Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE18868
2009-02-27 23:59:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

INFORMING NATO ALLIES OF POTENTIAL CHANGES TO

Tags:  AF MARR MOPS NATO PREL 
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S E C R E T STATE 018868 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2039
TAGS: AF MARR MOPS NATO PREL
SUBJECT: INFORMING NATO ALLIES OF POTENTIAL CHANGES TO
U.S. SOF POSTURE IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. A)STATE 15959

B. B)15623

Classified By: A/S DANIEL FRIED FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T STATE 018868 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2039 TAGS: AF MARR MOPS NATO PREL SUBJECT: INFORMING NATO ALLIES OF POTENTIAL CHANGES TO U.S. SOF POSTURE IN AFGHANISTAN REF: A. A)STATE 15959 ¶B. B)15623 Classified By: A/S DANIEL FRIED FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) This is an action cable, see para 4. ¶2. (S) BACKGROUND: As part of the troop increase in Afghanistan ordered by the President (REF A),the United States will also significantly increase the number of Special Operations Forces (SOF) units. The new SOF units are needed in Afghanistan to carry out four tasks: provide support for the Afghan National Army commando forces; partner with other Afghan National Army units; provide support alongside the Afghan National Army for the Afghan Public Protection Program pilot project; and partner with select Afghan National Police special response teams. Additionally, SOF are needed in Afghanistan by mid-2009 in order to have maximum effect, particularly in support of the Afghan election. ¶3. (S) BACKGROUND: Ensuring that Allies and ISAF contributors have a good understanding of the goals and purposes of this potential increase (REF B),particularly the emphasis on supporting, training and mentoring Afghan National Security forces, will be crucial to avoid misperceptions that could undermine support for our efforts in Afghanistan. In addition, in order to address any questions that NATO allies may have about SOF command relationships under the potential increase, we would like to use this opportunity to describe the new SOF command node, which is meant to improve synchronization of SOF activities in the field. ¶4. (C/REL ISAF) ACTION USNATO and USMILDEL: USNATO and USMILDEL should draw from the following points to brief Allies in the North Atlantic Council and/or bilaterally to Allied Missions as appropriate as well as seeking where necessary a suitable forum or forums that include non-NATO, ISAF Contributors: -- (U) The U.S. government recognizes that success in Afghanistan requires building host nation governance capacity, including legitimate and capable security institutions; -- (C/REL ISAF) As part of the increase of U.S. forces and capabilities in Afghanistan, we are increasing the number of Special Operations Forces throughout the summer of 2009; -- (C/REL ISAF) The primary focus of this increase is to continue developing the capacity and professionalism of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),enabling them to protect the
population and promote the legitimacy of the Afghan government; -- (C/REL ISAF) These additional U.S. SOF elements will partner with Afghan National Army (ANA) Commando kandaks, ANA kandaks, and Afghan National Police (ANP) SWAT units. We envision that U.S. SOF would live with and advise and mentor their Afghan counterparts as they accompany them on missions; -- (C/REL ISAF) Additionally, a small number of our SOF will partner with ANA to support a pilot program in Wardak Province to develop an Afghan public protection force - district-level units comprised of villagers selected and vetted by local/district Shuras, responsible for protecting local village infrastructure and denying insurgents safe haven. U.S. SOF will not/not arm these community units, but will provide logistical support, training, and mentoring to this Afghan-led community engagement program. U.S. SOF will also play a vital contributing role in providing a level of professionalism, transparency, and accountability. -- (C/REL ISAF) In light of more conventional forces in theater, GEN McKiernan has approved the stand-up of a Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) as a new SOF command element in theater, and as a higher command to CJSOTF-A. This new SOF command will contribute toward improving the synchronization of U.S. SOF efforts in Afghanistan as well as increasing coordination and interoperability with general purpose forces. The already-established SOF Intelligence Fusion Center will enable coordinating activities between NATO (ISAF) and U.S. OEF SOF. CFSOCC-A will also support CJSOTF-A in expanding SOF partnerships with ANSF. No other changes to our command and control architecture for SOF are currently planned; -- (C/REL ISAF) Along with our broader plans to increase U.S. forces and resources in Afghanistan in 2009, this increase in Special Operations Forces partnering with Afghan forces will represent a significant effort on the part of the United States. We urge all of our Allies and ISAF partners to consider ways that we might all do more in Afghanistan; -- (C/REL ISAF) As further details are developed regarding U.S. SOF deployments, Department of Defense officials will provide more information to their NATO and ISAF counterparts. -- (C/REL ISAF) (if raised) A small number of our Special Operations Forces will partner with elite ANP SWAT units. Such ANP units will remain within the Ministry of Interior chain of command and so we consider this limited partnership appropriate. We do not envision a role for SOF in training and mentoring regular ANP; -- (C/REL ISAF) (if raised) Using the term "SOF surge" to refer to these efforts is inaccurate. "Surge" does not accurately depict what we will be a sustained mission to partner with, train, and mentor ANSF until they are able to defend their own people and territory. It also does not capture our efforts to better manage SOF in theater for increased unity of effort; -- (C/REL ISAF) (if raised) While the additional U.S. SOF deploying to Afghanistan will be primarily in a training and advising role to ANSF, the types of missions they might need to undertake could vary greatly. Therefore, all U.S. SOF would remain under SOF-specific chains of command. CLINTON

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