PAKISTAN,S ATTEMPT TO PROCURE MILITARY ITEMS FROM

S E C R E T STATE 033304 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2019 TAGS: ETRD MARR MCAP PARM PREL SUBJECT: PAKISTAN,S ATTEMPT TO PROCURE MILITARY ITEMS FROM IRAN Classified By: S/SRAP Paul Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please, see paragraph 7. ¶2. (S//NF) Summary: Embassy is requested to deliver points in paragraph 7 regarding the Government of Pakistan (GOP) desire to purchase military items from Iran. We have received information that the Pakistani firm Omar Exports traders and Oars Associates International (Omar exports) was working to procure RAAD-2 155-mm self-propelled howitzer guns and patrol boats from Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) for Pakistan's Ministry of Defense. End Summary. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (S) Pakistan has previously attempted to procure military items from Iran. In a previous demarche (Ref. A),we have expressed our concerns to the GOP about the transfers of military-related items to countries the Secretary of State has determined to be state sponsors of terrorism. It is important that the Pakistanis understand the sensitivity of their military dealings with Iran and that acquisition from Iran (as well as transfers to Iran) are troubling and could potentially trigger sanctions against the entities involved under the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). Sanctions that could be imposed under INKSNA include: -- No department or agency of the United States Government may procure, or enter into any contract or the procurement of any goods, technology, or services from them; -- No department or agency of the United States Government may provide any assistance to them, and they shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the United States Government; -- No sales to them of any item on the United States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to them of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated; and, -- No new individual licenses shall be granted for the transfer to them of items, the export of which is controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration Regulations, and existing such licenses are suspended. ¶4. (S) Washington understands that Pakistan had no major military interactions with Iran other than an exchange of National Defense College and Command and Staff College students, and permitting Iranian observers to Pakistani military exercises. However, Washington has information that Pakistan is seeking to acquire from Iran patrol boats and self-propelled howitzer guns. ¶5. (S) Paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1747 provides that Iran "shall not supply, sell or transfer...any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals..." Despite the prohibition on all Iranian exports of arms and related materiel imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007),some states find defense cooperation with Tehran attractive because Iranian arms are relatively inexpensive. Iran is also willing to sell to states that other major arms suppliers are not. Moreover, Iranian arms sales may accompany Iranian efforts to exert its influence, expand its presence, and lessen its international isolation caused by its nuclear-related activities and support for terrorism. -------------- OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶6. (S//REL Pakistan) Post should pursue the following objectives: -- Emphasize to the GOP that Iran is prohibited, under operative paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1747, from supplying, selling or transferring any arms or related materiel (including spare parts). Also point out the same operative paragraph includes a requirement that all states prohibit the procurement of such items by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran. -- Strongly discourage the GOP from acquiring arms or arms related materiel from Iran and from conducting business with individuals or entities designated by the Security Council in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803. -- Note that entities in the GOP's jurisdiction that acquire arms from Iran or do business with designated entities may be subject to sanctions under U.S. law, including Executive Order 13382 and the Iran, North Korean, Syria Nonproliferation Act. -- Stress that continued defense cooperation with Iran may jeopardize US defense cooperation and military assistance. -- Note that the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee monitors states' implementation of their obligations, and examines and takes appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations measures in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803. -------------- DEMARCHE POINTS -------------- ¶7. (S//REL TO PAKISTAN) (Note: Bullets under the Demarche Points are derived from intelligence and must be used verbatim). Begin Demarche Points: -- We have information that, in November 2008, the Pakistani firm Omar Exports Traders and Oars Associates International (Omar exports) was working to procure RAAD-2 155-mm self-propelled howitzer guns and patrol boats from Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) for Pakistan' s Ministry of Defense. -- We understand that Omar Exports is located at 115 Block 7-8, Amir Khusro Road, Bahadurabad Society, Karachi, Pakistan. -- We ask that you halt the purchase of all military equipment from Iran in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747. -- All procurements from the DIO are prohibited under UNSCR ¶1747. Paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1747 provides that Iran "shall not supply, sell or transfer...any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals..." -- Moreover, DIO is an entity subject to the asset freeze provisions in paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1737. Accordingly, Pakistan should freeze any DIO assets in its territory. -- Additionally, the howitzers are controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement and are therefore reportable to Congress under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) if a transfer occurs. -- We ask that you provide us with any additional information you may have regarding the patrol boats, as they may also be subject to sanctions under INKSNA. -- The United States is required under INKSNA to identify persons and companies who have transferred goods, services, or technology controlled by multilateral nonproliferation control regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria. -- INKSNA sanctions could be imposed on Omar Exports and the Pakistani Ministry of Defense. -- We urge you to investigate Omar Exports and share with us at your earliest convenience the results of your investigation. -- We look forward to our continued cooperation on this and other related matters. End demarche points. ¶8. (U) Washington appreciates Post's assistance on this matter. Department point of contact is Lou Ganem (202) 647-2329, ganemlc@state.sgov.gov, Sajit Gandhi (202)647-6728, gandhiSX@state.sgov.gov and James Ballas (202)736-4972, ballasJL@state.sgov.gov. Please slug all replies to ISN/CATR AND SCA/P. CLINTON