HLTF ACTION REQUEST: U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 041124 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014 TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL SUBJECT: HLTF ACTION REQUEST: U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE STATUS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CFE PARALLEL ACTIONS PACKAGE REF: USNATO 115 ? March 12 HLTF Reporting Cable Classified by Donna Phelan, VCI/CCA Acting Office Director, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request. USNATO is requested to deliver the text in para 2 to the NATO International Staff to distribute on April 24 as a U.S. non-paper on the status of the elements of the Parallel Actions Package. This paper was requested by Allies at the March 12 HLTF and will serve as the basis for discussion at the April 28 HLTF. If Allies request, U.S. HLTF team will make available copies of the most recent (end of December 2007) version of the Parallel Actions Package, but Mission should not raise this in passing the paper contained below to the I.S. ¶2. (C/REL NATO) Begin Text for delivery: CFE Parallel Actions Package Update on Status ? April 2009 At the HLTF on March 12, Allies requested that the U.S. provide an update on the status of the parallel actions package in order to help frame discussions on the current CFE situation. The following points, which provide both an overall assessment and an issue-by-issue analysis of the current dialogue, should be useful as we look ahead. Recent Contacts: -- A/S Gottemoeller will meet with Russian Security and Disarmament Director Antonov on April 24. While this meeting will focus on START issues, it will be an opportunity for the U.S. to seek Russian reaction to U.S. ideas on Georgia that were advanced by A/S Fried in December 2008, and for Antonov to offer any new ideas on the way ahead. -- Secretary Clinton and FM Lavrov briefly discussed CFE at their first meeting on March 6. Both identified the need to develop a way ahead on CFE, and Lavrov reiterated the Russian assessment that while the original parallel actions package (October 2007) had been a useful document, U.S. negotiators had stepped back from its original content. (The USG disputes this assessment.) The exchange on CFE was brief since the meeting encompassed the full range of U.S.-Russia bi-lateral and multi-lateral issues. -- The most recent CFE discussions between Russian and U.S. CFE teams took place in December 2008. The U.S. advanced ideas, developed in coordination with Georgian authorities, to update the content of the 
Georgia section of the parallel actions package. Russia raised many questions about those proposals, but has not yet formally responded. The meeting touched on all the major elements of the parallel actions package, but focused on the flank, Georgia, and Russia's suspension. Elements of the Parallel Actions Package Ratification of Adapted CFE Treaty: In discussions of this section Russia has focused on eliciting as much certainty as possible regarding Allies' plans for ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty with particular interest in ratification by the U.S., the UK, Germany, France and to a lesser extent, Georgia and Moldova. In this regard, the Russian lead negotiator MFA Director Antonov has stated he did not consider sufficient efforts by Allies in fall 2007 to develop a three-phase matrix of ratification plans and processes. His focus has been on U.S. ratification. Russia wants Allies, Georgia, and Moldova to begin ratification procedures "immediately" following agreement on the package vice "as soon as possible." Significantly, Russia views "complete the ratification process" to include "deposit of instruments." The U.S. has explained that NATO Allies do not consider "ratification" to be the same action as "deposit." Respect for Adapted CFE Treaty: Russian comments on this section have focused on provisional application, and not on the generalized political commitment proposed by NATO, that all parties would act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of the Adapted Treaty (A/CFE) until it enters into force. The Russians have made clear that the phrase "agree to consider provisional application" is not sufficient to meet Russian goals. They want provisional application of A/CFE if it is not in force within 12 months of agreement of the Package. At this point no version of the text on provisional application is agreed. Moscow has at several points appeared to recognize the political reality that the U.S. cannot move forward on provisional application until the Senate has given advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty; thus Russia as early as 2007 suggested language on the lines of "once a majority of CFE states has ratified the Treaty, including the U.S., the States Parties will pursue an agreement on its provisional application." In spring 2008 and again in December 2008, the U.S. stressed that many NATO Allies had made clear that they will not consider provisional application while Russia's suspension is in effect, and in December also noted that Russia's military action in Georgia had made provisional application even more difficult to consider. Future Review/Flank Limits: *This section also contains language on Russia's push for a collective ceiling on NATO.