SUBJECT: BELGIUM REQUESTS URGENT INFORMATION ON

S E C R E T STATE 026295 SIPDIS FOR POL/ECON AARON JENSEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019 TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP KSCA MNUC PARM TRGY BE IR SUBJECT: SUBJECT: BELGIUM REQUESTS URGENT INFORMATION ON PENDING EXPORT TO IRAN REF: REF: BRUSSELS 381 Classified By: ISN/FO Acting Assistant Secretary Richard Stratford for reasons 1.4(b) & (d). ¶1. (S) This is an action request (see paragraphs 2 and 3) in response to a question from Werner Bauwens, Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, on GOB request (reftel) for USG views regarding a pending Belgian export license application for Iran. ¶2. (S) Although Bauwens did not furnish information regarding the Belgian exporter, the Iranian customer or the specific quantity of iridium (Ir-192) ordered, the U.S. Government strongly recommends that the export be denied under Belgian catch-all controls, particularly in view of Bauwens, observation that GOB authorities are concerned about the large quantity ordered. The U.S. notes that the Iranian Government appears to be seeking large amounts of Ir-192 for industrial radiography which could be needed for fabrication of sensitive nuclear facilities and equipment or for checking welds in ballistic missile airframes and fuel tanks. ¶3. (SBU)) Embassy should inform GOB that there will be no U.S. industry competition for the cited proposed export. Embassy should also inform GOB that the current exchange of information is similar to the non- paper provided GOB in February 2009 (via SBU email transmittal 02/12/09 to Robert Kiene) regarding a USG recommendation of denial of the proposed Belgian export of GAMMAMAT industrial radiography machines for petrochemical weld inspection in Iran. The points made in the GAMMAMAT non-paper regarding the proposed export falling under operative paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1737 would appear to apply equally to the currently proposed export. That paragraph requires a State to prohibit the transfer of items, even if not controlled under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, if that State determines that the items would contribute to enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water- related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. As op4(b) gives each state the discretion to make this determination, it,s up to the GOB to decide whether op4(b) is triggered by the proposed export. CLINTON