(U) Secretary Clinton's February 24, 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 020757 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- ADDING ADDEES SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019 TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY RODHAM KDRG ENRG EUN IZ, AF, XF, KV, SP SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's February 24, 2009 Meeting with Spanish FM Moratinos STATE 00020757 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (U) Classified by EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried. Reason: 1.4 (d) ¶2. (U) February 24, 2009; 9:45 a.m., Washington. ¶3. (U) Participants: U.S. The Secretary EUR Acting DAS Pamela Spratlen PA Robert Wood S Staff NSC Tobin Bradley EUR/WE Elaine Samson (EUR Notetaker) SPAIN FM Moratinos Deputy FM Angel Lossada DG for North America Fernandez de la Pena FM Chief of Staff Augustin Santos Ambassador Jorge Dezcallar DCM Jose-Pascual Marco ¶4. (C) SUMMARY: In her first meeting with Spanish FM Moratinos, Secretary Clinton told FM Moratinos that President Obama valued the leadership role that Spain can play. Moratinos commended the new atmosphere between our two countries. Secretary Clinton asked Spain to send police trainers to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, to take detainees from Guantanamo, to contribute more troops in Afghanistan, and to work with us on clean energy and energy security. FM Moratinos conveyed Spain's full support and commitment to working as partners on a number of issues: the global financial crisis, Latin America, Middle East issues, North Africa, and Spain's 2010 EU Presidency. The FM agreed that Spain would take some Guantanamo detainees, subject to information about their legal status, that he would present the request for police trainers for Iraq to President Zapatero with a positive recommendation; and that Spain would step forward to do its share in Afghanistan when the strategy review was done. Moratinos noted that, because of strained relations over the past several years, Spain sometimes had not been able to contribute even in areas where it possessed a natural "value added." Secretary Clinton welcomed his pledge to work with the U.S.. END SUMMARY. -------------- NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) -------------- ¶5. (C) Noting the respected reputation of the Spanish police forces, especially their performance and professionalism after the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the Secretary asked if Spain would be willing to support the NATO Training Mission in Iraq by contributing Spanish police trainers. NTM-I was transitioning to concentrate on civilian support systems. The Iraqi police needed help and training to carry out their duties. Noting that Spain had continued contributing funds to Iraq through NATO and was the fourth or fifth largest donor, Moratinos explained that he would have to report this request to President Zapatero, but that his initial reaction was positive. Iraq was moving into a post-crisis situation, and it was time to "turn the page" on policy differences on Iraq. -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶6. (C) The Secretary noted that within the NATO context we were conducting a thorough policy review on Afghanistan. A successful resolution to the situtation STATE 00020757 002.3 OF 003 SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's February 24, 2009 Meeting with Spanish FM Moratin in Afghanistan was a test for NATO, not just the United States. Moratinos said Spain awaited the results of the strategy review, but reassured that Spain was "absolutely committed," even though other countries may have a larger military presence. Moratinos characterized Afghanistan as NATO's challenge: if NATO failed in Afghanistan, it would call into question the future of NATO. The FM commented that he questioned how some policies and programs had been implemented in Afghanistan, noting the deteriorating security situation was affecting the ability to conduct humanitarian and development programs. ¶7. (C) The Secretary remarked that the strategy review provided an opportunity for shared contributions. The United States was making a significant increase in the number of troops it was contributing, and we hoped we could ask our allies for more support. Moratinos gave assurances that Spain would "step forward" to contribute more, saying that if for domestic reasons Spain could not increase the number of troops deployed, the GOS would tell us directly and contribute more in another way. ¶8. (C) Secretary Clinton noted that delegations from Pakistan and Afghanistan were visiting Washington to discuss the way forward, and that the U.S. approach was to work with both countries in consultation and respectful partnerships, not to impose U.S. decisions. This kind of approach would lead to more sustainable progress. The Secretary said any views from Spain would be valued and appreciated. -------------- Guantanamo -------------- ¶9. (U) The Secretary stated that Guantanamo was a very important issue for the new U.S. Administration, and