DEMARCHE: SEEKING ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR AMISOM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 024665 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL SO KPKO SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: SEEKING ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR AMISOM AND THE SOMALIA SECURITY SECTOR REF: A) STATE 17205 B) PARIS 301 ¶1. This is an action request, please see paragraph 2. OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Post is asked to approach the Host Government at the highest appropriate levels to pursue the following objectives, drawing from the talking points in paragraph 3. Tokyo should also draw from the talking points in paragraph 4, and London and Paris from paragraph 5: -- Seek a commitment by the Host Government to make public statements in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),particularly at the UN Security Council (UNSC) debate on Somalia scheduled for March 20. -- For Tokyo: Urge the Host Government to provide support to AMISOM in the form of funding for troop salaries, equipment, equipment reimbursements, logistical support, and/or infrastructure improvements. Also urge the Host Government to provide support for Somali security forces loyal to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and/or support the security sector reform (SSR)/capacity building activities that are being conducted by the United Nations (UN) and regional states for Somali forces. -- For London and Paris: Thank the Host Government for previously delivered and pledged support in the security sector (REFTELS) and ask for an update on the status of all support, both pledged and planned. TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Post should draw from the following talking points in approaching Host Governments: -- The United States believes the election of Sheikh Sharif, the recent move of the unity government to Mogadishu, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces has created a narrow window in which real progress can be made with regard to building the governance capacity of the TFG and furthering the Somali peace process. It is imperative the international community takes full advantage of this opening, before al-Shabaab and other spoilers can reverse these gains. Failure to take prompt and decisive action in the weeks and months ahead could result in the consolidation of a safe haven for terrorists, including al-Qaeda. It is in our common security and humanitarian interests to provide all possible assistance to Somalia now. -- We are particularly encouraged that progress in Somalia has been made through a Somali-led process, albeit with assistance from the UN and international partners. It is crucial this process continues to be led, and is perceived to be led by, Somalis. At the same time, we believe it is critical the international community increases its support at this juncture. The Somali people need to see that their current path leads to stability and economic recovery. -- The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to Somalia, providing more than $427 million in food and non-food assistance in FY 2008 and to date in FY 2009, and we remain committed to strengthening AMISOM and building the capacity of Somali security forces. The Somali Government cannot accomplish these goals without the help of other international partners, and increased assistance from your STATE 00024665 002 OF 004 government is urgently needed if the gains of the past several weeks are to be consolidated, and the security situation stabilized. --We would be interested in hearing your views on developments in Somalia and your plans for supporting Somalia as it struggles to overcome its troubled history and retake its place among the family of nations. ¶4. (SBU) Tokyo should also draw from the following talking points: Immediate donor assistance, in the form of salaries, equipment, equipment reimbursements, logistical support, and infrastructure improvements are required if the African Union is to attract additional troop contributors for AMISOM in the near-term. -- Immediate donor assistance would also help to convince the current troop contributing countries, Burundi and Uganda, to maintain their current AMISOM commitments. -- Support for Somali security forces loyal to the TFG is also urgently needed. Without support from the international community in the form of salaries, equipment, and logistical support (including food and fuel),Somali security forces are likely to either desert or defect to al-Shabaab and other armed groups opposed to the TFG. We are particularly interested in developing cooperation and mechanisms that will allow the international community to expand delivery of assistance inside Somalia to these forces and monitor its effective use. -- In addition to providing operational support, we call on your government to support the SSR and capacity building efforts conducted by the UN and regional states such as Uganda. -- IF THE SUBJECT OF THE TRUST FUND IS RAISED: While the United States will continue to provide its in-kind support to AMISOM through the contract mechanism we currently have in place, we support the concept of the trust fund called for in ¶1863. We are still determining the most appropriate mechanism through which to provide support to Somali security forces. ¶5. (SBU) London and Paris should also draw from the following talking points: The USG has asked the Government of Japan to provide assistance to AMISOM, the Somali security force and SSR (see paragraph 4 above). ¶6. (U) End Talking Points. