Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE26339
2009-03-19 14:11:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:
SEEKING VIEWS ON IAEA PROPOSAL (WMD TERRORIST
how-toVZCZCXRO3935 OO RUEHTRO DE RUEHC #6339/01 0781429 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O P 191411Z MAR 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2882 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3487 INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 7649 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6598 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 8905 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 5445 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 9642 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8642 RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 8283 RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY 0342 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8168 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 7647 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 2383 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 5328 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 6308 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 8507 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 5407 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 4656
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 026339
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC FR IAEA KPAO PARM PREL PTER UK UNSC
SUBJECT: SEEKING VIEWS ON IAEA PROPOSAL (WMD TERRORIST
ATTACKS COORDINATION)
REF: EMAIL USUN/1540 COORDINATOR -- 2/5 WITH IAEA
PROPOSAL
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
-------
Summary
-------
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 026339
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC FR IAEA KPAO PARM PREL PTER UK UNSC
SUBJECT: SEEKING VIEWS ON IAEA PROPOSAL (WMD TERRORIST
ATTACKS COORDINATION)
REF: EMAIL USUN/1540 COORDINATOR -- 2/5 WITH IAEA
PROPOSAL
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (SBU) This cable requests London and Paris obtain views
regarding a proposal by Gustavo Zlauvunin, International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) New York Representative, to
integrate efforts of the various counterterrorism and
nonproliferation Committees to focus on weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) post-incident response. While we agree
that both areas of activity are complementary, we consider it
important to hear views on UNSCR 1540 and on how it should
maintain its distinct character and implementation
activities. Regarding Zlauvunin,s proposal to conduct an
inter and intra-organizational exercise on WMD post-incident
response, we support the concept under the conditions that
the exercise be properly designed, comprehensive, and produce
a deliverable as described in paragraph 9.
--------------
OBJECTIVES
--------------
2. (U) In pursuing this request, Washington requests that
London and Paris Posts seek views from their interlocutors
regarding Zlauvunin,s proposal, and report results NLT April
3, 2009.
-- Seek London and Paris nonproliferation views on their
thoughts on the meshing of various Counterterrorism
Committees and their activities, such as the UNSCR 1267
(Al-Qaeda) and UNSCR 1373 with the Counterterrorism Committee
Executive Directorate (CTED),with the primarily
nonproliferation Committee focused on UNSCR 1540. Zlauvunin
suggested the various Counterterrorism and
Counterproliferation Committees share a common interest of
and emphasis on WMD post-incident response.
-- Seek London and Paris nonproliferation views on support
with reservation for an exercise involving the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),the Office for
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),the UN Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI),and supported by the
World Health Organization (WHO),the International Crime
Police Organization (INTERPOL),the International Maritime
Organization (IMO),the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the Experts assisting the 1540
Committee. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO),and the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) would participate as observers,
as well as other CT Implementation Task Force (CTITF)
entities. Zlauvunin envisioned such an exercise would
promote greater inter and intra-organizational understanding
of resources, responsibilities, and capabilities related to
response to WMD terrorism attack; increase awareness of
preparedness within international organizations to confront
such attacks; strengthen communication and relationships
among diverse organizations; and, enhance
inter-organizational counterterrorism cooperation.
-------------- --------------
USG Thoughts on Committees Efforts ) Views London/Paris
STATE 00026339 002 OF 003
-------------- --------------
3. (U) We seek views on the meshing of UNSCR 1540
counterproliferation activities with UNSCR counterterrorism
activities. There is no question that the
counterproliferation objectives in UNSCR 1540 can be
complementary to the counterterrorism efforts of the UNSCR
1267 and 1373 Committees, but consider UNSCR 1540 should
maintain its distinct character and implementation
activities.
4. (SBU) The 1540 Committee, stemming from the wake of the
unraveling of the elaborate black market nuclear network of
AQ Khan, is directed against the proliferation of WMD, their
means of delivery, and related items. While the scope of the
resolution includes terrorist activities, the resolution was
designed to address the full range of proliferation activity,
including any non-state actor providing proliferation-related
services. The resolution
also places requirements on state actors to ensure they do
not in any way contribute to or support proliferation
activities.
5. (U) Since UNSCR 1673 (2006) extended the committee for two
additional years and UNSCR 1810 (2008) extended it for an
additional three, a robust outreach program has energized a
broad nonproliferation dialogue in our community that
encompasses both Treaty-based activities (NPT, CWC) as well
as the nonproliferation dialogue in such regimes as Missile
Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia
Group, and others. We have not objected to efforts to
refine/coordinate the two CT (1267/1373) Committees and such
efforts should proceed -- but the nonproliferation community
in nearly all aspects is a different group with a core set of
assistance programs and less direct overlaps. We have
supported
joint briefings and workshop reciprocal overview
presentations for late-reporting states but not viewed
efforts to consolidate reporting requirements or technical
implementation workshops as needed.