we needed help from other countries in taking detainees. She noted that she had spoken recently to EU Commissioner Javier Solana about closing Guantanamo and a solution for the detainees and that the EU was interested in working with us. She asked for Spain's help in building an EU consensus on Guantanamo detainees. The FM confirmed that he had said publicly that Spain would help. He added that Spain would need information on the legal status of Guantanamo and the individual detainees proposed for Spain to accept. -------------- Middle East -------------- ¶10. (C) The Secretary said that the United States needed help and international coordination for a durable ceasefire. She noted the need to return to emphasizing a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which would provide an impetus to restarting negotiations with the new Israeli government. Moratinos described the frustration he had heard from his contacts over making so much progress over the past year toward a final deal but missing the opportunity to close the deal. Moratinos put himself at the Secretary's "full disposal" to help on Middle East issues, but conveyed the need to move forward -- the quicker, the better. Moratinos commented on new Israeli PM Netanyahu as a hard, but good, serious negotiator. Moratinos said Hamas must be defeated, describing the past month in Gaza as a disaster, with Syria and Iran helping Hamas. The Palestinians needed the support of the international community, not just support from Hamas. ¶11. (C) Moratinos predicted that Netanyahu was likely to move quickly on Syria and would need the United States. Moratinos commented that it was a mistake to try to isolate Syria. Syria played the "spoiler;" it wants to be engaged. More than anything Syria wanted normalization of relations with the United States. But it wanted complete normalization, not just bits and pieces, and could not be coaxed along a step-by-step route. -------------- 2010 EU Presidency STATE 00020757 003.2 OF 003 ¶12. (U) Moratinos urged that Spain and the United States start preparing now for Spain's 2010 EU Presidency, and stated that the US-EU Summit offered an opportunity for President Obama to visit Spain. Recalling that during Spain's EU Presidency in 1995 the EU had adopted the first Transatlantic Agenda, Moratinos commented that the United States and the EU needed a new transatlantic relationship for the 21st century. Spain expected the Lisbon Treaty to be adopted by 2010. Spain therefore would hold the first EU Presidency under the new EU institutional arrangements. The Secretary agreed that a renewed, strong Transatlantic relationship was a priority for the USG. She commended Spain for the progress and economic growth it had achieved over the past decade, as well as the institutional reforms it had made. Because of this record and its participation in multilateral institutions, Spain could stand as an example for other countries. -------------- Kosovo -------------- ¶13. (C) The Secretary noted that policy differences on Kosovo had created some irritants in the bilateral relationship. She said that the United States understood the sensitivity of the Kosovo issue domestically in Spain, but we needed to find a way to work through our differences. She would look to Spain for ideas on Kosovo. Moratinos protested that there was a misunderstanding on Kosovo. Despite internal factors in Spain affecting its policy, he asserted, Spain had been very supportive. He argued that he had personally worked to develop a new, moderate, democratic government in Serbia, and that in the long run these efforts would help Serbia come to terms with reality. -------------- Global Financial Crisis -------------- ¶14. (U) Moratinos expressed satisfaction that Spain was now included as a member of the "enlarged G-20" and that the United States accepted it. Despite having grown from a medium-sized economy to the world's eighth largest economy, Spain was not a member of the P-5, the G-8, or the G-20 and was left out of many fora where it could and should contribute. He cited a similar example when Spain had to fight to attend the November 2007 Annapolis Conference, even with Spain's history (and FM Moratinos' long personal experience) of involvement in the Middle East peace process. Since the Washington Summit on the Global Financial Crisis, however, Spain was more integrated into the groupings where it could make a contribution. Moratinos expressed hope that Spain would have U.S. support to continue to be invited to these meetings. -------------- Clean Energy and Energy Security -------------- ¶15. (U) Secretary Clinton noted Spain's leading position in the clean energy sector, recounting a visit during the election campaign to a Spanish wind power project in Pennsylvania, and expressed U.S. desire to work with Spain and the EU on clean energy and energy security. After the disruption of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe, it was clear that diversifying energy sources was critical to ensuring energy security for Europe and that clean energy sources were a key component. CLINTON