DEMARCHE REQUEST: PRESSING MOSCOW AND BEIJING ON

S E C R E T STATE 030123 C O R R E C T E D COPY - TEXT NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019 TAGS: UNSC PREL CM RU KNNP KN SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: PRESSING MOSCOW AND BEIJING ON CONSEQUENCES OF A NORTH KOREAN LAUNCH Classified By: EAP Acting A/S Alexander A. Arvizu, For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request, see para 2. ¶2. (S/NF) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to press Russia and China to support meaningful UN Security Council action in response to a DPRK rocket launch, which North Korea has announced will occur between April 4-8, 2009. Drawing on the points in paras 3-4, posts should approach Chinese and Russian Foreign Ministry officials at the highest possible level to stress the importance of responding to a North Korean launch via public messaging that condemns the launch, through private diplomacy to discourage further North Korean provocations, and by effective action in the United Nations: ¶3. (S/REL CHINA AND RUSSIA) Begin points on launch and messaging responses. -- The United States remains very concerned about North Korea's announced plans to launch a Taepo-Dong 2 long range missile between April 4-8, 2009. -- This issue will undoubtedly be discussed between our Presidents during their upcoming meetings in London. -- We believe that the North Korean launch of a missile, even if it is characterized as a space launch vehicle to place a satellite in orbit, would violate United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, which requires that North Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and reinstate its missile launch moratorium. -- We believe that we should respond quickly and send the strongest possible message of disapproval at the United Nations to respond to the violation of UNSCR 1718. -- We want to work together with you closely on our UN response in order to gain support in the P-5. -- This is particularly important because you are also a member of the Six-Party Talks. -- We believe we should coordinate on our public messaging and private diplomacy, and that we must be clear in condemning the launch and warning North Korea against further provocative action. In addition, we should work together to ensure that there are appropriate consequences for North Korea for engaging in activities related to its ballistic missile program -- i.e., conducting a launch -- over the objections of the international community. ¶4. (S/REL CHINA AND RUSSIA) Points related to UNSCR and UN consequences: -- As we have repeatedly made clear, any launch by the DPRK of a long-range missile, such as a Taepo-Dong 2 (TD-2),would be a provocative act and a violation of UNSCR 1718, even if the DPRK characterizes it as a satellite launch. The equipment and technology necessary to launch a satellite into orbit are virtually identical to and interchangeable with the equipment and technology necessary to launch a ballistic missile weapons payload. -- UNSCR 1718 requires North Korea to suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, states that it should re-establish its previous commitments to a moratorium on missile launching, and requires the DPRK to abandon its ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. -- North Korea's development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles, and missile-related materials, equipment, and technologies pose a serious threat to the region and to the international community. -- Any launch of a rocket of this type would further the North Korean ballistic missile development activities that UNCRS 1718 was intended to restrain, given the interchangeability of the ballistic missile and SLV technology. UNSCR 1718's requirement that the DPRK end all activity related to its ballistic missile program was intended to deny any such benefits to this program. -- We are aware of the diplomatic outreach that the DPRK has undertaken to characterize this launch as a peaceful attempt to join the ranks of space-faring states. But we must view the TD-2 system in the context in which it was developed: as a military program designed to carry dangerous payloads over great distances. -- Condemnation by the Security Council of a North Korean launch would by no means constitute an inappropriate restriction on states' right to space exploration. The restrictions of UNSCR 1718 apply only to the DPRK, in response to its October 2006 nuclear test and the barrage of ballistic missiles, including the TD-2 missile, it launched in July ¶2006. -- It is important that we respond to any launch as a threat to international security, and as a threat to the credibility of the Security Council. -- Furthermore, as permanent members of the Security Council, we have an obligation to ensure that violations of Security Council decisions are properly addressed. -- It is for this reason that we believe the most appropriate response is a new Security Council resolution condemning any launch of a TD-2 missile or other rocket, no matter how the DPRK chooses to characterize the launch. -- We share the view held by many that we must not jeopardize progress on denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has threatened to pull back from the process if the UNSC takes action, but as Permanent Members we cannot accept such threats. In fact, we believe an appropriate response to North Korea's launch at the UNSC is the best way to ensure that it does not impede our ability to engage Pyongyang constructively in the Six-Party Process. -- We therefore do not propose the imposition of a new sanctions regime on the DPRK at this time. The appropriate response is to designate and take action against those North Korean entities engaged in missile proliferation under the existing UNSCR 1718 regime, and to revise the list of items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology related to ballistic missile programs in Security Council Document S/2006/815 . The annex will include the following 11 entities, which already face sanctions under existing U.S. law: - Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation - Tanchon Commercial Bank - Korea Ryonbong General Corporation - Hesong Trading Corporation - Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation - Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company - Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation - Korea Pugang Trading Corporation - Korea Ryongwang Trading Corporation - Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation - Tosong Technology Trading Corporation End Points for Beijing and Moscow. ¶5. (S/NF) Further details about the expanded annex for enforcement of UNSCR 1718, including the 11 entities listed above, are available from the Russia and China desks. Please slug responses for EAP/K and ISN/RA. CLINTON NNNN End Cable Text