APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JANUARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 STATE 004297 SIPDIS BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019 TAGS: EUN PREL PGOV ZL AF SU ZI UP BO SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JANUARY 26-27 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC) REF: PRAGUE 27 Classified By: N. Dean, Acting Director, EUR/ERA. Reasons: 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 25. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their next General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting in Brussels January 26-27. We expect the formal agenda to include: Western Balkans, Sudan/Darfur, Zimbabwe, Ukraine, Belarus, and a discussion of how the EU can assist the United States with the closure of detention facilities at Guantanamo. Afghanistan had been on the preliminary agenda but we understand it has now been deferred, likely to the February GAERC. Afghanistan points are still included in this cable, and posts should deliver them along with the other demarche subjects. A background section covering some of these issues is provided prior to a section containing talking points. Talking Points only are to be delivered as soon as possible at the appropriate level to EU members only. Other posts should not/not deliver these points. Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS caption on their response cables and to reference this cable. End Summary. BACKGROUND -------------- WESTERN BALKANS KOSOVO/SERBIA ¶3. (SBU) EULEX now has most of its personnel on the ground in Kosovo, including over 1,200 police, and UNMIK has largely transferred the rule of law portfolio to EULEX. However, EULEX has not yet announced a firm date for its &full operational capacity,8 which would herald the formal end of UNMIK Rule of Law activities in Kosovo. We remain concerned that EULEX is dragging its feet on full implementation of its mandate in deference to Belgrade. We also want to see EU strategic planning on key rule of law issues ) including customs, courts and police ) in a way that protects Kosovo sovereignty but also keeps Belgrade engaged and Serb hardliners contained, a point EUR A/S Fried stressed in his January 9 meeting with EU political directors (reftel). The myriad international organizations in Pristina (EU Special Representative/ICO, EULEX, NATO and UNMIK) need a formal coordination mechanism to ensure unity of message to both Kosovo and Serb officials. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ¶4. (C) There has been little progress towards completion of the &5 plus 28 objectives and conditions for closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) since the November 8 Prud/Odzak agreement. Prud/Odzak established a framework for resolving the OHR objectives related to State and Defense property. Despite a December 22 meeting among the signatories to clarify elements of the agreement, it lacks broad political support, and implementation has lagged. Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dodik also continues to object to a constitutional amendment solution to resolve the status of Brcko District, another outstanding OHR closure objective. Brussels has not shared a plan for how its new EU Special Representative mission will manage post-OHR Bosnia. Therefore, we do not expect to be in a position to agree at the March meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) to close OHR in July 2009. During their January 9 meeting with EUR A/S Fried, EU political directors said Bosnia was far from genuine integration, and that the EU was working to advance visa liberalization in order to increase contact the orientation of Bosnia towards the EU (reftel). A/S Fried encouraged the EU to provide more support for moderate Bosniaks. MACEDONIA STATE 00004297 002 OF 009 ¶5. (SBU) With its NATO and EU perspectives clouded by the name issue, Macedonia risks falling backwards. PM Gruevski has shifted to a more nationalist agenda that could strain inter-ethnic relations and further isolate Macedonia in the region. Ahead of March 2009 presidential and local elections, Gruevski has taken steps that intimidate and constrain the opposition, media and independent civil society. The EU needs to find a way to engage with Macedonia at senior levels, and we must both work together with the PM to give us the tools to help keep Macedonia moving forward on its Euro-Atlantic path. CROATIA ¶6. (SBU) We continue to encourage the EU to sustain a transparent, equitable accession process for Croatia, especially in view of the border dispute with Slovenia and possible enlargement fatigue among member states. The failure of the French initiative in December (which would have allowed the opening and closing of new chapters in the acquis without prejudice to the border dispute) was a discouraging blow to the GOC. ALBANIA ¶7. (SBU) Tensions are high between the Prime Minister and the judiciary, most