MARCH 19 COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 034777

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC XB ZP ZO AE
SUBJECT: MARCH 19 COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE

REF: STATE 021428

Classified By: ISN C.S. Eliot Kang for reasons 1.4 b,c and d

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ACTION REQUEST
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1. (U) Post is requested to deliver the nonpapers in para 13
to appropriate host country government officials.

End action request.

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SUMMARY
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2. (S) The fourth U.S. ) UAE Counterproliferation Task Force
(CTF) was held on March 19 in Abu Dhabi at the level of
Assistant Secretary of State. While discussions were
productive and cordial, more work remains to be done by the
UAE. For example, in the area of export controls, it has
been almost a year and a half since the UAE passed an export
control law and it still remains without a dedicated export
control authority. Counterproliferation cooperation remains
strong on interdictions but the UAE needs to expedite its
investigations of the transshipment cases that we have
brought to its attention.


3. (C) The U.S. delegation was led by State International
Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) Bureau Acting Assistant
Secretary C.S. Eliot Kang. U.S. delegation members included:
Ambassador Richard Olson; Commerce Acting Assistant Secretary
for the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS),Matt Borman;
Caroline Russell (ISN); Michael Shaw, CENTCOM; Chris Davey
(ISN); Treasury Attache, Matthew Epstein, and Treasury
representative Jonathan Burke (TFFC). The UAE delegation was
led by Major General (MG) Mohammed al-Qemzi, Chairman of CTF
and Director of Dubai's GDSS (General Department of State
Security). The UAE,s delegation included: Abdul Hameed
Kathim, Director of American and European Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs; Mohammed al-Muhairi, Director General,
Federal Customs Authority; Yahya Buamin, Staff Colonel,
Commander of Chemical Defense, UAE Armed Forces; Khaled
al-Kharji, UAE Central Bank; Mansour al-Bastaki,(GDSS);
Mohammed al-Ketbi, Preventive Security Administration,
Ministry of Interior; David Scott, Director of Economic
Affairs, Abu Dhabi Executive Authority (Abu Dhabi nuclear
power project); Yacub al-Ala, Engineer, UAE Armed Forces;
Hamad al-Shamsi (NFI); Riad Khalfan (NFI); and Rowda
al-Otaiba, America Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

End summary.

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OBJECTIVES
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4. (S) Post should achieve the following objectives:

-- Thank the UAE for hosting the CTF.

-- Emphasize the need for progress in three key areas: export
control implementation; resolution of trans-shipment cases;
and disposition of interdicted cargoes.

-- Thank the UAE for its cooperation on interdictions; pursue
MG al-Qemzi,s agreement to discuss disposition issues after
the export control amendment is approved by the Cabinet.

-- Emphasize the importance of the UAE Cabinet expediting
approval of the amendment creating a body to implement the
export control law.

-- Secure a date in May for the experts group on export
controls that MG al-Qemzi agreed to.

-- Secure a date for the follow-up to the June 2008
prosecutorial training that was requested by the UAE.

-- Acquire information on the status of the two ongoing
export control-related prosecutions as promised by the UAE
during the CTF.

-- Provide the non-papers in para 13 intended to follow-up on
the above actions.

End objectives.

STATE 00034777 002 OF 006


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BACKGROUND: CTF Meeting
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5. (C) Both sides agreed that the CTF remains a productive
mechanism for continuing our counterproliferation cooperation
in a number of areas. Discussions covered export controls;
implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions;
counterproliferation cooperation; and the Proliferation
Security Initiative and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism.


6. (C) Export Controls: The Export Control Law, passed in
2007, still lacks a cohesive coordinating and implementing
body. A/AS Kang, Ambassador Olson, and A/AS Borman urged MG
al-Qemzi, in a separate private meeting prior to the CTF, to
expedite the amendment that has been pending Cabinet approval
since September (the amendment would approve the creation of
this body). MG al-Qemzi responded that the amendment is on
track and that he hopes it will be completed soon, but added
that the decision was at a higher political (not his more
technical) level. He acknowledged the need for public steps
to demonstrate that the law is being implemented and offered
to provide additional details on ongoing prosecutions.


7. (C) Export Controls (cont.): The U.S pressed for more
public signs that the UAE is effectively implementing its
export control law such as industry outreach, successful
prosecutions, and updating its control list. The UAE
emphasized that it is currently implementing its law. The
UAE noted that Dubai Customs has information on its website
related to dual use items for industry and that two export
control-related cases involving the alleged sale of zirconium
remain active in the courts; the UAE said that it would
provide us with additional information on these cases through
the Embassy.


