PROBLEMS WITH UNDP'S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAM

S E C R E T STATE 030009 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2026 TAGS: ECON IO IZ KCOR PGOV SUBJECT: PROBLEMS WITH UNDP'S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAM Classified By: NEA/I Director Timothy Betts for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1.(SBU) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 8. 2.(C) Representatives from NEA/I and Embassy Baghdad Anti-Corruption Coordinator's Office (ACCO) met with representatives of the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Iraq team, including the Deputy Special Representative Secretary General for Iraq (SGSR) David Shearer, in Amman Jordan on March 8 and10 to discuss UNDP's implementation of its USG-funded anti-corruption program. NEA and ACCO expressed strong concerns regarding the pace and focus of implementation and highlighted the need for swift improvement. Senior UNDP staff indicated that a significant re-organization of the UNDP Iraq office is forthcoming and that this may have a positive impact on the implementation of the ACCO/NEA anti-corruption program. End Summary. Problems with Project Implementation ¶3. (SBU) On March 8 and 10 NEA/I and Embassy Baghdad Anti-Corruption Coordinator's Office met with representatives of UNDP's Iraq team to discuss UNDP's implementation of the anti-corruption program funded from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. NEA/I awarded $8 million to UNDP in August 2008 to begin working with the Government of Iraq (GOI) to develop a more robust anti-corruption strategy and to address capacity development in the GOI's three major anti-corruption institutions: the Commission on Integrity, the Board of Supreme Audit and Inspectors General. UNDP undertook few activities between August 2008 and the first week of January 2009, at which point a conference was held in Amman to begin discussing an anti-corruption self-assessment to be carried out by various GOI ministries. We note that UNDP delivered a draft workplan in December 2009. Since that time we understand that UNPDC/Vienna has held discussions with relevant GOI institutions regarding the self-assessment. ¶4. (C) Discussions with UNDP Governance Director Sylvia Fletcher (Note: Ms. Fletcher is responsible for the management of UNDPs anti-corruption program. End Note.) focused on the need to increase the speed of project implementation and re-focus UNDP's efforts on helping the GOI draft its anti-corruption strategy, engaging with the GOI's primary anti-corruption institutions, and newly elected provincial leaders, and hiring the appropriate staff to carry out these activities. Fletcher stated that UNDP is attempting to hire two consultants but one candidate backed out and the other will not be available until July. Fletcher also indicated that before work would begin on the GOI's anti-corruption strategy, the anti-corruption self-assessment had to be completed, which she estimated would occur sometime in April. Despite the expression of concern by NEA/I and ACCO, Ms. Fletcher and her colleague, Henrik Lindroth, asserted that the project was progressing well. ¶5. (C) Senior UNDP staff told NEA/I and ACCO that UNDP leadership in Amman and New York are not satisfied with the lack of progress on implementing the anti-corruption program. DSRSG David Shearer stated that GOI Council of Ministers Secretary General, Ali Alaq, recently voiced his dismay at the lack of project implementation on the part of UNDP regarding anti-corruption, citing specifically the lack of assistance in drafting a revised anti-corruption strategy. Mr. Shearer said that he shared these concerns and would be taking a closer look at the program. Potential Impact ¶6. (C) Anti-corruption remains a serious problem in Iraq and a major priority for U.S. technical assistance moving forward. In his Iraq policy speech of February 27, the President specifically listed the fight against corruption as a key element of our effort. Congress has expressed strong interest in the topic of corruption in Iraq and what the U.S. and GOI are doing to combat it. Congress has mandated several extensive reports and has even placed a hold on 60% of Rule of Law funding for Iraq pending a report certifying that the GOI has an anti-corruption strategy and is implementing it. In response to this reporting requirement the Department submitted a report to Congress in November 2008. The report stated that while the GOI had an anti-corruption strategy, the GOI would soon begin work, in tandem with UNDP and UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on a more robust strategy. Due to the exceedingly slow implementation of this program, this has yet to happen. The Administration plans to request additional funds from Congress for anti-corruption activities in Iraq. But with little progress to show for the previous funding, any request m ay meet with resistance from appropriators. Re-organization of UNDP-Iraq ¶7. (S) DSRSG David Shearer indicated that a significant re-organization of the UNDP-Iraq office in Amman will take place in the near future. Currently there are four pillars in the UNDP office: Governance, Reconstruction, Services, and Refugees. Under the re-organization the four pillars will be folded into two; Governance (which will subsume the refugee functions) and Economics (which will take on reconstruction and essential services). Shearer indicated that UNDP is recruiting senior leaders to serve as directors of these two pillars, and that this re-organization may have a positive impact on the implementation of the anti-corruption project. (Note: Basil Comnas, who is likely to become Shearer's deputy in Baghdad, indicated that Ms. Fletcher was not likely to be considered for one of these two posts and that as a result, her involvement with the anti-corruption project may come to an end. End note.) Action Request ¶8. (C) Embassy Baghdad is requested to seek Ali Alaq's feedback regarding UNDP's performance in providing assistance and technical training to as part of its anti-corruption program and to share with Alaq the need for the GOI to communicate its concerns on this issue formally and directly with the head of UNDP in New York, as well as the UNSYG through the GOI Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and through the GOI Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. The following talking points may be used in discussion with Alaq: Begin talking points: - We remain committed to assisting the GOI in combating corruption in Iraq, - We support the GOI's efforts to craft a more robust anti-corruption strategy and to that end have funded UNDP and UNODC to assist the GOI in the drafting its new strategy, - While we acknowledge UNDP's difficulties in recruiting qualified personnel, we share your concerns regarding the lack of UNDP progress in providing technical assistance in drafting a more robust anti-corruption strategy and in providing the GOI's primary anti-corruption institutions with necessary capacity development training. - We have spoken to UNDP representatives about the need for swifter implementation of its anti-corruption program, - We strongly encourage you to express your concerns formally and directly to the Head of UNDP in Amman and in New York, as well as the UN Secretary General, - We are also pressing UNDP to implement the project with greater speed and effectiveness. End Talking Points. CLINTON