NATO KFOR MISSION: IN TOGETHER, OUT TOGETHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 026179 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR NATO KPKO KV SUBJECT: NATO KFOR MISSION: IN TOGETHER, OUT TOGETHER Classified By: Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried, EUR, for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (SBU) This is an urgent action request in an effort to lock the barn doors on those NATO Allies and Partners who are looking for an early exit from the NATO Kosovo mission, please see paragraph 5. ¶2. (C) Although Foreign and Defense Ministers have pledged to keep NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) at current force levels, some Allied capitals are planning to draw down their forces and in some cases are looking for an early exit, citing budget constraints and projected pledges to increase their ISAF presence. Initial wavering began in February with French discussions to downsize its contributions to KFOR. In late February, the UK coincidentally announced in the press its intention to withdraw from KFOR, claiming to NATO officials that its military contribution of an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance unit was no longer needed by KFOR. Sweden also made rumblings about its future presence, but stopped short of announcing any withdrawal. Complicating this further was the KFOR Commander's (COMKFOR) AP press interview on February 27, in which COMKFOR said the Alliance is considering reducing the number of peacekeeping troops in Kosovo within a year. NATO's Secretary General adamantly denied this suggestion and publicly said there is no plan for downsizing KFOR's presence in Kosovo. Vice President Biden echoed this remark in Brussels stating that "there is more to be done in Kosovo. The business is not finished...we do not believe we need to withdraw (from Kosovo) or make a judgment relative to Afghanistan based on the progress or lack thereof in Kosovo." As an Alliance we have agreed that we are in this together, and upon completing the mission, we will be out together. ¶3. (C) In the initial drafting session for the NATO Summit Declaration, France, supported by the UK and Poland, began the debate on Kosovo with a suggestion to adjust the posture of KFOR. This suggestion was met with resistance from Turkey (supported by Italy, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria),who argued that "we're not there yet" in regard to such a reference, adding that both defense and foreign ministers in their recent meetings did not take a decision on this issue. Germany indicated its cautious approach to any new posturing while Norway argued that "we don't know how EULEX works yet, so Allies cannot yet even debate such an adjustment." Denmark argued that the text should signal Alliance unity, and the French proposal does not send this message. ¶4. (C) Other Allies of potential concern are Finland and Spain. Although not confirmed, officials in Brussels noted Finnish remarks regarding a possible withdrawal of its forces in the summer. Finland has about 442 soldiers in KFOR. And on March 18, Spain's Secretary General for Policy, Luis Cuesta, informed Embassy Madrid of its "final" decision to withdraw all of Spain's 615 troops from KFOR. Cuesta offered several reasons for the decision, including: Spain's budget crunch due to the financial crisis; the evolving KFOR mission; the stable conditions in Kosovo (including the Serbian pledge not to use force); the fact that KFOR troops were performing third-tier security functions; and the increasing necessity for KFOR coordination with Pristina authorities and the uncomfortable position Spain found itself in given its non-recognition of Kosovo. ¶5. (SBU) In light of the initial discussions in Brussels and announcements made in capitals, Posts are requested to deliver urgently the following points to senior MFA and MOD officials: -- As an Alliance we have agreed that we are in this together, and upon completing the mission, we will leave together. -- Kosovo is on the right trajectory, but our mission is not complete. STATE 00026179 002 OF 002 -- We look forward to seeing NATO's presence in Kosovo evolve to reflect a more secure environment. -- Changes in KFOR,s force posture should be predicated on careful and thorough consideration of mission performance, as well as political and security conditions in Kosovo. -- We need to ensure there are no security gaps and be mindful of EULEX's ability to fully exercise its mandate throughout all of Kosovo, which should be considered in conjunction with the full maturation of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) into a professional and effective organization. -- Before KFOR moves to a deterrent presence, benchmarks should be established. -- For instance, the smooth transition from the UN mission in Kosovo to the EU's rule of law mission (EULEX) should be confirmed by an established EULEX track record of fully exercising all of its roles and responsibilities throughout Kosovo. We note that EULEX has not yet even reached Full Operational Capability. -- While the newly established Kosovo Security Force's (KSF) ability to effectively function on its own must also be a factor. -- Continued ability of ethnic Serb hardliners in Kosovo to threaten the safe and secure environment (SASE) in Kosovo also must be carefully evaluated. -- In support of KFOR,s new tasks in Kosovo, Allies need to follow through on their pledges to contribute resources to the KSF Trust Fund. Ensuring the KSF is properly trained and equipped to become a multi-ethnic, diverse and effective organization is in all Allies' best interest. -- As Allies, we must refute Serbia's specious claim that the KSF is an illegal entity which represents a national security threat to it. We must encourage Belgrade to cease its efforts to criticize NATO's work in Kosovo. -------------- REPORTING AND POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶5. (U) Department requests Posts demarche as soon as possible and report responses via front channel message. Please contact EUR/RPM Chris Davy at DavyRC@state.sgov.gov or 202-647-2127 for additional information. CLINTON