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The past several months have included a number of positive developments with regard to the situation in Somalia. The election of moderate leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as President of the TFG, the enlargement of the Transitional Federal Parliament, the appointment of Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as Prime Minister, the appointment of a Cabinet, and the withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) from the country have created momentum behind international efforts to support the Somali peace process and assist Somalis in standing up a more effective transitional government. Nonetheless, the security situation within the country remains tenuous, and the terrorist organization al-Shabaab and other spoilers remain determined to scuttle the peace process, drive out AMISOM and other international actors, and solidify their hold across Southern and Central Somalia. Without increased, sustained international support for AMISOM force generation efforts and capacity-building programs for Somali security forces, the progress that has been made over the past several months may be reversed. STATE 00024665 003 OF 004 ¶8. (SBU) With only 3,400 troops deployed in Mogadishu, AMISOM is still far below its authorized force strength of 8,000. Increasing AMISOM's troop level is central to our strategy of stabilizing Mogadishu and supporting the Somali peace process. AMISOM is focused on protecting TFG personnel taking part in the peace process and securing strategic locations within the city, such as the airport, the seaport, the strategic K4 intersection, and the Presidential Palace. ¶9. (SBU) The USG is bringing significant resources to bear on AMISOM force generation and logistical support efforts. Between FY2007 and FY2008, the USG provided over $67 million in peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds, including through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, to train, equip, transport, and sustain Ugandan and Burundian forces in AMISOM. The U.S. is committed to providing at least another $67 million in FY 2009 PKO funds for AMISOM and Somalia SSR. The USG is providing logistical support (including food, fuel, airlift, and medical evacuations),equipment support, and training through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to the forces on the ground, including for two additional battalions (one from Burundi, one from Uganda, for a total of 1,700 troops) slated to deploy in the coming weeks. Additional donor support, however, is required for salaries, equipment reimbursements and infrastructure improvements. USG funding set aside for equipment will be stretched increasingly thin, and AMISOM battalions will remain well below the UN standard for contingent-owned equipment without additional support. ¶10. (SBU) UNSCR 1863 called for the establishment of a UN logistics support package, to include equipment and infrastructure support, which will eventually supplant the current USG support efforts, and allow our PKO funding to be diverted towards other urgent priorities with respect to Somalia, including SSR. Nonetheless, we do not expect the UN,s own mechanisms to be in place for at least 6 months. Until these new mechanisms are in place, AMISOM will continue to be largely dependent on donor support for the maintenance of the current forces on the ground, as well as the generation of additional forces. UNSCR 1863 also calls for the establishment of a multi-nation donor trust fund to support AMISOM and the all-inclusive Somali security forces. ¶11. (SBU) Equally urgent is the need to provide operational support to Somali security forces loyal to the TFG. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations are outside of AMISOM,s mandate, and only Somali security forces will be capable of filling the gap in these areas created by the withdrawal of the ENDF. Without the provision of food, fuel, salaries and other critical forms of support by the international community, the Somali forces are likely to desert the government, and either melt away or join armed groups opposed to the unity government. The USG has already publicly committed to providing $5 million to support the creation of a joint security force as part of the SSR effort, but this amount is insufficient to fully develop the capacity of the unity government,s security forces and reform the Somali security institutions. REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶12. (U) The Department greatly appreciates Posts' assistance and engagement on this issue. Please report results of this effort via front-channel cable to AF/RSA Col. Mike Skardon, AF/E Matthew Walsh, and IO/PSC Tanaz Khambatta no later than March 18th. POINT OF CONTACT -------------- STATE 00024665 004 OF 004 ¶13. (U) Please contact AF/RSA, Col. Mike Skardon (x7-7371) or Matthew Walsh (x7-8284) or via e-mail for any further background information or argumentation needed to meet our objectives. CLINTON