6. (SBU) Each committee features legally binding obligations
imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, together with
mechanisms for capacity building and technical assistance to
encourage more robust Member State implementation of these
obligations. This committee
apparatus is potentially a powerful policy tool, yet broader
UN membership often sees these structures imposing burdensome
requirements (particularly reporting requirements) and other
legal obligations in which all but 15 Member States have no
real say. We have been
constantly vigilant against attempts to shift the center of
gravity within the UN system from the UNSC to the UNGA.
7. (SBU) We seek views on ensuring the Security Council
carefully address efforts designed to rationalize the work of
all three Committees. Carefully addressing such efforts does
not reflect opposition to improving efficiencies but does
support the need to maintain the independence and uniqueness
of the nonproliferation treaties and regimes. We are
interested in your thoughts on how, as the UNGA proceeds to
implement the CT Strategy, and the UNSC continues its
implementation of the CT and NP-related resolutions, there is
coordination and cooperation between these principal organs
as they go down their separate, mandated tracks together.
--------------
Exercise Proposal Views for London/Paris
--------------
8. (U) We support the concept, with the following conditions,
that a properly designed comprehensive exercise should take
place that produces the following deliverables:
STATE 00026339 003 OF 003
-- Produce written procedural and operation guidelines prior
to the exercise. IAEA, OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, UNICRI,
ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO and OCHA produce written procedural
and operational guidelines due six (6) months before the
exercise.
-- Produce written policy clarification post exercise. IAEA,
OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, UNICRI, ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO
and OCHA each produce their individual roles and
responsibilities that define their contribution to the whole
in support of a stricken nation due two (2) months post
exercise.
-- Produce revised written procedural and operation
guidelines post exercise. IAEA, OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO,
UNICRI, ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO and OCHA produce new written
procedural and operational guidelines that outline response
teams, activities, equipment, support requirements, and
contributions on the ground that do not duplicate stricken
nations activities for each chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear type of emergency
operation, due two (2) months post exercise.
9. (U) Should multiple nations show interest in, and
contribute funding for, an exercise that includes our
conditions, the U.S. would seek ways to support through
expertise and other contributions, as well as possibly
contributing to the $994,400.00 exercise cost. Currently,
Washington does not have funding available for this purpose.
--------------
Possible Alternatives for USUN to Underscore
--------------
10. (U) As an alternative plan the U.S./Russia co-chaired
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism offers 75
nations opportunities to participate in a variety of
exercises, seminars, and other activities that could lend
themselves to developing the same deliverables as the
proposed exercise for at potentially a lower overall
participant cost. Each GI participating state may be granted
access to an activity through the Global
Initiative Information Portal at:
https://www.global-initiative.info.
11. (U) In addition, more activities may be available with
the newly formed World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS).
WINS was created in order to formalize the sharing of best
governmental and industrial security practices for nuclear
facilities and materials. WINS is headquartered in Vienna,
Austria and is strongly endorsed by the U.S. Department of
Energy.
--------------
POINT OF CONTACT
--------------
12. (U) Further questions or information on this response to
the IAEA or UNSCR 1540 can be directed to Tom Wuchte, U.S.
1540 Coordinator. Washington appreciates London,s and
Paris'
assistance.
CLINTON
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC FR IAEA KPAO PARM PREL PTER UK UNSC
SUBJECT: SEEKING VIEWS ON IAEA PROPOSAL (WMD TERRORIST
ATTACKS COORDINATION)
REF: EMAIL USUN/1540 COORDINATOR -- 2/5 WITH IAEA
PROPOSAL
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (SBU) This cable requests London and Paris obtain views
regarding a proposal by Gustavo Zlauvunin, International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) New York Representative, to
integrate efforts of the various counterterrorism and
nonproliferation Committees to focus on weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) post-incident response. While we agree
that both areas of activity are complementary, we consider it
important to hear views on UNSCR 1540 and on how it should
maintain its distinct character and implementation
activities. Regarding Zlauvunin,s proposal to conduct an
inter and intra-organizational exercise on WMD post-incident
response, we support the concept under the conditions that
the exercise be properly designed, comprehensive, and produce
a deliverable as described in paragraph 9.
--------------
OBJECTIVES
--------------
2. (U) In pursuing this request, Washington requests that
London and Paris Posts seek views from their interlocutors
regarding Zlauvunin,s proposal, and report results NLT April
3, 2009.
-- Seek London and Paris nonproliferation views on their
thoughts on the meshing of various Counterterrorism
Committees and their activities, such as the UNSCR 1267
(Al-Qaeda) and UNSCR 1373 with the Counterterrorism Committee
Executive Directorate (CTED),with the primarily
nonproliferation Committee focused on UNSCR 1540. Zlauvunin
suggested the various Counterterrorism and
Counterproliferation Committees share a common interest of
and emphasis on WMD post-incident response.
-- Seek London and Paris nonproliferation views on support
with reservation for an exercise involving the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),the Office for
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),the UN Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI),and supported by the
World Health Organization (WHO),the International Crime
Police Organization (INTERPOL),the International Maritime
Organization (IMO),the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the Experts assisting the 1540
Committee. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO),and the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) would participate as observers,
as well as other CT Implementation Task Force (CTITF)
entities. Zlauvunin envisioned such an exercise would
promote greater inter and intra-organizational understanding
of resources, responsibilities, and capabilities related to
response to WMD terrorism attack; increase awareness of
preparedness within international organizations to confront
such attacks; strengthen communication and relationships
among diverse organizations; and, enhance
inter-organizational counterterrorism cooperation.