recently over the Lustration Law. The EU shares our misgivings over PM Berisha,s excesses and has conveyed them to the Albanian leadership, but has generally refrained from public statements. AFGHANISTAN ¶8. (C) NSC, Joint Staff, and CENTCOM policy reviews have recommended that the incoming U.S. administration maintain our current &clear, hold, build8 counterinsurgency strategy, but strengthen its implementation. We need to increase the international troop presence, accelerate the expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces, help improve governance, support government outreach to tribes and villages, and help improve the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship. ¶9. (C) Afghanistan will hold a pivotal presidential election this year. The European Commission has indicated EU support will equal or exceed support for previous elections. NATO needs help addressing election security, a critical concern. ¶10. (C) In July 2008, the EU agreed to double the EUPOL police mission to 400 authorized personnel, but international staff on the ground still number less than 200. Afghan Minister of Interior Atmar traveled to Brussels in December seeking accelerated EU support for police reform. EUPOL has an effective new head of mission. The EU should empower him with the resources and flexible mandate EUPOL needs in order to make an impact. ¶11. (C) We plan to deploy as many as four additional combat brigades to Afghanistan in 2009, depending on the security situation in Iraq, with the first brigade (roughly 3,750 troops) arriving this month. The deployment of up to 30,000 troops will nearly double the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, with many of our forces deploying to southern Afghanistan in support of our Allies. CHAD/SUDAN ¶12. (SBU) To address the twin crises in eastern Chad and Darfur, the international community must continue its humanitarian efforts, its support for domestic political dialogue and regional peace initiatives, and its contributions to the relevant peacekeeping operations. The March 2008 Dakar Agreement called on the two countries to discontinue support for armed groups in the other country and established a Chad-Sudan Contact Group of African nations to facilitate relations. In November 2008, following the resumption of diplomatic relations between Chad and Sudan, the Contact Group agreed to establish a border monitoring and security mechanism consisting of joint operations by the STATE 00004297 003 OF 009 Chadian and Sudanese militaries. The EU,s financial contributions and its EUFOR mission in Chad and the Central African Republic have helped protect refugees, facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensured the safety of UN personnel. ¶13. (SBU) In Darfur, the U.S. remains concerned with the slow pace of UNAMID (United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur) deployment and operations and the President demonstrated U.S. commitment to UNAMID during his meeting with the Sudanese VP on January 5. EUR A/S Fried highlighted this concern to EU political directors January 9 (reftel). Politically, 2009 national elections established in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) are critical for stability in Sudan and for a democratic transition. We are eager to make additional progress in Darfur and fully support AU/UN Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole,s effort to develop a shared set of principals from the Doha platform provided by the Government of Qatar. We are mindful of the value of a possible ICC arrest warrant on Sudanese President Bashir in generating an improvement in the behavior of the Government of Sudan, and we are looking for opportunities to use this potential opening to advance key initiatives. ZIMBABWE ¶14. (SBU) In Zimbabwe's 2008 presidential elections, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Tsvangirai won 47% of the popular vote, while President Mugabe won 43%. Tsvangirai then dropped out of a sham run-off marked by intimidation and violence. POTUS and the Secretary have both called for Mugabe to step down. The people of Zimbabwe are suffering from a largely man-made humanitarian crisis brought about by repression, corruption, and neglect on the part of the Mugabe regime. Cholera has infected close to 40,000 and caused more than 2000 deaths, unemployment is above 90 percent, virtually all schools and hospitals are closed, and the rate of inflation is estimated in the billions. EUR A/S Fried raised these issues with EU political directors January 9; despite agreeing on the dire situation, the EU side anticipated that Mugabe would remain in charge for the foreseeable future because African leaders (SADC, AU, and South Africa) to not want outsiders to assist, yet do not themselves act to apply pressure for Mugabe to step down (reftel). ¶15. (SBU) Notwithstanding U.S., UK, and French calls for Mugabe to step aside, the MDC has indicated it will participate in a government with him, provided that certain key issues are addressed: allocation of ministries/key posts; due process for detainees; and a commitment to new elections. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) continues to advocate power-sharing as espoused in the September 15 agreement between Mugabe and Tsvangirai. Though our principled position is that Mugabe must go, we will support the MDC in a credible power-sharing agreement if it contains real checks on ZANU-PF and benchmarks for a fair and democratic disposition of government power. ¶16. (SBU) The U.S. will continue providing humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe ($226 million since October 2007) but will not provide development assistance until there is concrete evidence of a democratic transition. Similarly, we will not lift targeted U.S. sanctions on individuals and entities tied to the Mugabe regime (OFAC Specially Designated Nationals sanctions) until there is evidence of democratic change. The EU announced its most recent round of targeted Zimbabwe sanctions (similar in scope to ours) on December 8, bringing its total to 183 entities and individuals. We plan to work with EU member states, as well as African Union and SADC states, to pursue UNSC actions if the situation does not improve. UKRAINE ¶17. (SBU) The September 9 EU-Ukraine Summit decided that the enhanced cooperation between the EU and Ukraine will be incorporated in the framework of an Association Agreement. The AA will strengthen Ukraine,s political and economic integration with the EU. Negotiations on the AA are on-going with a prospect of being concluded in 2009 (realistically STATE 00004297 004 OF 009 during the Swedish Presidency). ¶18. (SBU) The Dec 11-12 European Council endorsed the Eastern Partnership (EaP),the objective of which is to strengthen the EU,s Eastern policy. Intra-EU discussions will continue on the EaP, which is expected to be adopted at the March 2009 European Council. Although the crisis in Georgia has increased the EU,s interest in deepening cooperation with its Eastern neighbors, Member States still have diverse positions concerning the EU,s proposed level of engagement with EaP countries. ¶19. (SBU) In December the IMF approved a $16.4 billion loan for Ukraine, and the World Bank a $500 million loan. However, economic conditions are worsening, with negative growth and rising unemployment predicted for 2009. RUSSIA-UKRAINE GAS DISPUTE ¶20. (SBU) Gazprom,s decision to reduce gas flows to Ukraine on January 1 and the subsequent January 5 shut-off combined with Russian PM Putin,s statement politicizing the dispute, caught many Europeans by surprise. The initial reluctance of the EU and the Czech Presidency to get involved in the dispute also faded as gas reductions of varying degrees of severity occurred in many EU Member States. The Czech Presidency called an extraordinary meeting of the COREPER I Ambassadors on January 5, sent a fact finding mission to Ukraine, and issued a joint statement with the Commission on January 6 demanding that gas supplies to the EU be restored and made the crisis the centerpiece of discussions at the General Affairs Council on January 8. ¶21. (SBU) After a flurry of stop-and-start negotiations in Kyiv and Brussels, Ukrainian and Russian representatives signed an agreement on January 12 to allow EU, Ukrainian and Russian monitors to verify gas flows from Russia to Europe via Ukraine. Following a meeting of the EU Energy Council in Brussels on January 12, EU Energy Commissioner Piebalgs and Czech Trade Minister Riman said Russia would restart deliveries of gas to Ukraine on January 13. Nevertheless, continued disagreements over the pricing of fuel gas used to operate pipelines in Ukraine have prevented the parties from restarting gas flows to Europe. PM Putin and PM Tymoshenko plan to meet January 17 to address the situation. GUANTANAMO DETAINEE RESETTLEMENT ¶22. (C) There are approximately 250 detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. A number of these detainees are currently approved for release or transfer, but cannot be transferred to their home countries due to humane treatment concerns. Over the past several years, the USG has approached more than 70 countries in an effort to resettle these detainees, but thus far, Albania has been the only country to accept detainees that are not its nationals. On December 11, Portuguese FM Amado announced Portugal,s willingness to accept cleared detainees*making Portugal the first EU Member State to do so*and urged other EU countries to follow suit. On December 22, German FM Steinmeier publicly asked his government to examine options for accepting detainees; Germany would reportedly be most interested in resettling the 17 Uighur detainees who face likely persecution if returned to China. Other European governments have privately expressed willingness to consider accepting detainees. On December 26, France called for a common EU position on