8. (C) Export Controls (cont.): MG al-Qemzi also handed over
a copy of the Dubai Customs Inspector,s Hand Book on Dual
Use Items (first edition 2008) as well as a copy of a
brochure entitled the &Partners Guide to Safe Exports8 )
an effort by Dubai Customs at industry outreach. With regard
to updating its export control list, the UAE said that it had
been updated to meet international standards and will be
approved when the Cabinet creates the export control body.
MG al-Qemzi agreed to hold an experts meeting on export
controls with the U.S. on implementation of the law; the U.S.
proposed May, but the UAE has not yet agreed to a date. When
asked if the UAE could benefit from additional export control
training, MG al-Qemzi said yes and emphasized the importance
of completing successful prosecutions. He requested more
details, including specific dates, on the advanced
prosecutorial training (Note: see non-paper). At lunch,
Federal Customs expressed interest in receiving information
on how the U.S. handles interstate commerce issues (how
federal and state authorities coordinate and what federal and
state laws apply). The U.S. agreed to identify what
information is available and which agencies are best placed
to provide such information in response to the UAE. (Note:
We are working to provide this information).


9. (S) UNSCR Implementation: The UAE said that it is in full
compliance with the resolutions. MG al-Qemzi said that all
entities named in the UNSCRs are placed on the UAE,s black
list,, although it was unclear what impact that had. In
response to the U.S. presentation on proliferation finance,
al-Qemzi said that the UAE Central Bank had issued circulars
to UAE banks informing them of the proliferation finance
requirements of resolutions 1718, 1737, and 1803 and said
that the Central Bank froze accounts of two entities under
1718 and 1803. Turning to the subject of IRISL, the U.S.
encouraged the UAE to take action against IRISL-affiliates
Oasis Freight and Great Ocean Shipping, arguing that this is
part of its obligation under UNSCR 1803. The UAE asked for
additional information on IRISL activities in the UAE and
also suggested that while the shipping companies mentioned
may represent IRISL, they may also represent other shipping
lines as well. The U.S. agreed to provide additional
information on IRISL as appropriate. MG al-Qemzi reported
that the UAE is conducting surveillance of Oasis Freight, has
met with and warned one of its Directors, and committed to
investigate the information provided on Great Ocean Shipping.


10. (S) Counterproliferation Cooperation: MG al-Qemzi
explained that while he understands the need for public
examples of progress on export controls, much of the
counterproliferation cooperation activities are
intelligence-based operations and must remain confidential.
The UAE was very interested in the U.S.-provided briefing on
Iran procurement and paid close attention to the new
information we provided on suspect front company - Flowtech -

STATE 00034777 003 OF 006


and said that it would investigate the activities of this
company (see non-paper). MG al-Qemzi, citing press articles,
raised several questions relating to the 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran,s nuclear program, as
well as more recent press reporting on the progress of
Iran,s nuclear program. The U.S. side indicated that a
separate briefing could be arranged to cover these and
similar questions relating to the NIE and Iran,s nuclear
program. The U.S. requested from the UAE an update (reftel)
on the outstanding trans-shipment cases and to provide
additional information on Alkaen ) a missile-related case
(see non-paper). On the missile and chem/bio cases, the UAE
indicated that all entities are under surveillance, and
that it was still collecting information on these entities.
Of particular note was the brief description of some of the
operational techniques that the UAE is using in its
investigations including: communications intercepts;
monitoring and analysis of financial transactions; and link
analysis of suspect entities. The U.S. pressed for quicker
resolution of these cases considering that some of the
chem/bio cases go back to 2004. MG al-Qemzi referred the
U.S. to the UAE Armed Forces when the subject of KOMID came
up; A/AS Kang stressed in private with MG al-Qemzi the
importance of not doing business with KOMID.


