PREVENTING IRAN'S ACQUISITION OF NAMIBIAN URANIUM

S E C R E T STATE 018236



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2029

TAGS: EMIN, ENRG, ETTC, IR, KNNP, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, AF

SUBJECT: PREVENTING IRAN'S ACQUISITION OF NAMIBIAN URANIUM



REF: A) 07 STATE 119630 B) 07 WINDHOEK 000458 C) 09

WINDHOEK 00063 D) 07 STATE 93518 E) 07

LONDON 002848 F) 09 WINDHOEK 00065



Classified By: A A/S Eliot Kang, for reasons 1.4 (b),(d),

and (e)



1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 10.



2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Iran's limited indigenous supply of uranium

makes it nearly impossible to support its current and future

nuclear reactor capabilities. As a consequence, Iran will

likely be forced to reach out to foreign suppliers of uranium

for its nuclear industry. However, the UN Security Council

decided in Resolution 1737 that states must prevent the

supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, technology,

and goods to Iran that could contribute to Iran's

enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water related

activities. This includes most forms of uranium. Iran's

continuing violation of its UNSC obligation to suspend these

activities renders it especially important that states

refrain from all uranium exports to Iran unless contained in

fuel rods and for a light-water reactor. The Namibian

Government has been previously approached regarding these

concerns (REFs A and B),and GON indicated that it would not

transfer uranium to Iran as long as the UNSC sanctions remain

in force. However, recent public remarks by Namibian Prime

Minister Angula have caused concern. Embassy Windhoek has

since approached a variety of GRN officials to ensure that

Namibia's policy has not changed; they have confirmed that

this is the case (REFs C and F). Embassies London and

Canberra are requested to approach UK and Australian

counterparts to suggest that they approach the Namibian

Government and Rio Tinto, the mining company that owns a

controlling share of the Rossing Uranium Mine in Namibia, to

press strongly for both to reject any Iranian attempt to

acquire Namibian uranium. END SUMMARY.



3. (SBU) OBJECTIVE:



-- To encourage the UK and Australian governments to remind

the Namibian government that UN Security Council resolution

1737 prohibits the sale or transfer to Iran of specified

nuclear-related items -- including uranium (unless low

enriched, contained in fuel rods, and for a light water

reactor) and take similar actions with respect to Rio Tinto.



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BACKGROUND

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4. (SBU) As a consequence of its geology, Iran's indigenous

uranium reserves are insufficient to support its current

nuclear power reactor program for a sustained period of time,

much less the additional 7-20 power reactors it publicly

proclaims an intention to build. Iran has two uranium mines,

Saghand and Gachine, but the declared combined output from

these mines will meet only about one-third of the annual fuel

reload requirements of the single reactor at Bushehr.

According to a study on Iran's plans for future nuclear power

reactors by the Department of Energy and using data provided

by Iran to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) and International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA),Iran's total uranium resources (approximately 16,050

tons including approximately 1,500 metric tons of identified

and 14,550 metric tons of undiscovered resources) represent

less than 25 percent of the 40 year life-cycle requirement of

just seven reactors. Consequently, although Iran

periodically presents optimistic plans for discovery and

exploitation of new domestic uranium resources, its stated

long-term uranium and reactor fuel requirements cannot be met

without substantial foreign imports. However, its indigenous

reserves are more than sufficient for a nuclear weapons

program.



5. (SBU) Iran could soon begin to look for outside suppliers

of uranium, either through uranium producers or countries

with uranium mines both to build up its stockpile of uranium

and to further its argument that its fuel cycle program is

dedicated entirely to civil purposes. This is despite the

fact that low enriched uranium fuel for power reactors can be

procured on the international market at a lower cost than

what Iranian indigenous production would require. Moreover,

Iran would not need to engage in such an effort if it would

accept the P5 1's generous offer of guaranteed nuclear fuel

supply to Iran, contained in both the original June 2006

incentives package and June 2008 updated version, as well as

Russia's long-term contract to provide fuel to Iran's sole

nuclear power plant under construction at Bushehr.



6. (SBU) Iran has turned to the international market in the

past, including by importing 531 tons of uranium ore

concentrate, commonly referred to as "yellowcake," in 1982.

Given the IAEA's report to the IAEA Board of Governors on 19

February 2009 that 357 tons of uranium in the form of UF6

have been produced at the Uranium Conversion Facility, it can

be deduced that well over two-thirds of this imported

material has already been processed at its Uranium Conversion

Facility in Esfahan. Unclassified calculations based on

Iran's rate of uranium conversion thus far suggest that Iran

will run out of yellowcake in early-to-mid 2009, assuming

Iran does not slow its conversion process in order to avoid

quickly depleting its stockpile. This uranium shortage

suggests further that Iran may soon feel pressed to turn to a

wide variety of possible suppliers.