the Guantanamo resettlement issue. To date, France has not expressed willingness to accept detainees. Over the next year, Czech leadership in the EU will be critical for our efforts to resettle Guantanamo detainees, which is a prerequisite for closure of Guantanamo. When EUR A/S Fried raised this issue with EU political directors January 9, the EU side cautioned that accepting detainees for resettlement would likely be politically difficult with EU member state domestic audiences, as well as from the legislative/judicial perspective (reftel). BELARUS ¶23. (SBU) The IMF Board approved a USD 2.5 billion stand-by STATE 00004297 005 OF 009 agreement with Belarus on January 12. The U.S. opposed the loan because of its lack of structural reform conditionality. This follows a USD 2 billion loan Russia agreed in November to provide. Belarus remains active in seeking external financial assistance, including asking Russia for an additional USD 3 billion. Belarus and Russia have also reached agreement in principle on 2009 gas prices, but no document has yet been signed. ¶24. (SBU) Czech colleagues have told us the EU will likely invite President Lukashenka to a summit to launch the Eastern Partnership Initiative in Prague this spring. The EU will ostensibly extend an invitation on the basis of &goodwill gestures8 from Belarus; we expect the invitation to go out unless Belarus makes major missteps. We oppose an invitation at this time as it sends the wrong message to Lukashenka on the need for reform. ¶25. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as possible (in advance of the January 26-27 GAERC). BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT WESTERN BALKANS --Congratulations on a very good first month for EULEX. The clear challenges in the north demonstrated the need to act in close coordination with KFOR and other international actors to respond to recent violence. Are plans still on track for EULEX assuming final operational capability in the coming weeks? --As UNMIK draws down and cedes control of rule of law issues in Kosovo, we must ensure that no vacuum ensues. EULEX and ICO will need to fill that space. --There is an urgent need for formal, institutionalized coordination on the ground among EULEX, ICO, KFOR, OSCE and what remains of UNMIK. We strongly encourage ICR Feith and EULEX HOM de Kermabon to lead in pulling together a process that protects Kosovo sovereignty, keeps Belgrade engaged and Serb hardliners contained, and treats northern Kosovo and Serb enclaves the same as the rest of Kosovo. --We look to EULEX to quickly develop concrete proposals for customs, courts, police and other sensitive issues. Failure to do so could severely damage EULEX,s credibility, tempt UNMIK to continue to take a larger political role that is warranted, and greatly increase the risk of instability. --The U.S. strongly welcomes Serbia,s EU integration, and we believe that its participation in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) process will strengthen both President Tadic and the push for reforms. We are also encouraged by GOS moves to implement the interim trade agreement with the EU. What is the EU plan for engaging Belgrade going forward? --We're also encouraged by the cooperation between Hungary, Austria, Germany, and Serbia on providing gas supplies to Serbia during the recent gas cutoff. It will be interesting to see if the crisis affects relations between Serbia and Russia, although we note Tadic has publicly sought to place the blame on Ukraine. --We are concerned by the slow pace of progress on implementation of the Prud/Odzak agreement. There has also been virtually no progress on the outstanding &5 plus 28 objectives and conditions for closing OHR. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the PIC will be prepared in March to decide to close OHR in July. --Where does the EU,s post-OHR transition planning stand? BiH will require intrusive international engagement beyond next summer, particularly from Brussels on EU accession and constitutional reform issues. --We need to find ways to bolster moderates who are prepared to compromise to advance BiH,s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and STATE 00004297 006 OF 009 to isolate those who put their narrow personal or ethnic agendas first. --It is critical that Macedonia hear clearly and distinctly from both the U.S. and EU that its prospects for NATO and EU membership remain strong and real. Macedonia, however, must ensure free, fair and peaceful presidential and local elections in March 2009 and needs to address the serious shortcomings evident in flawed elections in June 2008. Full and timely implementation of OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to prevent electoral misconduct, fraud, intimidation and violence is critical. --We hope the EU remains clear, firm and fair in its benchmarks for Macedonia,s accession. The U.S. will continue to press PM Gruevski to avoid letting the name dispute