11. (S) Counterproliferation Cooperation (cont.): Noting
that interdiction cooperation was strong, the U.S. pressed
for resolution of the disposition of interdicted cargoes.
The U.S. pointed out that it had repeatedly discussed the
Anna E case (reftel) with Thai authorities and asked that the
cargo be considered abandoned, so that the UAE would have
legal cover to dispose of the cargo. MG al-Qemzi thanked the
U.S. for its intervention with the Thai government, and
agreed to pursue such issues with the U.S. when the export
control amendment is approved by the Cabinet. Significantly,
he noted that the amendment may provide legal authority for
the UAE to dispose of interdicted cargoes. With regard to
solving the disposition dilemma, MG al-Qemzi said in a side
conversation that he had initiated a conversation with his
Chinese counterpart. As part of this dialogue, the Chinese
have agreed to take back a shipment of aluminum sheets (NFI)
and he is hopeful the Chinese will also agree to take back
shipments seized from the YM Energy and M/V Sinotrans Qingdao
(reftel). He said that he did not plan on asking the Chinese
to prevent the re-shipment of these materials and said that
he had also asked the UK and Russia to press China to
implement its export control laws so that future sensitive
items are not shipped through the UAE.


12. (SBU) Counterproliferation Cooperation (cont.): The U.S.
provided additional information on the fall 2009
Proliferation Security Initiative exercise Leading Edge and
thanked the UAE for hosting portions of the exercise. The
U.S. also requested the UAE send a senior political official
to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Plenary
at the Hague in June; the UAE was noncommittal regarding its
attendance at this event.

End background.

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Non-Papers
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13. (S/REL UAE) Begin non-papers:

U.S. and UAE Counterproliferation Task Force Discussions:

-- Cooperation on counterproliferation issues continues to
improve and we are pleased with the relationship that we are
building together.

-- All agree that our "ad hoc" cooperation on interdictions
has been good. However, the details of these interdictions
are "sensitive" and cannot always be shared with all members
of Congress.

-- Our ad hoc coordination on interdictions is a rather
limited part of the overall counter-proliferation picture
that also includes discussions related to companies and
banking and assistance on export controls.

-- For this reason, it will be important to demonstrate
progress in three important areas:

Export Controls

-- The Export Control Law, passed in 2007, still lacks a
cohesive coordinating/implementing body. That decision
resides with the UAE Cabinet that needs to approve an
amendment creating this body; the Cabinet's attention is
urgently needed to establish firm UAE export control

STATE 00034777 004 OF 006


credentials as nuclear power enters the picture.

-- An implementing body with a dedicated staff could help
ensure publicly visible (including to the Congress) progress
in institutionalizing cooperation in areas of particular
import:

-- Drafting and passing implementing regulations;
-- Ensuring more rapid information exchange on export control
implementation;
-- More extensive follow-up to investigation requests;
-- More aggressive industry outreach to make sure the private
sector is aware of its requirements under the law;
-- Ensure that the control list is consistent with
international standards;
-- Pursuing prosecutions;
-- Coordinating training for capacity building in customs,
the judiciary, and other agencies;
-- and taking coordination from an ad hoc arrangement to a
systematic approach to a key national security issue.

-- Of course, the staff of the implementing body must be
empowered to draw data from all agencies concerned and
coordinate with diplomatic missions.

-- Both governments agreed at the CTF that this body can make
cooperation on export controls much more effective and
systematic.

-- We hope the UAE recognized the need for public steps to
demonstrate that the law is being implemented, which should
be one result of the amendment.

-- The UAE noted that it is currently implementing its law
and promised to provide details on ongoing prosecutions to
further demonstrate progress the UAE has made in this area.

-- The UAE also agreed to hold an expert-level working group
on implementation of the law, but has not yet agreed to a
date. This working group would be a follow up to the 2007
export control legal regulatory workshop that was held with
UAE officials responsible for the legal aspects of the export
control law. Our idea for this workshop is to have
individuals from the Departments of Commerce and State who
participated in the CTF, come back to the UAE with a small
interagency team to gain a greater understanding of steps the
UAE is taking to implement its law now and exchange ideas on
best practices for future implementation. Such an exchange
is important in order to demonstrate ongoing engagement on
this important issue. We propose holding this meeting in May
and seek your agreement to a specific date.

-- The UAE also emphasized the importance of successful
prosecutions and would like to focus on training for its
judges and prosecutors and requested more details about this
training including specific dates.

-- The following provides more details on the requested
training for the UAE,s judges and prosecutors:

The goal of the advanced prosecutorial training course is to
enhance the ability of the UAE in its efforts to enforce its
export control law with particular emphasis on initiating and
completing successful administrative and criminal
prosecutions of export control-related crimes. The two day
program would include UAE officials, prosecutors, and judges
tasked with nonproliferation oversight and administrative and
criminal prosecutorial responsibilities. The U.S. presenters
will lead the participants in discussions of advanced
administrative and criminal prosecutorial and legislative
topics related to export control enforcement. Participating
U.S. agencies potentially include the Departments of Justice,
State, Commerce, Homeland Security and the Treasury.

