(S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE TURKISH

S E C R E T STATE 027957 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2034 TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL TW IR TU SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE TURKISH FIRM AK MAKINA'S DEALINGS IN IRAN REF: A. STATE 003403 ¶B. ANKARA 000070 ¶C. ANKARA 000095 ¶D. ANKARA 000293 Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Ankara, please see paragraph 5. ¶2. (S) Background/Purpose/Objective: In January 2009, the United States alerted Turkish officials that Iran's Machine Sazi Tabriz was working with the Turkish firm Ak Makina to procure Taiwan-origin machine tools (Ref A). During our discussion of this case, we noted our concerns that Machine Sazi Tabriz had been associated with proliferation-related procurement for the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG), the lead entity responsible for Iran's liquid propellant ballistic missile program. In response, Turkish authorities informed us that they have been monitoring Ak Makina closely and have denied some export licenses involving Ak Makina and proliferation-related entities in Iran (Refs B and C). They also requested further information linking SHIG and Machine Sazi Tabriz (Ref B). ¶3. (S) While we do not have additional details to provide regarding SHIG's relationship with Machine Sazi Tabriz, we now would like to share with the GOT information regarding a broad effort by SHIG to procure highly capable machine tools from Ak Makina. Specifically, we understand that in late 2008 and early 2009, Ak Makina was working to supply a variety of machine tools produced by companies in Taiwan, South Korea, and Spain to a front company associated with SHIG. We believe some of these machines are controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). We also believe that all of these machines can be used by SHIG to support its missile production efforts. ¶4. (S) We want to raise this activity with Turkish officials and urge them to take measures to stop Ak Makina from acting as a source of supply to cover companies for Iran's missile program. We also want to emphasize that that such actions would be consistent with UNSCR 1737, stressing that SHIG has been designated by the United Nations for its role in Iran's missile development efforts. ¶5. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Ankara approach appropriate host government authorities to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. ¶6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET REL TURKEY) -- You will recall that in January 2009, we brought to your attention efforts by an entity in Turkey to assist Iran's procurement of Taiwan-origin machine tools, and requested your assistance in investigating this activity. -- Specifically, we advised you that in mid-2008, Iran's Machine Sazi Tabriz was seeking to procure a model VF-3000 double column bridge mill produced by the Taiwan-based company Vision Wide Tech Co. and a computer numerically controlled (CNC) flat bed lathe manufactured by Taiwan's Proking Machinery. -- Machine Sazi Tabriz sought these machines through a Turkish company named Ak Makina. -- During our discussions, we noted our concerns that Machine Sazi Tabriz had been associated with proliferation-related procurement for Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG). SHIG is responsible for Iran's liquid propellant ballistic missile program. -- In response, you indicated that your government has been closely monitoring Ak Makina. You also said that your government had denied some export licenses involving Ak Makina and proliferation-related entities in Iran. -- In addition, you asked for further information linking SHIG and Machine Sazi Tabriz to assist your government's efforts to prevent transactions of concern involving Ak Makina. -- Although we do not have additional details to provide concerning SHIG's relationship with Machine Sazi Tabriz, we would like to share with you information regarding SHIG's efforts to procure a number of highly-capable machine tools from the Turkish firm Ak Makina. -- Specifically, we understand that in late 2008 and early 2009, Ak Makina was working to supply Iran's Ardalan Machineries Company with a variety of machine tools from companies in Taiwan, South Korea, and Spain. -- Ardalan Machineries is a procurement cover for SHIG, and we believe this firm is acting as a false end-user in its dealings with Ak Makina to circumvent your export controls. -- Among the machines sought by Ardalan from Ak Makina is a model FS-1 milling machine produced by the Spanish company Maquinaria CME that is capable of performing five-axis machining operations. -- We believe this machine would be controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Such a machine could be used by SHIG to machine turbopump rotors, aerofoils, fuel control devices, and guidance components for Iran's ballistic missiles. -- Ardalan Machineries also requested that Ak Makina provide a model XD32H lathe produced by the Taiwan subsidiary of the South Korean Hanwha Machinery Co. -- We believe this machine is capable of performing five-axis machining operations and is potentially controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Such a machine could be used by SHIG to manufacture liquid rocket engine and missile guidance components. -- In addition, Ardalan Machineries has worked to procure the following machines from Ak Makina since December 2008: -a number of SKT-series CNC slant bed lathes, including models SKT21L and SKT250LM, and a model KB100 horizontal boring and milling machine produced by South Korea's Hyundai-Kia; -a model SR3-AXP CNC vertical machining center equipped with a rotary table and a V4A-XP CNC vertical machining center produced by Akira-Seiki of Taiwan; -model DV1270 and VB-1516 CNC vertical machining centers produced by Taiwan's Vision Wide Technology Co. Ltd.; and -a model SL35HE lathe produced by Taiwan's Mori Seiki. -- Although not controlled, each of these machine tools is highly-capable and could be used by SHIG to support its production of liquid rocket engine components. -- We believe Ak Makina's business relationship with a SHIG-affiliated front company poses clear missile proliferation risks and we urge you to take measures to stop this firm from acting as a source of supply for Iran's missile program. -- Taking these steps would be consistent with UNSCR 1737: SHIG has been designated by the UN Security Council for its role in Iran's missile program. -- We look forward to continued cooperation on export control and nonproliferation issues and would appreciate hearing any actions your government takes in response to this information at the earliest possible time. End talking points/non-paper ¶7. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR. ¶8. (U) A word version file of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON NNNN End Cable Text