(S) ALLIANCE COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

S E C R E T STATE 029932 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2034 TAGS: MARR PREL PARM KPAO KN KS JA SUBJECT: (S) ALLIANCE COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A TD-2 LAUNCH Classified By: EAP A/S Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (S/NF) For alliance management reasons and in order to shape public perceptions, it is important that our Embassies and military Commands in the ROK and Japan work closely with host governments and provide consistent messaging in responding publicly to the expected North Korean Taepodong-2 launch. The State and Defense Departments appreciate the excellent work of Embassies and Commands on this matter thus far, in particular the superb cross-agency coordination. Based on input received from Embassies Seoul and Tokyo, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK),U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ),as well as the plans of the ROK and Japanese governments, Department issues the following guidance, to be implemented under the direction of the Chiefs of Mission in Seoul and Tokyo, and supported by Commander USPACOM and Commanders at USFK and USFJ. Embassy and Commands may share these instructions with host governments for coordination purposes, drawing on talking points in para 4 to reinforce the continued importance of message discipline to serve shared strategic objectives. This message has been coordinated with the Department of Defense. ¶2. (S/Rel JA, KS) In the event of a North Korean missile launch, Chiefs of Mission in Seoul and Tokyo may, if requested/invited, call on the Blue House/Kantei for discussions and to exhibit coordination. ¶3. (S/Rel JA, KS) Either the White House or the State Department may issue a public statement following a North Korean missile launch. Embassies should not/not release press statements. Prior to a launch, Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may respond on-the-record to press inquiries using the pre-cleared language contained in para 6. Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may also share the points contained in para 7 with the ROKG and GOJ in advance of a launch and recommend that the ROKG/GOJ use the same points in order to ensure a consistent message. Because any missile launch is expected to occur during the day in Seoul and Tokyo (overnight in Washington),to ensure roll out of a coordinated post-launch message, Embassies Seoul and Tokyo are also authorized to respond on-the-record to press inquiries using the pre-cleared language contained in para 6. (NOTE: When directed by OASD Public Affairs, and in coordination with the post-launch White House or State Department public statement, NORTHCOM will be prepared to issue a press release confirming the launch, as NORTHCOM has the responsibility and capability within the Defense Department to provide launch characterization. END NOTE). ¶4. (S/Rel JA, KS) Country teams with the support of the military Commands, should make the following points to counterparts in the ROKG and GOJ as context for coordinating public diplomacy related to the TD-2 launch. -- It is important to avoid creating a crisis atmosphere that will reduce our flexibility and give advantage to North Korea. -- We understand that North Korea,s actions create domestic pressure in your countries to appear responsive. The demands of the news cycle only heighten the pressure. However, we strongly urge you to use public statements as a means to reduce public anxiety and project our joint preparedness as well as the in-depth cooperation that continues among our three countries. -- We expect that the international response to a North Korean launch will be centered largely in the UN Security Council based on the violation of UNSCR 1718. It would be unwise and potentially counterproductive to speculate publicly on the outcome of our joint efforts there. -- We are concerned by continued leaks, which place sources and methods at risk and undermine the unified careful message we have developed together. It is important that our governments not confirm leaked information that appears in the media. ¶5. (S/Rel JA, KS) PACOM, USFK, USFJ, Missile Defense Agency, and STRATCOM should not/not release press statements following a DPRK launch. As authorized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Commander PACOM, USFK and USFJ personnel may respond to media questions on background, to explain in general terms, using unclassified information, the extent of U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK information-sharing and military-to-military coordination in advance of and during the launch. ¶6. (SBU) Before the TD-2 launch, Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may use the following points to respond to press inquiries. These points are similar to the standing guidance being used by the State Department spokesperson. -- We are closely monitoring North Korea,s activities and intentions, which have indicated they are preparing to launch a Taepodong-2 (TD-2) for delivery of a so-called &experimental communications satellite.8 -- Through close consultations, the governments of the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan have tried to discourage North Korea from launching a TD-2 or other rocket. -- This provocative act would not be helpful to stability and relations in the region. -- Any launch would only further isolate North Korea from the international community. -- North Korea should focus instead on the Six-Party Talks process and denuclearization, and on improving its relations with its neighbors. -- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 requires North Korea to suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and to abandon its ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. -- The (ROK)/(Japanese) and U.S. governments agree that the launch of a TD-2 or other rocket by North Korea would be a violation of UNSC Resolution 1718, even if the North characterizes it as the launch of a satellite or a space launch vehicle. The equipment and technology necessary to launch a satellite into orbit are virtually identical to and interchangeable with the equipment and technology necessary to launch a ballistic missile weapons payload. -- Our governments will continue to be in close communication as this situation further develops. ¶7. (S/Rel JA, KS; SBU after launch) Following a TD-2 launch, Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may draw from the following points in response to press inquiries. All other questions should be referred to Washington. -- On XX, North Korea launched (a Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) long-range missile.) The launch resulted in (delivery of a payload to orbit) (failure to deliver a payload to orbit) (failure of launch vehicle). -- We have long expressed our concerns regarding North Korea,s ballistic missile programs. -- North Korea's development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles, missile-related materials, equipment, and technologies pose a serious threat to the region and to the international community. -- This launch is a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, (even though the DPRK has characterized this as a (satellite) (space launch vehicle) launch). -- The United States believes that any missile test by the DPRK violates UNSCR 1718, even if the DPRK characterizes it as a launch vehicle. Ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles derive from nearly identical and interchangeable technologies. -- UNSCR 1718 requires that North Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and that it abandon its ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. If asked about the DPRK characterization of the event as the launch of a space-launch vehicle: -- Given the clear statement of the United Nations Security Council in two resolutions (1695 and 1718) that missile-related activities must cease, the United States believes any launches of this type conducted by the DPRK violate UNSCR 1718, even if the DPRK seeks to characterize them as space launch vehicles. If asked about North Korea's motives: -- We will not speculate about North Korea's motives. If asked regarding North Korean missile exports: -- We are greatly concerned about North Korea's continued export of ballistic missiles and related equipment, materials, and technologies to countries of concern. Such exports violate UNSCR 1718. -- North Korea has marketed its missile technology and equipment worldwide. -- The United States imposed sanctions on North Korean entities multiple times for missile-related transfers, most recently in February 2009. If asked about the future of the Six-Party Talks: --The United States remains committed to the Six-Party Talks process, and calls on the DPRK to fulfill its commitments under the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. If asked about UN actions: --The United States considers this launch a violation of UNSCR 1718. (Refer to Washington for further comment.) If asked about U.S. bilateral and/or unilateral actions/sanctions: -- (Refer to Washington for further comment.) If asked about U.S.-ROK-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation: -- The United States, ROK, and Japan have worked closely as alliance partners to better monitor, understand, and respond appropriately to North Korean actions in support and execution of a missile launch. If asked about when the United States shared data with (Japan) (the ROK) about the launch: -- The United States and (Japan) (the ROK) have exchanged information before and immediately after the launch through a variety of diplomatic and military channels. We will continue to consult closely with our (Japanese) (ROK) allies. We cannot, however, discuss details of our military operations, plans or intelligence, or the content of our diplomatic exchanges. If asked about the U.S. commitment to defend (Japan) (the ROK): -- The United States is prepared to meet fully its obligations under the (U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security) (U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954). Our forces in Korea, Japan, and throughout the region train rigorously in order to be prepared to meet our treaty obligations. End Text of Press Guidance. CLINTON NNNN End Cable Text