therefore reportable under the INKSNA. -- INKSNA also provides for the imposition of sanctions against the entities responsible for such transfers. -- We urge you to investigate the activities of these two companies and share with us at your earliest convenience the results of your investigation. -- Specifically, we would like to know if these detonators are subject to Indian export control laws, and whether these companies sought Indian Government authorization to conduct the export of the detonators. -- Such information will be an important factor in the decision process leading to the imposition or non-imposition of sanctions under INKSNA. -- Beyond these cases, we urge India to cease all cooperation with Syria, Iran, and North Korea on goods and technologies controlled under the nonproliferation export control regimes we have cited. -- We look forward to our continued cooperation on this and other related matters. (If Asked) -- Sanctions that could be imposed under INKSNA include: a. No department or agency of the United States Government or U.S. company may procure, or enter into any contract or the procurement of any goods, technology, or services from them; b. No department or agency of the United States Government or U.S. company may provide any assistance to them, and they shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the United States Government; c. No sales to them of any item on the United States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to them of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated; and, d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the transfer to them of items controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration Regulations, and existing such licenses are suspended. -------------- Reporting Deadline -------------- ¶6. (U) Please report the delivery of this demarche and any immediate response by January 23. -------------- Point of Contact -------------- ¶7. (U) Department of State POC is Mike Rolleri. Please slug all replies to ISN, VCI, SCA, and NEA. RICE NNNN End Cable Text