ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 000322 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC IAEA ENRG NPT PREL KNNP TRGY KTIA PARM, MNUC, PGOV SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL ¶1. This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 15-17. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶2. Summary: On December 30, 2008, the President signed the instrument of ratification for the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America ("the Additional Protocol"). He did so to bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards and thus to strengthen the ability of the IAEA to detect clandestine nuclear programs, and to promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security policy. The United States will continue to encourage all states which have not done so to bring into force Additional Protocols of their own. END SUMMARY -------------- Objectives -------------- ¶3. Objectives: -- To highlight the President's ratification and entry into force of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol; -- To urge host governments that have not done so to take the steps necessary to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements required by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; -- To urge host governments that have not done so to take the steps necessary to bring into force an Additional Protocol. End Objectives. -------------- Background -------------- ¶4. Background: To help guard against the spread of nuclear weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the "NPT") mandates acceptance of safeguards to be implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) that are States Party. These IAEA safeguards increase confidence and provide assurances that nuclear materials and technologies are not diverted from peaceful uses to weapons uses in non-nuclear-weapon states and provide a basis for international responses to nonproliferation violations. The IAEA safeguards system plays an indispensable role in implementing the NPT, and in curbing nuclear proliferation and reducing the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. ¶5. The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon States Party to accept Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in all of their peaceful nuclear activities. The United States, as a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT, is under no legal obligation to accept such safeguards. However, beginning with the U.S. Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement in 1977, it has been the policy of the United States to permit the full application of Agency safeguards, excluding only those facilities associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States. By submitting itself to the same safeguards on all of its civil nuclear facilities to which non-nuclear-weapon States Party are subject, the United States in 1967 intended to demonstrate that adherence to the NPT would not place other countries at a commercial disadvantage, either because of increased costs associated with safeguards or because of the risk of the compromise of proprietary information. This offer was critical to gaining the acceptance of the NPT by countries such as Germany and Japan. ¶6. At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world learned that Iraq had clandestinely pursued an advanced program to develop nuclear weapons, despite the application of IAEA safeguards. The international community recognized that the Agency's safeguards system needed to be strengthened in order to increase its STATE 00000322 002 OF 004 SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA ADDITIONAL PROTOC capability to detect secret nuclear programs. The Model Additional Protocol for strengthening nuclear safeguards was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors in 1997. An Additional Protocol based on this Model amends an existing safeguards agreement by requiring non-nuclear- weapon states to provide, inter alia, broader declarations to the Agency about their nuclear programs and nuclear-related activities, and by expanding the access rights of the Agency. ¶7. During the negotiations of the Model Protocol, many non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT urged the United States, as the strongest proponent, to accept its provisions on a voluntary basis. Following the example of its safeguards agreement, the United States stated during the negotiations that it would accept the provisions of the Model Protocol, subject to a National Security Exclusion. The success in achieving a strong Model Protocol was critically dependent on this U.S. commitment. The U.S. signature of the Additional Protocol was in turn a significant factor in the early decision by many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the Protocol. ¶8. The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty that supplements and amends IAEA verification arrangements under the existing Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America of November 18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980. The United States signed the Additional Protocol on June 12, 1998. The President submitted it to the Senate on May 9, 2002; the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on March 31, 2004; and the required implementing legislation, i.e., United States Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401),became law on December 18, 2006. The President issued Executive Order 13458 on February 4, 2008, and on December 30, 2008, the President signed the instrument of ratification for the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America ("The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol"). ¶9. The United States has long called for universal adoption of the Additional Protocol; notably, the President did so in a speech at the National Defense University on February 12, 2004. Washington would like to use the occasion of the President's ratification of the Additional Protocol to continue to encourage NPT non-nuclear weapon states that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. (The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol will enter into force on the date that the IAEA receives written notification from the United States that U.S. statutory and constitutional procedures for entry into force have been met. The United States expects to make this notification shortly.) ¶10. The following states have Additional Protocols in force with the IAEA: Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan. ¶11. The following states have signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, but not brought them into force: Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Honduras, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, and Vietnam. ¶12. The following states have had their Additional Protocol approved by the IAEA Board of Governors but STATE 00000322 003 OF 004 SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA ADDITIONAL PROTOC have taken no further action: Algeria, Central African Republic, Chad, Cte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Mozambique, Republic of Moldova, Swaziland, and Timor-Leste. ¶13. The following NPT States Party have taken no action on an Additional Protocol: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Maldives, Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Republic of Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. ¶14. Thirty non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) Party to the NPT have not yet brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required by the NPT. Eleven of these NNWS have signed such agreements, but not brought them into force: Andorra, Bahrain, Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Gabon, Mauritania, Montenegro, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Six NNWS have had their comprehensive safeguards agreements approved by the Board of Governors but have not yet signed them and brought them into force: Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Qatar, and Timor-Leste. Thirteen NNWS have not yet submitted comprehensive safeguards agreements to the Board of Governors for its consideration: Angola, Rep. of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Micronesia, Rwanda, S?o Tom and Principe, Somalia, and Vanuatu. End Background. -------------- Action Requested -------------- ¶15. Posts are requested to bring the President's action to the attention of appropriate host government officials who are responsible for nuclear nonproliferation and IAEA matters. Posts may draw upon the background above, as appropriate. ¶16. UNVIE, GENEVA, and USUN NEW YORK may draw upon these points as appropriate in meetings with counterparts from other missions. All posts should deliver points in paragraph 17 below. ¶17. Points for all posts: -- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the "NPT") requires non-nuclear-weapon States Party to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in all of their peaceful nuclear activities. -- The United States, as a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT, is under no obligation to accept such safeguards. -- Nonetheless, for over forty years, the United States has permitted the full application of IAEA safeguards, except for those facilities and activities excluded for national security reasons. -- It has been the policy of the Bush Administration to encourage all states which have not done so to bring into force Additional Protocols of their own. -- On December 30, 2008, President Bush signed the instrument of ratification for the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol, and the Protocol will enter into force when the United States notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency in writing that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met and that it is prepared to deposit its instrument of ratification. -- The President's ratification of this agreement reinforces longstanding U.S. support for the IAEA in the fight against nuclear proliferation. -- Specifically, this Additional Protocol expands the types of nuclear and nuclear-related locations and activities the United States will declare and, by permitting access to these locations and activities in STATE 00000322 004 OF 004 -- The United States will continue to pursue the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply within the Nuclear Suppliers Group as the President called for in February 2004. --The United States stands ready to assist countries in their ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol, with the goal of universal implementation of the Protocol. End points for all posts. ¶18. Minimize considered. RICE