SUBJECT: BELGIUM REQUESTS URGENT INFORMATION ON

S E C R E T STATE 026295

SIPDIS
FOR POL/ECON AARON JENSEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP KSCA MNUC PARM TRGY BE IR
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: BELGIUM REQUESTS URGENT INFORMATION ON
PENDING EXPORT TO IRAN

REF: REF: BRUSSELS 381

Classified By: ISN/FO Acting Assistant Secretary Richard
Stratford for reasons 1.4(b) & (d).


1. (S) This is an action request (see paragraphs 2 and 3) in
response to a question from Werner Bauwens, Special
Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, on GOB
request (reftel) for USG views regarding a pending
Belgian export license application for Iran.


2. (S) Although Bauwens did not furnish information
regarding the Belgian exporter, the Iranian customer
or the specific quantity of iridium (Ir-192) ordered, the
U.S. Government strongly recommends that the export
be denied under Belgian catch-all controls, particularly
in view of Bauwens, observation that GOB authorities
are concerned about the large quantity ordered. The
U.S. notes that the Iranian Government appears to be
seeking large amounts of Ir-192 for industrial
radiography which could be needed for fabrication
of sensitive nuclear facilities and equipment or for
checking welds in ballistic missile airframes and fuel
tanks.

3. (SBU)) Embassy should inform GOB that there will
be no U.S. industry competition for the cited proposed
export. Embassy should also inform GOB that the
current exchange of information is similar to the non-
paper provided GOB in February 2009 (via SBU
email transmittal 02/12/09 to Robert Kiene) regarding
a USG recommendation of denial of the proposed
Belgian export of GAMMAMAT industrial
radiography machines for petrochemical weld
inspection in Iran. The points made in the GAMMAMAT
non-paper regarding the proposed export falling under
operative paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1737 would appear to
apply equally to the currently proposed export. That
paragraph requires a State to prohibit the transfer of
items, even if not controlled under the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control
Regime, if that State determines that the items would
contribute to enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-
related activities, or to the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems. As op4(b) gives each state
the discretion to make this determination, it,s up to
the GOB to decide whether op4(b) is triggered by
the proposed export.
CLINTON