Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE26339
2009-03-19 14:11:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

SEEKING VIEWS ON IAEA PROPOSAL (WMD TERRORIST

Tags:  AORC FR IAEA KPAO PARM PREL PTER UK UNSC 
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VZCZCXRO3935
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #6339/01 0781429
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 191411Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2882
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3487
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 7649
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6598
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 8905
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 5445
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 9642
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8642
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 8283
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY 0342
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8168
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 7647
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 2383
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 5328
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 6308
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 8507
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 5407
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 4656
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 026339 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC FR IAEA KPAO PARM PREL PTER UK UNSC
SUBJECT: SEEKING VIEWS ON IAEA PROPOSAL (WMD TERRORIST
ATTACKS COORDINATION)

REF: EMAIL USUN/1540 COORDINATOR -- 2/5 WITH IAEA
PROPOSAL

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

-------
Summary
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 026339 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC FR IAEA KPAO PARM PREL PTER UK UNSC SUBJECT: SEEKING VIEWS ON IAEA PROPOSAL (WMD TERRORIST ATTACKS COORDINATION) REF: EMAIL USUN/1540 COORDINATOR -- 2/5 WITH IAEA PROPOSAL SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) This cable requests London and Paris obtain views regarding a proposal by Gustavo Zlauvunin, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) New York Representative, to integrate efforts of the various counterterrorism and nonproliferation Committees to focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) post-incident response. While we agree that both areas of activity are complementary, we consider it important to hear views on UNSCR 1540 and on how it should maintain its distinct character and implementation activities. Regarding Zlauvunin,s proposal to conduct an inter and intra-organizational exercise on WMD post-incident response, we support the concept under the conditions that the exercise be properly designed, comprehensive, and produce a deliverable as described in paragraph 9. -------------- OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶2. (U) In pursuing this request, Washington requests that London and Paris Posts seek views from their interlocutors regarding Zlauvunin,s proposal, and report results NLT April 3, 2009. -- Seek London and Paris nonproliferation views on their thoughts on the meshing of various Counterterrorism Committees and their activities, such as the UNSCR 1267 (Al-Qaeda) and UNSCR 1373 with the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED),with the primarily nonproliferation Committee focused on UNSCR 1540. Zlauvunin suggested the various Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation Committees share a common interest of and emphasis on WMD post-incident response. -- Seek London and Paris nonproliferation views on support with reservation for an exercise involving the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),the Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI),and supported by the World Health Organization (WHO),the International Crime Police Organization (INTERPOL),the International Maritime Organization (IMO),the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Experts assisting the 1540 Committee. The United Nations Developme
nt Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) would participate as observers, as well as other CT Implementation Task Force (CTITF) entities. Zlauvunin envisioned such an exercise would promote greater inter and intra-organizational understanding of resources, responsibilities, and capabilities related to response to WMD terrorism attack; increase awareness of preparedness within international organizations to confront such attacks; strengthen communication and relationships among diverse organizations; and, enhance inter-organizational counterterrorism cooperation. -------------- -------------- USG Thoughts on Committees Efforts ) Views London/Paris STATE 00026339 002 OF 003 -------------- -------------- ¶3. (U) We seek views on the meshing of UNSCR 1540 counterproliferation activities with UNSCR counterterrorism activities. There is no question that the counterproliferation objectives in UNSCR 1540 can be complementary to the counterterrorism efforts of the UNSCR 1267 and 1373 Committees, but consider UNSCR 1540 should maintain its distinct character and implementation activities. ¶4. (SBU) The 1540 Committee, stemming from the wake of the unraveling of the elaborate black market nuclear network of AQ Khan, is directed against the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and related items. While the scope of the resolution includes terrorist activities, the resolution was designed to address the full range of proliferation activity, including any non-state actor providing proliferation-related services. The resolution also places requirements on state actors to ensure they do not in any way contribute to or support proliferation activities. ¶5. (U) Since UNSCR 1673 (2006) extended the committee for two additional years and UNSCR 1810 (2008) extended it for an additional three, a robust outreach program has energized a broad nonproliferation dialogue in our community that encompasses both Treaty-based activities (NPT, CWC) as well as the nonproliferation dialogue in such regimes as Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, and others. We have not objected to efforts to refine/coordinate the two CT (1267/1373) Committees and such efforts should proceed -- but the nonproliferation community in nearly all aspects is a different group with a core set of assistance programs and less direct overlaps. We have supported joint briefings and workshop reciprocal overview presentations for late-reporting states but not viewed efforts to consolidate reporting requirements or technical implementation workshops as needed. ¶6. (SBU) Each committee features legally binding obligations imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, together with mechanisms for capacity building and technical assistance to encourage more robust Member State implementation of these obligations. This committee apparatus is potentially a powerful policy tool, yet broader UN membership often sees these structures imposing burdensome requirements (particularly reporting requirements) and other legal obligations in which all but 15 Member States have no real say. We have been constantly vigilant against attempts to shift the center of gravity within the UN system from the UNSC to the UNGA. ¶7. (SBU) We seek views on ensuring the Security Council carefully address efforts designed to rationalize the work of all three Committees. Carefully addressing such efforts does not reflect opposition to improving efficiencies but does support the need to maintain the independence and uniqueness of the nonproliferation treaties and regimes. We are interested in your thoughts on how, as the UNGA proceeds to implement the CT Strategy, and the UNSC continues its implementation of the CT and NP-related resolutions, there is coordination and cooperation between these principal organs as they go down their separate, mandated tracks together. -------------- Exercise Proposal Views for London/Paris -------------- ¶8. (U) We support the concept, with the following conditions, that a properly designed comprehensive exercise should take place that produces the following deliverables: STATE 00026339 003 OF 003 -- Produce written procedural and operation guidelines prior to the exercise. IAEA, OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, UNICRI, ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO and OCHA produce written procedural and operational guidelines due six (6) months before the exercise. -- Produce written policy clarification post exercise. IAEA, OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, UNICRI, ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO and OCHA each produce their individual roles and responsibilities that define their contribution to the whole in support of a stricken nation due two (2) months post exercise. -- Produce revised written procedural and operation guidelines post exercise. IAEA, OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, UNICRI, ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO and OCHA produce new written procedural and operational guidelines that outline response teams, activities, equipment, support requirements, and contributions on the ground that do not duplicate stricken nations activities for each chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear type of emergency operation, due two (2) months post exercise. ¶9. (U) Should multiple nations show interest in, and contribute funding for, an exercise that includes our conditions, the U.S. would seek ways to support through expertise and other contributions, as well as possibly contributing to the $994,400.00 exercise cost. Currently, Washington does not have funding available for this purpose. -------------- Possible Alternatives for USUN to Underscore -------------- ¶10. (U) As an alternative plan the U.S./Russia co-chaired Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism offers 75 nations opportunities to participate in a variety of exercises, seminars, and other activities that could lend themselves to developing the same deliverables as the proposed exercise for at potentially a lower overall participant cost. Each GI participating state may be granted access to an activity through the Global Initiative Information Portal at: https://www.global-initiative.info. ¶11. (U) In addition, more activities may be available with the newly formed World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS). WINS was created in order to formalize the sharing of best governmental and industrial security practices for nuclear facilities and materials. WINS is headquartered in Vienna, Austria and is strongly endorsed by the U.S. Department of Energy. -------------- POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶12. (U) Further questions or information on this response to the IAEA or UNSCR 1540 can be directed to Tom Wuchte, U.S. 1540 Coordinator. Washington appreciates London,s and Paris' assistance. CLINTON

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