undermine progress on reforms necessary for the country and its EU and NATO accession. The region will bear the costs of instability if Macedonia is allowed to flounder, increasingly isolated and without a Euro-Atlantic perspective. --We encourage the EU to find a way to move forward with Croatia,s accession negotiations, based upon the real progress already made, that would keep alive the goal of concluding talks by late 2009. Forward progress is important not just for Croatia, but also for future membership prospects of other countries in Southeastern Europe. AFGHANISTAN --The presidential election is the most important event in Afghanistan in 2009. We urge generous EU support for the 2009 presidential elections, which will likely take place in August or September. --We urge the EU to urgently proceed with plans to expand EUPOL to 400 authorized international staff. We encourage the EU to set a benchmark to have all 400 authorized staff on the ground before the 2009 presidential election. --In order to be effective, EUPOL staff should deploy to the district level as part of international Police Mentoring Teams. The EU and Member States should provide vehicles, housing, and force protection to enable district-level deployment. --We urge the EU to significantly expand assistance levels for Afghanistan as the Commission begins formulating its 2010-2013 Afghanistan assistance package. --We call upon our European Allies and Partners to join the U.S. in committing more forces to the ISAF combat and training mission. CHAD/SUDAN CHAD --As an observer, the U.S. supports the Contact Group and urges Chad and Sudan to cease support for opposing rebel groups. The U.S. supports the deployment of a robust UN Mission in the Central African Republic and the Chad (MINURCAT) follow-on force. --We appreciate the contribution made by the EU,s EUFOR mission to protect refugees in Eastern Chad and the CAR --The U.S. looks forward to participating in a joint U.S.-EU mission to eastern Chad from January 25-31 to review humanitarian operations. We welcome this opportunity to more closely coordinate our programs. DARFUR --The U.S. is concerned CPA milestones (2009 elections, the 2011 referendum, and border demarcation of the Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile) may become flashpoints for renewed violence. This makes us all the more concerned with the slow pace of UNAMID deployment; we should press for faster progress. STATE 00004297 007 OF 009 --The U.S. urges more action from international community to encourage parties to agree to an election date and to create a political climate necessary for free and fair elections including changes to current legislation, the end to media suppression, and freedoms to campaign and for NGOs to provide assistance without harassment. ZIMBABWE --We continue to call on Mugabe to leave power in order to end the terrible man-made disaster in Zimbabwe. --Should the MDC enter a power-sharing government with Mugabe, it will be crucial for the U.S., EU, and other like-minded international actors to continue to pressure Mugabe to negotiate and act in good faith and withhold development assistance until there are concrete changes. --It is important to continue to raise Zimbabwe in the UN, as well as with AU and SADC members. While Mugabe decries Western meddling, he cares what African leaders say. More African nations need to speak out against Mugabe. We should continue to pressure South Africa in particular to do so. --We welcome the EU,s continued commitment to targeted sanctions against Mugabe regime cronies. We intend to maintain ours until we see real changes. Such pressure is hurting the regime, and is one of the few levers we have to encourage a change in behavior. --We would also welcome continued dialogue with the EU to explore how we can support each other,s autonomous sanctions efforts. --We continue to desire to see a UN Security Council resolution on Zimbabwe in the very near future. UKRAINE --We urge the European Union to continue to work with Ukraine and keep it on a path toward EU membership. Ukraine has already clarified its European direction and the EU should not abandon it. --We encourage the EU to conclude negotiations on the Association Agreement with Ukraine. --We support the EU plans to help its Eastern neighbors, reforms in the context of the Eastern Partnership, and bring them closer to the EU. --The recent gas crisis shows that Ukraine still needs assistance with the development of a transparent energy market and stronger institutions that meet European standards. We are willing to assist, but this will require European leadership. New members have experience with making needed reforms and have much to offer. --We both should emphasize to the Ukrainian leadership that government unity is needed if Ukraine is to move forward by implementing policies that will increase confidence in Ukraine,s currency and its banking sector. RUSSIA-UKRAINE GAS DISPUTE --The