REPORTING: AMBASSADOR SANO'S BRIEFING TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 029794 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019 TAGS: MOPS PARM PREL PGOV JA SUBJECT: REPORTING: AMBASSADOR SANO'S BRIEFING TO WASHINGTON ON CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS REF: 08 TOKYO 3532 Classified By: PM DAS Greg Delawie FOR REASONS 1.4 (a),(b),and (c) ¶1. (C) Summary: PM Deputy Assistant Secretary Greg Delawie met with Ambassador Toshio Sano, Director General for Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 13 to discuss the Japanese progress in developing their national implementation legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the status of the ratification process. The U.S. side had few concerns with the Japanese approach to implementation and should the policy described be accepted by the Diet, U.S. Forces Japan (USJF) operations will be protected. One point that requires follow-on action is how we will address the Japanese interpretation that prohibits development, production, and acquisition of cluster munitions(CM) on Japanese territory. The Department suggested that the group that has been discussing CM in Tokyo (including Embassy Tokyo, USFJ and relevant Japanese interlocutors) address this issue to ensure that USFJ operations are not impacted. We also requested an advance copy of the statement to the Diet. (End Summary.) ¶2. (C) Ambassador Sano was accompanied by Hidetoshi Iijima and Masaki Amadera from the Japanese Embassy. On the U.S. side PM DAS Delawie was joined by Lt Col Wes Norris (JS/J5),Maj Leslie Maher (JS/J5),Eric Jaffe (OSD Policy),and Steven Costner and Katherine Baker (both from PM/WRA). Ambassador Sano began with an overview of the Japanese ratification process for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM),highlighting that parliamentary discussions would begin as early as April. He believes that most representatives from the foreign affairs committee should support the GOJ position on the treaty but that there would be members that would apply pressure for policies that would restrict cooperation. He wanted to ensure that we had a common understanding of the issues. ¶3. (C) Sano presented an overview of the Japanese position: -- USFJ are not restricted in anyway because the U.S. is classified as a "State not Party" to the CCM. -- GOJ is not obliged to prevent U.S. forces themselves from undertaking activities prohibited by the CCM (use, production, stockpiling, etc). -- CCM (Article 21) permits military forces of "states not party" to operate within the territory of State Parties. (Note: USG participants interpreted this statement as an assurance that nothing in the CCM would prevent Japan from allowing U.S. bases in Japan, even if the U.S. remained outside the CCM.) -- Along the lines of Article 21, the GOJ would make best efforts to ensure cooperation and interoperability between Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and USFJ. -- The GOJ highly regards the DoD policy of June 19, 2008 on CM and unintended harm to civilians and requests that USFJ be equipped with these new CM as soon as possible. This will make Japanese nationals more understanding of our positions and requirements vis-a-vis the CCM. ¶4. (C) On the finer points of what will be presented to the Diet, Sano represented the following regarding the use of CM by USFJ and related activities by others (Japanese national contractors to USFJ, JSDF, and private transportation companies): -- All diplomatic efforts would be exhausted in order to prevent an armed attack on Japanese territory; if such efforts fail JSDF and USFJ would closely coordinate an effective defense. CM will be considered in extreme cases. -- The U.S. has no obligations under the CCM. -- The GOJ highly regards the U.S. policy--the maximum self-restraint will be used to avoid unintended harm to civilians. -- It is not appropriate for GOJ to prevent the USFJ from stockpiling CM; however production, development, and acquisition would be prohibited on Japanese territory. -- Regarding activities by "others" (i.e., USJF contractors) the GOJ is drafting legislation to ensure smooth operation for USFJ. JSDF may transport US CM and may stockpile US CM in JSDF facilities (per joint use arrangements in the SOFA Article 2 paragraph 4 (b)). JSDF cannot use, develop, acquire, transfer, or produce CM. USFJ contractors/private companies can transport and maintain (to include assembly/disassembly) US CM, but cannot use, produce, develop, or otherwise acquire CM (with "acquire" meaning a change of title). ¶5. (C) Sano acknowledged that the GOJ recognized major differences between the CCM and the Ottawa Convention (banning anti-personnel landmines) because of Article 21 in the CCM. The GOJ must persuade certain political parties that this is the case and that the GOJ interpretation is correct. The points articulated above will assist in this effort. ¶6. (C) Throughout the meeting Delawie expressed U.S. appreciation for the efforts of the GOJ to work to protect interoperability and that although we understand the Japanese public,s dislike for CM, they remain legitimate weapons and that in certain circumstances the U.S. needs to reserve the option to use them, stressing that in some cases they will cause less suffering. Delawie also noted how important it remains for the GOJ follow through on the commitment it has made to the USG throughout our consultations on cluster munitions that their participation in the Oslo Process, including signing the Convention, not impact the operations of USFJ. Costner, supported by Norris, noted U.S. concerns on the GOJ interpretation that production, development and acquisition of CM by USFJ on Japanese territory would be prohibited. They stated that the USG,s primary concern on a "production" prohibition might be resolved by considering "assembly" of cluster munitions on Japanese territory to be part of "maintenance", as the GOJ has confirmed. They also highlighted that there may be situations when it could be necessary for the U.S. to acquire CM in Japan, e.g., if under extreme circumstances USFJ received CM directly from a third country instead of them being shipped from U.S. territory. An in-depth discussion of the terminology would be required and the permitted activities should be clear in the implementing legislation. Costner suggested the experts group in Tokyo that has been working on this legislation add this to their agenda. ¶7. (U) Please contact Katherine Baker, PM/WRA if more information is required (202-663-0104; bakerkm2@state.gov). CLINTON