MD ISSUES RELATED TO DPRK

S E C R E T STATE 031392 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2019 TAGS: PARM KN RS SUBJECT: MD ISSUES RELATED TO DPRK CLASSIFIED BY: ISN ACTING A/S C.S. ELIOT KANG, FOR REASONS 1.4 b and d REF: STATE 30123 ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request for EMBASSY MOSCOW. ¶2. (S/NF) BACKGROUND and ACTION REQUEST As discussed in REFTEL, the United States remains concerned about the likelihood of a launch of a TD-2 long-range missile, regardless of how North Korea characterizes such a launch. North Korea has publicly announced a launch window of April 4-8. Washington expects North Korea to proceed under the guise of a space-launch, which would provide technical experience of value to its long-range ballistic missile program. While such a launch is not/not expected to pose a direct threat to U.S. territory, the United States ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) will stand ready to provide protection should U.S. territory be threatened. Washington wishes to provide advance warning to the Russian Federation of this unlikely possibility, to avoid any miscalculations in the unlikely event of the launch of U.S. Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs). Post is asked to deliver points in paragraph 3 to host government officials as soon as possible before the announced launch window of April 4- 8, and report any response to Department. Additional background on discussions for such notification is provided for Post in paragraph 4. If asked about the status of discussions on establishing the U.S.-Russia Direct Communications Link, post may refer to points in paragraph 5. ¶3. (S/REL RUS) Begin points: -- We appreciate the remarks that Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin made encouraging the DPRK to refrain from proceeding with its announced launch. -- It is important for the DPRK to hear from Six-Party partners that such provocative actions are not helpful to achieving our common goal of promoting implementation of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. -- However, in the event that our collective efforts to dissuade the DPRK from pursuing this course of action are not successful, we wish to share with you one possible, albeit unlikely, outcome that may result from a North Korean launch: potential use of the U.S. Ground Based Missile Defense System. -- Prior to the North Korean July 2006 attempted missile launch, the United States advised Russia, at the level of Secretary of Defense to Minister of Defense, that the United States would be prepared to defend itself against the TD-2 if it threatened the territory of the United States. -- If during the flight trajectory of this TD-2 we have determined that it will imminently impact the territory of the United States, the United States will exercise its right of self-defense as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, and attempt a missile defense intercept in order to protect our population and territory. -- In such an unlikely event, the United States would attempt to advise the Russian Federation through a notification message transmitted through the Washington- Moscow Direct Communications Link (DCL) for the launch of long-range ground-based missile defense interceptor missiles. -- We would appreciate your passing this information to appropriate agencies within the Russian government as you deem necessary. End points. ¶4. (SBU) ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND U.S. technical experts to the Washington-Moscow DCL have been unable -- despite U.S. proposals -- to schedule a meeting with their Russian counterparts in the Kremlin's Presidential Communications Directorate in order to develop specific wording for an agreed pre-formatted notification message transmitted through the Washington-Moscow DCL channel, that is, the Presidential "Hotline." In the event that the United States is compelled to launch such missile defense interceptors from either Fort Greely, Alaska, or Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, against an imminent threat to the territory of the United States, and the U.S. President directs the U.S. National Military Command Center to notify President Medvedev in a time-urgent fashion that the launch(es) is(are) solely in self-defense, the U.S.-side of the Washington-Moscow DCL will be authorized by the U.S. President to transmit the following notification message to the Russian-side of the DCL: "We have launched ground-based missile defense interceptors in response to a ballistic missile threat to our territory, forces, or interests. Our launch is defensive only. We will follow up with more information as appropriate. This message constitutes notification in accordance with the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War." ¶5. (S/Rel Russia) If raised: It is the understanding of U.S. technical experts of the Washington-Moscow DCL that their counterparts at the Kremlin's Presidential Communications Directorate responsible for the Russian side of the Washington-Moscow DCL facility in Moscow have a copy of the above draft U.S.-proposed English language text for such an eventual pre-formatted notification message. It is also our understanding that experts on the Russian side of the DCL may have translated the English text into Russian for use in an emergency and are prepared to take appropriate action if received from the U.S. Having such a pre-formatted notification message available in an emergency would serve as an important transparency and confidence- building measure for transmitting time-urgent information in order to mitigate the risk of either Moscow or Washington receiving a false warning of attack from its respective early warning system, and thus misinterpreting a missile defense interceptor launch. End Additional Background. ¶6. (SBU) Please slug all responses for EUR, EAP and ISN. CLINTON