* Collective ceiling: The U.S. has countered Russia's proposal for a collective ceiling on NATO Allies with the idea of lowering national equipment ceilings after entry into force of the Adapted Treaty, where possible. The Russian side has made clear that its concerns on this point are related to prospective NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia. Flank: During an extensive discussion in December 2008, Antonov insisted that there could be no deal on CFE if Russia's concern about the flank was not addressed to Russia's satisfaction. He ascribed this position to Prime Minister Putin, underscoring that legal limits on where Russia could locate equipment on its own territory had to be eliminated, and called attention to the Baluyevskiy flank proposal ? which would extend the flank regime to cover all Russian territory in the Area of Application. The U.S. observed that this proposal would, in effect, eliminate the flank for Russia and keep it for all other Treaty signatories. For many Allies, Russian action in Georgia had reinforced the need for the flank limits. The Russian team suggested that CSBMS might be possible in combination with the Baluyevskiy proposal, and indicated, when asked, that Russia intended to abide by its political commitments regarding equipment levels in the northern flank. Accession: This section has not changed since December 2007, although Antonov at various points has expressed dissatisfaction with the timeframe for discussions, noting that Russia seeks to establish as soon as possible the conditions for Baltic accession to the Adapted CFE Treaty. Substantial Combat Forces: The U.S. has consistently made clear that a definition of "substantial combat forces," as the phrase is used in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, should only be developed in the context of a deal on CFE. Such a discussion is not appropriate for the OSCE in Vienna - this is a NATO-Russia, not a CFE or OSCE issue. A/S Fried suggested in July 2008 that if Russia resumed implementation of CFE, the U.S. would be prepared to "deepen" discussion of this issue in the context of the U.S.-Russia bilateral channel. Antonov welcomed the idea of deepened discussion but stressed that resuming implementation for Russia would be very difficult, given that Russia's suspension was a Presidential-level decision. Moldova: In December 2008 Antonov said that the U.S. and Russia were "closest" to agreement on Moldova. That said, particularly in the wake of the 2+1 statement on March 18 it is clear that Russia's timeline for transforming the current Russian-dominated PKF into an OSCE-mandated, civilian observer presence is not the same as that suggested by the U.S. The U.S. has asked Moldovan authorities for their official interpretation of point 4 of the 2+1 statement; but does not expect to receive that until a new government is in place. It is also worth noting that Antonov has set out many caveats regarding the transparency elements of the package with regard to munitions and personnel, and that these elements are not settled. Munitions: As a step leading toward withdrawal of stored ammunition, Russia says it is ready to provide more information to the OSCE on its munitions; but the Russians are not willing to pursue a joint Russia-OSCE inventory. Russia is open to OSCE inspection visits of Kolbasna, but in their proposal visits are subject to Transnistrian veto and will begin only when munitions withdrawal resumes. PKF: In the CFE context, Russia has sought open-ended OSCE blessing to continue the PKF presence on the basis of the 1992 cease fire agreement, without any notion of gradual civilianization of the armed PKF, until a political settlement is agreed. Russia has said it is willing to accept the presence of a small number of civilian monitors in parallel with the current Russian presence. Georgia: The current text in the parallel actions package could not be agreed by either Russia or Georgia. Russian actions in August 2008 further complicated progress. In December 2008 the U.S. proposed new elements to replace that portion of the package. Those elements, agreed by Georgian authorities, are: -- Withdrawal of all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) from the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; -- An international presence at Gudauta and other relevant facilities; -- A transparency and verification regime, using Adapted CFE modalities to provide information on and monitor the number and armament of: -- Russian military, security and other forces in the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as a tool to observe and facilitate full implementation of the military withdrawal elements of the August 12 ceasefire agreement; -- Russian military forces in the North Caucasus Military District; -- Comparable Georgian forces. Suspension: The U.S. has insisted that if NATO Allies are to move ahead with ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty, Russia will need to end its suspension. In mid- 2008 A/S Fried suggested that if Russia resumed implementation, the U.S. would try to convince Allies to engage in deepened discussions of elements of the package. He also proposed intensifying U.S.-Russia bilateral efforts and inviting a variable geometry of Allies to join in discussions with the Russians. Antonov was very interested in intensified and expanded discussions, but regarding Russian resumption of implementation, he has continued to underscore that a reversal of the Putin decision on suspension would have to be decided at the very top of the Russian government. In December 2008 the U.S. again stressed that Russia needed to find some way to resume implementation of the Treaty. Fulfillment of data exchange/information and inspection provisions would be a useful step. Antonov reiterated that this would be extremely hard, and that while implementation of the verification and information provisions might be possible in the context of agreement on the entire parallel actions package, resumption of implementation of the flank limits could not be expected. END TEXT CLINTON