-- We understand that Federal Customs is also interested in
getting information on how the U.S. handles interstate
commerce issues (how federal and state authorities coordinate
and what federal and state laws apply). We will identify
what information is available and which agencies are best
placed to provide such information.

-- We look forward to continuing cooperation. When a full
time and dedicated export control implementing body is
effectively running, we will be in a better position to
counter the continuing skepticism by the Congress on the
UAE,s counterproliferation achievements.

Trans-shipment

-- It is important that the UAE investigate and take
appropriate actions, including possible prosecutions, against
the front companies and others involved in transferring

STATE 00034777 005 OF 006


sensitive items to places like Iran. In addition to the
information we provided you before the CTF, we provided new
information on Alkaen, Flowtech, Oasis Freight and Great
Ocean during the CTF.

-- Actions, such as prosecutions or deportations, will
further help demonstrate the UAE,s commitment not to be a
trans-shipment hub for proliferators.

Interdiction

-- It is important that we continue to work closely to stop
shipments of sensitive items and work to resolve outstanding
issues, such as the disposition of seized cargo. We
understand that the Export Control Amendment will give the
UAE additional authority to address issues associated with
disposition. The UAE agreed that following its approval, the
US and UAE should meet to discuss ways to resolve disposition
issues.

End U.S. and UAE Counterproliferation Task Force Discussions.

Begin New Information Provided During the CTF:

Below is the new information that was provided to the UAE
during the CTF:

-- We appreciate you investigating the entities listed below
and hope you will provide us with information on the results
of your investigations.

Alkaen

-- Goods were shipped from Switzerland to Alkaen Equipment
and Industrial Supplies LLC in Dubai by air on October 31,
2008 in seven cartons.

-- They were forwarded from Dubai to Iran on an Iran Air
Cargo flight in early or possibly mid-November.

-- FEDCO also submitted partial payment to Alkaen. The
banking details are as follows:

Bank name: Bank Saderat Iran, Bur Dubai Branch
Address: Khalid bin Walid Road (Bank Street),Bur Dubai, UAE
Beneficiary: Al Kaen Equipment and Industrial Supplies LLC
Account Number: 2533-201301

End information on Alkaen.

Flowtech

-- In September of 2008, UAE-based Flowtech, wittingly acting
on behalf of a contractor for Iran,s heavy water program,
was attempting to circumvent German export controls by using
a false end-user for a shipment of unidentified goods,
probably some type of valves.

-- Flowtech officials did this after a previous shipment was
apparently stopped by German customs. Subsequent arrangements
indicated they planned to use at least two unidentified banks
to finance the procurement, one of which was located in
France. We have no further information on the ultimate
disposition of the planned shipment.

-- Flowtech maintains a public website at
www.flowtech-me.com, and is located at PO Box 27623, Dubai,
although it appears to have branches in both Abu Dhabi and
Dubai. It identifies itself as a valve and control
specialist, apparently for the oil and gas industry.

End information on Flowtech.

Great Ocean Shipping Services and Oasis Freight Agency (OFA)

-- In October 2008, IRISL notified its agents that due to
recent events, IRISL would stop using OFA for its Dubai
shipping agent and begin using Great Ocean Shipping Services.


-- This change would take place on January 1, 2009.
(Great Ocean Shipping Services is wholly owned by Sharaf
Group).

-- OFA may be operating under the name of Great Ocean.

-- OFA employees were warned to be cautious about informing
customers about IRISL,s change in shipping agents.

-- PAS Clearing and Forwarding Co., a Dubai-based firm, was
told to use Great Ocean and that the phone number was the
same.

STATE 00034777 006 OF 006


-- PAS officials feared that IRISL, Iran, OFA and the
IRISL-related container code IRSU were on British banks black
list.

End information on Great Ocean Shipping Services and Oasis
Freight Agency.

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REPORTING DEADLINE
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14. (U) Please report response within ten working days of
receipt of this cable. Please include SIPDIS in all
responses.

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POINT OF CONTACT
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15. (U) Department point of contact for follow-up is Chris
Herrington ISN/CPI 647-5035.
CLINTON