-------------- --------------
USG Thoughts on Committees Efforts ) Views London/Paris
STATE 00026339 002 OF 003
-------------- --------------
3. (U) We seek views on the meshing of UNSCR 1540
counterproliferation activities with UNSCR counterterrorism
activities. There is no question that the
counterproliferation objectives in UNSCR 1540 can be
complementary to the counterterrorism efforts of the UNSCR
1267 and 1373 Committees, but consider UNSCR 1540 should
maintain its distinct character and implementation
activities.
4. (SBU) The 1540 Committee, stemming from the wake of the
unraveling of the elaborate black market nuclear network of
AQ Khan, is directed against the proliferation of WMD, their
means of delivery, and related items. While the scope of the
resolution includes terrorist activities, the resolution was
designed to address the full range of proliferation activity,
including any non-state actor providing proliferation-related
services. The resolution
also places requirements on state actors to ensure they do
not in any way contribute to or support proliferation
activities.
5. (U) Since UNSCR 1673 (2006) extended the committee for two
additional years and UNSCR 1810 (2008) extended it for an
additional three, a robust outreach program has energized a
broad nonproliferation dialogue in our community that
encompasses both Treaty-based activities (NPT, CWC) as well
as the nonproliferation dialogue in such regimes as Missile
Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia
Group, and others. We have not objected to efforts to
refine/coordinate the two CT (1267/1373) Committees and such
efforts should proceed -- but the nonproliferation community
in nearly all aspects is a different group with a core set of
assistance programs and less direct overlaps. We have
supported
joint briefings and workshop reciprocal overview
presentations for late-reporting states but not viewed
efforts to consolidate reporting requirements or technical
implementation workshops as needed.
6. (SBU) Each committee features legally binding obligations
imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, together with
mechanisms for capacity building and technical assistance to
encourage more robust Member State implementation of these
obligations. This committee
apparatus is potentially a powerful policy tool, yet broader
UN membership often sees these structures imposing burdensome
requirements (particularly reporting requirements) and other
legal obligations in which all but 15 Member States have no
real say. We have been
constantly vigilant against attempts to shift the center of
gravity within the UN system from the UNSC to the UNGA.
7. (SBU) We seek views on ensuring the Security Council
carefully address efforts designed to rationalize the work of
all three Committees. Carefully addressing such efforts does
not reflect opposition to improving efficiencies but does
support the need to maintain the independence and uniqueness
of the nonproliferation treaties and regimes. We are
interested in your thoughts on how, as the UNGA proceeds to
implement the CT Strategy, and the UNSC continues its
implementation of the CT and NP-related resolutions, there is
coordination and cooperation between these principal organs
as they go down their separate, mandated tracks together.
--------------
Exercise Proposal Views for London/Paris
--------------
8. (U) We support the concept, with the following conditions,
that a properly designed comprehensive exercise should take
place that produces the following deliverables:
STATE 00026339 003 OF 003
-- Produce written procedural and operation guidelines prior
to the exercise. IAEA, OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, UNICRI,
ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO and OCHA produce written procedural
and operational guidelines due six (6) months before the
exercise.
-- Produce written policy clarification post exercise. IAEA,
OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, UNICRI, ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO
and OCHA each produce their individual roles and
responsibilities that define their contribution to the whole
in support of a stricken nation due two (2) months post
exercise.
-- Produce revised written procedural and operation
guidelines post exercise. IAEA, OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO,
UNICRI, ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO and OCHA produce new written
procedural and operational guidelines that outline response
teams, activities, equipment, support requirements, and
contributions on the ground that do not duplicate stricken
nations activities for each chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear type of emergency
operation, due two (2) months post exercise.
9. (U) Should multiple nations show interest in, and
contribute funding for, an exercise that includes our
conditions, the U.S. would seek ways to support through
expertise and other contributions, as well as possibly
contributing to the $994,400.00 exercise cost. Currently,
Washington does not have funding available for this purpose.
--------------
Possible Alternatives for USUN to Underscore
--------------
10. (U) As an alternative plan the U.S./Russia co-chaired
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism offers 75
nations opportunities to participate in a variety of
exercises, seminars, and other activities that could lend
themselves to developing the same deliverables as the
proposed exercise for at potentially a lower overall
participant cost. Each GI participating state may be granted
access to an activity through the Global
Initiative Information Portal at:
https://www.global-initiative.info.
11. (U) In addition, more activities may be available with
the newly formed World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS).
WINS was created in order to formalize the sharing of best
governmental and industrial security practices for nuclear
facilities and materials. WINS is headquartered in Vienna,
Austria and is strongly endorsed by the U.S. Department of
Energy.
--------------
POINT OF CONTACT
--------------
12. (U) Further questions or information on this response to
the IAEA or UNSCR 1540 can be directed to Tom Wuchte, U.S.
1540 Coordinator. Washington appreciates London,s and
Paris'
assistance.
CLINTON