United States welcomes the agreement brokered by the Czech Presidency of the European Union to restore gas flows to European customers. --The Czech Republic,s leadership during this crisis has been impressive. --Now that the monitoring agreement is in place, we call upon Russia to restore the flow of gas immediately. --The EU needs to ensure the fair implementation of the agreement by both sides. --We also urge Russia and Ukraine to conclude a transparent STATE 00004297 008 OF 009 commercial agreement on the sale and transit of gas. --The March 2009 EU conference on rehabilitating Ukraine,s transit network is a very positive first step toward engaging Kyiv on energy sector reform. --This incident once again underscores the importance of diversifying energy supplies, particularly natural gas, and of transparent market-orientated arrangements for the sale and shipment of natural gas. --Now is the time for the EU to focus on forging a common policy on diversification of gas supplies, the development of the Southern Corridor and interconnectivity of EU gas and electrical grids. --Bypass pipelines such as Nord Stream and South Stream do not deal with the fundamental problems of Russia-Ukraine gas transit, increasing European reliance on Russian gas, or the lack of gas-on-gas competition in many Central and Southern European markets. GUANTANAMO DETAINEE RESETTLEMENT --We encourage the EU to discuss and evaluate what it can do to help close Guantanamo Bay. The detainee issue is a priority for the U.S., and President-elect Obama,s views on the topic are known. Although the new administration may not be in a position to immediately engage in detail with the EU on this issue, any progress on resettlements will undoubtedly be appreciated. --A significant obstacle to closing Guantanamo is finding appropriate resettlement locations for those detainees who cannot be returned to their country of nationality due to humane treatment concerns. It is with this group of up to 50 detainees that European states can be most helpful, as resettling these detainees is essential to closing Guantanamo. --The USG has approached a number of countries bilaterally in an effort to find resettlement solutions. We have also supported efforts to put together a collection of European countries that could move simultaneously to accept a few detainees each. We look to the EU leadership to support these ongoing efforts. --In addition to resettlement, European states can also help by providing capacity-building assistance to the detainees, countries of origin. In many cases, assistance could help countries to both mitigate the threat posed by transferees and to treat them humanely, thereby overcoming obstacles that currently prevent repatriation. --In considering this request, we hope that the EU will bear in mind that (contrary to allegations by Special Rapporteur Nowak and others) there are a significant number of individuals at Guantanamo who continue to present a real threat to the US and its allies, and who the US may need to hold even after Guantanamo ultimately closes. Please recognize the burden we have shouldered and will continue to shoulder when considering what you can do to help bring Guantanamo to closure. --We are ready to provide specific information on detainees if helpful. BELARUS --We urge the EU to extend an Eastern Partnership Summit invitation to President Lukashenka only on the basis of significant, demonstrable reforms. An invitation is international recognition that Lukashenka has long sought, and it should be considered with regard to our shared democracy and human rights goals in Belarus. --Belarus has taken small steps on democracy and human rights, including distributing two independent newspapers through state systems and registering former presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich,s &For Freedom8 STATE 00004297 009 OF 009 organization. --However, we should not mistake promises of reform ) including on media freedom, electoral reform, and dialogue with independent organizations ) with actual reform or confuse circumscribed actions with broad-reaching, systemic change. --In terms of the systemic reforms that we want to see from Belarus, the following would reflect genuine improvements in media freedom, civil society and other areas: -- Allowing distribution of all independent papers; -- Revising the repressive new media law that increases internet censorship, and which is scheduled to come into force in February; -- Allowing all NGOs and independent organizations to register and operate freely; -- Openly engaging civic groups and opposition political parties on domestic reform; -- Enacting electoral reform, per OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, ahead of 2010-2011 presidential elections; and -- Permitting real freedom of assembly and ending harassment of regime opponents. --The U.S. and EU should continue to coordinate our efforts to bring about genuine change in Belarus. RICE