7. (SBU) Under OP 3 of UNSC resolution 1737 and OP8 of UNSC

1803, states must prevent the export of nuclear-related items

described in S/2006/814, which includes most forms of

uranium. Given Iran's publicly stated intention to continue

its enrichment-related activities, we believe it is

critically important that the world's largest uranium

producers prevent all/all exports of uranium to Iran unless

contained in fuel rods and for a light-water reactor.



8. (S) A recent press article reported that Namibia's Prime

Minister Nahas Angula said that Namibia will not heed calls

by individual countries on supplying uranium to Iran. PM

Angula was quoted as saying that "unless an international

agreement, such as with the United Nations Security Council,

calls for countries not to supply to Iran, the Namibian

Government treats Iran as any other country." The government

of Iran has a 15 percent share of the Namibian firm Rossing

Uranium Limited, which, according to the press article,

supplied 7.6 percent of the world's mined uranium last year.

The Iranian government has held an ownership stake in Rossing

since the 1970s and the firm's External Affairs Manager has

publicly stated that shareholders do not have any product

take-off rights. Considering Namibia's existing commitments

and recent reassurances from the GRN (REFs C and F) it is

possible that the Prime Minister's statement was either

posturing and/or a misrepresentation of the Namibian

Government position. However, it is imperative that the GRN

has full appreciation of its UNSC obligations and does

not/not engage with Iran on a uranium transfer arrangement.

We therefore would like to encourage Australia and the UK to

weigh in separately with the GRN to ensure that this is the

case. Rio Tinto, as the dominant share-holder and operator

of the Rossing Uranium Mine would also be a useful

interlocutor. Given past exchanges Australia and the UK have

had with the company, it would also be useful for them to

raise with their POCs at the firm to solicit their views and

press its leadership to re-commit to its previous pledge to

not permit uranium deals with Iran from Rossing or any other

uranium concerns under its management.



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NONPAPER

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9. (SBU) BEGIN NONPAPER:



-- We are concerned about the article written by Nangula

Shejavali in the Namibia press (3 February 2009) indicating

that the GRN would allow Iran to procure uranium from its

mines.



-- Iran could soon begin, or may have begun, to look for

outside suppliers of uranium to build up its stockpile of

uranium and to further its argument that its fuel cycle

program is dedicated entirely to civil purposes.



-- As a consequence of its geology, Iran's reported

indigenous uranium reserves are insufficient to support its

current nuclear power reactor program for a sustained period

of time, much less the additional 7-20 power reactors it

publicly proclaims an intention to build.



-- The IAEA's report of 19 February 2009 indicates that well

over two-thirds of Iran's available uranium yellowcake has

been processed at its Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan.

Calculations based on Iran's rate of uranium conversion thus

far suggest that Iran will run out of yellowcake in

early-to-mid 2009, assuming Iran does not slow the current

pace of its conversion process.



-- Under OP 3 of UNSC resolution 1737 states must prevent the

supply, sale, or transfer of specified items, materials,

equipment, goods, and technology, which could contribute to

Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy-water

related activities, as described in S/2006/814, including

most forms of uranium.



-- Specifically, the transfer of natural uranium, in any

form, is explicitly prohibited by the UNSC. This includes

the transfer of uranium ore or its various processed forms.



-- Transfer of low enriched uranium, contained in fuel rods,

and for a light water reactor is permitted, but requires

notification to the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee.



-- Iran would not need to engage in such an effort if it

would accept the P5 1's generous offer of guaranteed nuclear

fuel supply to Iran, contained in both the original June 2006

incentives package and June 2008 updated version, as well as

Russia's long-term contract to provide fuel to Iran's sole

nuclear power plant under construction at Bushehr.



-- Moreover, low enriched uranium fuel for power reactors can

be securely procured on the international market at lower

cost than Iranian indigenous production.



-- Extreme vigilance in dealing with Iran and its nuclear

program is necessary given the requirements of the UN

Security Council and the significant threat Iran,s nuclear

program poses to international peace and security.



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END NONPAPER

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10. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to inform

host government officials of U.S. concerns regarding the

possibility of an Iranian attempt to acquire uranium from

Namibia. Posts should note that GRN officials have generally

allayed our immediate concerns but in light of our previous

cooperation on this issue, additional discussion from their

resident officials in Namibia on the basis of the press

reports would be useful. Posts should encourage host

governments to approach Namibia directly and express similar

concerns. Posts may provide host governments with a copy of

the non-paper contained in paragraph 9. Posts should also

encourage host governments to engage again with local

representatives of Rio Tinto to ensure any transfer request

is denied (previous discussions are described in REFs D and

E).



11. (U) Post is requested to report any substantive

responses by 4 March 2009. Judee Allen-Close (ISN/RA,

202-736-4686, CloseJA@state.sgov.gov) and Breck Heidlberg

(ISN/RA, 202-647-6599, HeidlbergBD@state.sgov.gov) are the

Department's POCs for this activity.

CLINTON